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The following study is a close scrutiny of Lin Biao. This study will focus on Lin 
Biao’s private life during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). This study argues that Lin 
suffered from two distinct personality disorders: schizoid personality disorder and social 
anxiety disorder. After assessing the private behavior of Lin Biao and how the two 
disorders disabled Lin, this study will then move to illustrate the consequential enabling 
affect the two disorders had on Lin Biao’s wife, Ye Qun. Thereafter, this study will 
reexamine several key cases that occurred immediately prior to and during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1969) where Lin Biao is typically portrayed as being deeply involved. 
The conclusions are that Lin suffered from two distinct disorders, the disorders had an 
enabling affect on Ye Qun, and that Lin is a tragic figure, as he was placed in a political 
position that he could not appropriately administer under Chairman Mao.     
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Of all the events that took place during the Cultural Revolution in China, the 
infamous Lin Biao incident, which took place on the evening of September 12 into the 
early morning hours of September 13, 1971, remains the most mysterious and perhaps 
least understood. In the course of simply a few hours Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, and son 
Lin Liguo, accompanied by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) best pilot Pan Jingyin, 
allegedly attempted to flee China in a British Trident aircraft bound for the Soviet Union 
after a failed attempt to assassinate Mao Zedong. Mysteriously, the Trident crashes over 
the People’s Republic of Mongolia, incinerating everyone on board and ending the life of 
Chairman Mao’s second chosen successor.  
 More than three decades later, the Lin Biao incident remains a puzzle, a riddle 
that has seen many attempts of interpretation in order to set the historical record straight. 
Some explanations appear more plausible than others. The official version pieced 
together by Chinese officials shortly following the event construct a historical tale based 
on “top secret” documents extolling serious charges against Lin Biao; the conclusions 
reached are that 1) Lin Biao had conspired to assassinate Mao Zedong; 2) that Lin Biao 
had planned to take over the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
country by means of a military coup with the close collaboration of his fellow military 
comrades; 3) after these conspiracies were exposed and the military coup failed Lin 
attempted to defect to the Soviet Union. The Party officially declares that:  
After the Lin Biao anti-Party clique failed in their plot to launch a 
counterrevolutionary coup d’ etat, Lin Biao, accompanied by Ye Qun, 
Lin Liguo, and several other diehards commandeered a plane to defect 
to the Soviet revisionists in betrayal of their Party and country. The 
plane carrying them crashed in the vicinity of Undur Khan in 
Mongolia. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and the others aboard were killed though 
as renegades and traitors they deserved a penalty worse than 
death….As early as before the Ninth Congress was held Lin Biao 
assembled his men for selfish purposes and together with his wife Ye 
Qun, colluded with Chen Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li 
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Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and others to form a bourgeois headquarters 




Bringing the Inside Out 
 As fascinating as it may be, this study does not aim to reinterpret the Lin Biao 
incident and the events of the evening of September 12, 1971. There is not only a lack of 
evidence but the event is so politically sensitive that reinvestigating it remains nearly 
impossible.   
Thus, instead of tackling the mysterious murder of Lin Biao head-on by proposing 
a new conspiracy theory, this study targets a different area of Lin Biao history. This study 
will focus on Lin Biao during the years of the Cultural Revolution when Lin was at the 
apex of the CCP and at the height of his political career. This period is characterized as 
China’s most turbulent years in modern history. It was during these few years that Mao 
aimed to destroy the foundations of the Party, completely eliminating any potential 
capitalists that might possibly exist who had intentions of leading China down a 
bourgeois Soviet Khrushchev type of revisionism. It was during this period that private 
and personal hatreds and animosities were used against fellow Party members for quick 
power grabs too.  
 The first three years of the Cultural Revolution is the primary time period of Lin 
Biao’s life under investigation for one main reason. Aside from the Western and Chinese 
assumptions based on Lin’s supposed coup attempt and subsequent escape to the Soviet 
Union, the majority of Western and Chinese sources have assumed Lin Biao as being a 
cruel and evil Party member who exercised maximum prejudice when eliminating 
                                                 
1
 “Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhi” (Circular of the CCP Central Committee). “Guanyu Lin Biao fandang 
zhituan fangeming zuixing di shencha baogao.” (Report on the Investigation of the Counterrevolutionary 
Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique). Zhongfa no. 34 (1973), September 8, 1973. 
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potential rivals for Party power. During these turbulent years Lin’s power allegedly 
accumulated, setting alarm bells off inside Mao’s head leading to his infamous southern 
tour where he attacked Lin.  
Indeed, there is some validity that Lin’s extension of power burgeoned during the 
Cultural Revolutionary period. At the time Lin was the only Vice Chairman of the Party. 
Lin also held pervasive influence throughout the Military Commission, the key decision 
making body of the PLA. This administrative group was composed of ten members. Lin’s 
key deputies in the group were Chief of the General Staffs Department Huang 
Yongsheng and PLAAF Commander Wu Faxian. Key members included Lin’s wife Ye 
Qun, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Political Commissar, Li Zuopeng, and 
General Logistics Department General, Qiu Huizuo. The ten marshals that originally 
made up the group upon its creation in 1955 were no longer existent on the board. Peng 
Dehuai was removed in 1959 following his downfall at Lushan, He Long became a 
victim of the Cultural Revolution, Zhu De was removed upon the MC’s reorganization in 
1969. Liu Bocheng retained his position but was blind and politically inactive during the 
Cultural Revolution. The remaining members, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nie 
Rongzhen, and Chen Yi, all came under intense political fire during the period in 
question, thus deeply affecting their abilities to administer the MC and challenge any 
major decisions by Lin Biao.  
Moreover, Lin’s military control extended into the realm of Party itself. The PLA, 
by 1969, had more than doubled its representation within the Central Committee, 
growing from a minimal nineteen percent to an impressive forty-five percent. Ye Qun, 
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and Lin’s four trusted generals-Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu-were all members of the 
Politburo as well.  
Historical interpretations of Lin during the Cultural Revolution period typically 
follow the above interpretation. Little or no difference is seen in both Chinese and 
Western sources. Conclusions about Lin’s behavior have been based largely on the 
conclusions of the CCP’s interpretation and record of what occurred.    
In sum, traditional Party history and nearly all Western interpretations of this 
period illuminate Lin as:
2
  
• A vicious, odious historical figure who possessed personal interests and 
ambitions to gain and consolidate his control of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), and then to attain the position of successor to Mao. 
• During the active phase of the Cultural Revolution, Lin was a forceful 
proponent of the movement, even to the extent of advocating or at least 
sanctioning measures which disrupted the economy of the country and the 
PLA. 
• Lin was power hungry and in his hunt he intentionally aggrandized the 
persona of Chairman Mao in public in order to take a political shortcut 
and ascend to the highest levels of the Party in the quickest amount of 
time.   
• Lin was a fervent revolutionary with dreams and aspirations of worldwide 
peasant uprisings in Latin America and Africa, which would eventually 
                                                 
2
 The following points have been partially drawn from Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of 
Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) 
pp. 6-7. 
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lead to the downfall of U.S. capitalism and the beginning of a worldwide 
socialist revolution. 
• Lin was a great risk taker and fearless military romantic who planned to 
initiate a war with the Soviet Union for his own unique political ends 
against the Party and Chairman Mao.  
A critical review of the evidence presented throughout this study reveals a very 
different Lin Biao. After examining existing evidence, discussed at greater depth below, 
the following points are omnipresent in Lin Biao and are consistent themes throughout 
this study:  
• Lin Biao possessed personality blots that affected his overall behavior and 
interactions with other Party members and his personal secretaries. Health 
problems heavily affected Lin’s abilities to interact and carry out the daily 
duties within the position he held and also effectively function as a father 
and husband.  
• Lin Biao was a weak, feeble Party figure. His health was unstable and 
erratic consequently affecting his ability to manage the inner political 
atmosphere of his home and family. 
• Lin Biao showed very little interest at all in Party politics and, even more 
specifically, the politics of the Cultural Revolution. Lin did do his best 
though to follow the zigs and zags of Mao’s political behavior fulfilling 
Mao’s expectations. In addition, Lin’s political behavior appears to be 
more reactive rather than proactive.  
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• Lin Biao did express emotion toward fellow Party members and utilized 
the Cultural Revolution to settle some personal disputes. But overall Lin 
did not take advantage of the turbulent Cultural Revolution to actively 
purge and remove Party members; instead he sought to limit chaos in both 
the military and the economy.  
Challenging orthodox Party beliefs and Western assumptions of Lin during this 
period, the three primary questions to answer in this study are:  
• What were the true political motivations and plans, if any, of Lin Biao 
during the Cultural Revolution? Did Lin truly have an intense desire to 
strengthen his own stature within the PLA and favor his military rule over 
the country effectively dismissing the Chairman’s wishes for civilian 
control or were Lin’s suggested ambitions actually the motivations and 
manipulation of Ye Qun?  
• What were the psychological and health deficiencies that Lin Biao 
possessed and how did these personality idiosyncrasies affect his private 
and public behavior? How did these personality and health inadequacies 
affect his ability to effectively manage his high-ranking position and his 
familial position as father and husband?  
• To what extent is Lin Biao’s wife, Ye Qun, involved in the Cultural 
Revolution drama due to Lin’s two personality disorders and how did she 
manage in Lin’s aloof absence from daily life as the pragmatic manager 
for the Lin Biao family in both the political and private familial realm?    
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These three points are deeply intertwined. By examining these three issues, a 
vastly different Lin Biao will appear, a man that hardly fits the description seen in 
political Party history and traditional Western interpretations—as a political sniper of 
sorts for Mao. Instead, a rather shy, introverted, and passive Lin Biao, one who rarely 
shows any interest in either politics or close personal relationships with a large number of 
people. Lin’s placement in a grand position of authority and decision-making during the 
Cultural Revolution and his concomitant social and personality problems led to his 
consequent reliance on Ye Qun. The enabling affect that Lin’s reliance had on Ye Qun 
was monstrous. While Ye Qun respected the authority of Lin and had a limited 
knowledge of sensitive top-level political matters, Ye still carried out periodic political 
escapades for Jiang Qing and orchestrated and managed political melodrama. 
Exacerbating the situation even further for Lin is that since he was so aloof, introverted, 
and passive, much of Ye Qun’s political missions were carried out underneath Lin’s nose 
without him either realizing her role in such affairs or with him simply not taking a firm 
position of opposition or favoritism for her behavior due to his disinterest in political 
affairs. 
Thus, this study is a revisionist history; it is targeted at reexamining the character 
of Lin Biao, opening the screen of secrecy that surrounds Lin and reinterpreting both 
Western and Chinese accounts of his political and personal behavior. This reexamination 
will consequently effect traditionally held beliefs concerning Lin’s assumed radical 
behavior. This study is also what should be labeled an indirect history, that is, it 
addresses another historical question while not directly focusing on that question. Within 
the context of this study, deconstructing Lin’s personal habits, personality, health, and 
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political attitude during the most tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution will also 
offer insight into whether or not Lin could have possibly been a wicked planner to 
execute Chairman Mao in 1971, as stated in traditional Party sources.  
Since this study is complex, with themes and sub-themes constantly interwoven 
throughout the text, a brief blueprint detailing the layout of this study is in order. The 
following chapter explicitly deals with the private Lin Biao and the personality that he 
displays in the source material that is available. The following chapter basis its evidence 
on the private conversations and experiences he had with secretaries and family. By 
thoroughly discussing the behavior of Lin Biao within the private sphere, a different Lin 
Biao will appear. The chapter will also illustrate the social inhibitions and personality 
deficiencies that Lin coped with on a daily basis. To further highlight both the inabilities 
of Lin Biao and the oddities of his behavior, chapter two will also offer a private view of 
Lin’s energetic wife, Ye Qun, based on the personal observations of the Lin Biao staff. 
Ye’s behavior heavily contrasts that of Lin, in both her daily routine and her social 
behavior toward other individuals. Outgoing and loquacious, Ye Qun was  the ideal 
candidate to act on Lin’s behalf in administering, offering guidance, and performing the 
daily chores required politically and in managing the family. Overall, the analysis in 
chapter two will provide us with the striking personality differences between Lin Biao 
and Ye Qun. Examples will also be offered of how Lin’s aloof and weak personality 
played a subservient role to Ye’s more demonstrative personality and political opinions 
and ambitions. Chapter three will move partially away from the private sphere and into 
the public arena. Chapter three will offer a series of re-examinations of often cited cases 
where Lin is labeled as culpable. While re-examining these cases, additional information 
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from Lin Biao and Ye Qun’s private life will be utilized. Consequently, Lin Biao’s social 
inhibitions caused by his personality disorders will become apparent as the debilitating 
affect on his capability to effectively make key decisions on policy are clear. 
Furthermore, the consequential enabling affect that Lin’s personality had on Ye’s own 
political ambitions; much of which bolstered the revolutionary excesses that occurred 
during the Cultural Revolution as well as the political targeting of certain prominent 
Party members that have typically been attributed to Lin Biao. A brief conclusion will 






















Chapter 2: Lin Biao the Man 
Adrian T. Luna 
 
“In that one moment, my view of Lin Biao changed—from bold and brilliant military 
commander to troubled soul unfit to lead.”  
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Understanding the depths and complexities of the human mind and the reasons 
why individuals act in certain ways is a puzzling and challenging task. Human beings are 
certainly complex as we are composed of emotions, bodily chemicals, and external 
stimuli that all have effects on the behaviors and compositions of personalities. This is 
certainly highlighted as humans try to understand themselves everyday—a constant 
process of self-reflection and examination that can take years before any significant 
amount of enlightenment and understanding might be achieved. For this particular study 
of Lin Biao, this examination is even more difficult as the ability to speak to the specific 
targeted subject is devoid. Comprehending Lin then, must come from those who shared 
close, intimate connections with him and are willing to tell their tale.  
 While a definitive, precise diagnosis cannot be made of Lin Biao’s personality, 
the existing evidence that is available portrays Lin Biao as possessing two distinct 
disorders: schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder.
3
 Schizoid personality 
disorder is described by the DSM-IV as “a pervasive pattern of detachment from social 
relationships and a restricted range of expression of emotions in interpersonal 
setting…and are present in a variety of contexts.”
4
 Individuals with schizoid personality 
disorder tend to lack any actual desire for intimacy and seem indifferent to opportunities 
to develop close relationships. As the DSM-IV also states, “They prefer spending time by 
themselves, rather than being with other people. They often appear to be socially isolated 
or ‘loners’ and almost always choose solitary activities or hobbies that do not include 
                                                 
3
 This study will not stray into a vague argument by labeling Lin’s personality problem as mere health or 
mental problems. The two personality disorders described below will be consistently mentioned throughout 
this study as Lin Biao, based on existing evidence, displayed symptoms of the two disorders.   
4
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington 
DC, 1994) p. 638. 
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interactions with others.”
5
 Schizoid personalities typically have a bland “exterior without 
visible emotional reactivity and rarely reciprocates gestures or facial expressions, such as 
smiles or nods….They often display a constricted affect and appear cold and aloof.”
6
  
 According to the DSM-IV, four of the following seven criteria must be met by a 
patient in order for a diagnosis. They are:  
• Neither desires nor enjoys close relationships, including being part of a 
family 
• Almost always chooses solitary activities 
• Has little, if any, interest in having sexual experiences with another person 
• Takes pleasure in few, if any, activities 
• Lacks close friends or confidants other than first-degree relatives  
• Appears indifferent to the praise or criticism of others 
• Show emotional coldness, detachment, or flattened affectivity7 
It should be added here that the labeling of schizoid personality disorder is itself a 
controversial topic. Some psychologists argue that schizoid personalities are not a 
disorder but simply a personality type. The core of their argument is that psychologists 
should not name a personality a disorder if it is simply unorthodox and unlike other 
personalities seen in society. These psychologists prefer to label the schizoid personality 
as “schizoid personality type.” Aside from differences over the title of schizoid 
personality, there exists no other differences i.e., criteria and symptoms, that are 
controversial. For purposes of clarity, this study will continue to call it schizoid 
personality disorder. Closely related to schizoid personality disorder are schizotypal 






 Ibid p. 641. 
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personality disorder, paranoid personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder. 
These three disorders are often confused for schizoid personality disorder, but according 
to the DSM-IV can be easily distinguished. Individuals who suffer from schizotypal 
personality disorder often suffer from delusional episodes where the individual is 
intensely superstitious toward others. Individuals may also believe they have special 
powers, to sense events before they happen, or believe they have the ability to read other 
people’s thoughts.
8
 The distinguishing component of paranoid personality disorder is that 
patients are filled with suspiciousness and paranoid ideation.
9
 Like schizoid personality 
disorder, avoidant personality disorder sufferers are inclined to remain aloof and away 
from social interaction. The two disorders are similar, but avoidant personality disorder 
differs since the individual favors solitude for an underlying psychological fear of 
rejection or embarrassment. Avoidant personality types typically feel inadequate, have 
low feelings of self worth, and are overly preoccupied and concerned that others may be 
critical or reject them. Unlike this disorder however, Lin was not dominated by a 
psychological trepidation of rejection. Rather, Lin possessed a more pervasive 
detachment and overall limited desire for social intimacy. It should also be briefly 
touched on that schizoid personalities are not necessarily always detached or aloof. 
Depending on the severity of the disorder, the individual may be more constrained and 
more reserved than others. The personality may be open to some people in their life, such 
as intimate family members or close friends. Furthermore, the DSM-IV observes that 
under some circumstances, the individual may be temporarily comfortable in revealing 
themselves; the individual may acknowledge having painful feelings, particularly related 
                                                 
8
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), p. 641. 
9
 Ibid p. 640. 
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to social interactions.
10
 As discussed in the following chapter, Lin did express emotion at 
varying moments in reaction to both current Party policies during the Cultural Revolution 
and during brief encounters with fellow Party members. Lin also expressed his disgust to 
his staff about being required to meet people and being placed in social situations. But the 
majority of the evidence we have contradicts these instances, showing an emotionally 
detached Lin Biao. This is not a dismissal of evidence which showed an emotional Lin 
Biao, but merely a factual point that must be considered. Lin Biao did indeed, at times, 
show some type of emotion, which, as mentioned above, is not absolutely 
uncharacteristic trait of schizoid personalities. Moreover, instances when Lin showed 
emotion were often reactionary from the input, influences, or suggestions from others.   
The second disorder revealed in this chapter and pertinent to this analysis is social 
anxiety disorder. Sometimes labeled social phobia, social anxiety disorder is among the 
most common of all psychiatric disorders. Social anxiety disorder is defined by the DSM-
IV as “an excessive, irrational fear of social or performance situations due to an 
expectation that others will scrutinize the person’s actions. Individuals with social anxiety 
disorder experience anticipatory anxiety prior to a feared event and, if the situation is 
endured, suffer intense and distressing symptoms of anxiety during exposure.”
11
 The 
primary characteristic of social anxiety disorder is that the individual experiences a 
dramatic fear of exposure to a particular situation, often leading to marked, acute anxiety 
symptoms, including blushing, tremor, sweating, muscle tension, palpitations and 
                                                 
10
 Ibid p. 638. 
11
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
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gastrointestinal discomfort.
12
 In addition, those who have social anxiety disorder have 
difficulty interacting sexually and overall have a substantial impairment in the quality of 
life and emotional functioning. 
Alarmingly similar to social anxiety disorder is the already discussed avoidant 
personality disorder. Avoidant personality disorder is the most common comorbid 
personality disorder, as it has been identified along with social anxiety disorder in 
individuals in some studies.
13
 Both social anxiety disorder and avoidant personality 
disorder are chronic illnesses that are not easily distinguishable. Both have very similar 
symptoms including social discomfort, fear of negative evaluation, and extensive 
interpersonal avoidance.
14
 The distinguishing feature between the two however is that 
avoidant personality disorder is not characterized by panic or anxiety attacks. Also, 
individuals with avoidant personality disorder have an underlying desire for social 
interaction, as long as there is no risk of rejection; whereas those who have social anxiety 
disorder have no interest in having social interaction whatsoever. Some confuse social 
anxiety disorder with mere shyness, thus leading the individual to live his daily life trying 
to cope with what had been deemed as ‘shyness’ but in actuality is living with a very real 
and common psychiatric disorder. But shyness does not lead to acute anxiety attacks for 
the sufferer when in social interactions.  
What should now be discussed and contemplated are the potentially jarring affects 
that such a type of disorder can have on an individual. For this analysis, the affects are 
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even more important to examine as Lin Biao was not a normal person in a basic position 
in society. Lin was not a farmer, shopkeeper, craftsman, or peasant. Lin was a statesman 
in a very important and politically sensitive position. Lin held a position as Mao’s so-
called “closest comrade in arms”. As Mao’s close sycophant, Lin was expected to loyally 
follow the Chairman’s every wish; from making public appearances to making politically 
sensitive decisions over ideology and Party members, Lin had to constantly gauge and 
predict the wishes of an ambiguous and always changing leader who also struggled with 
his own personality and psychological challenges.
15
 Such a position entailed in-depth and 
critical scrutiny of an ever-changing Cultural Revolution political landscape. When 
considering these facets of the context of which Lin Biao existed, his personality 
deficiencies create a potentially disastrous situation that Lin was forced to live within. 
Lin’s social anxiety disorder and schizoid personality disorder greatly affect his ability to 
effectively function in such a position. First, the ambivalence that surrounds schizoid 
personalities affected Lin’s ability to make solid and firm decisions, a must in the 
Cultural Revolution battlefield. The net effect was that Lin could be easily convinced to 
make decisions suiting another’s own political priorities despite the geopolitical realities. 
Of course much of Lin’s opinion was swayed in favor of Ye Qun who always attempted 
to look out for her family’s best interest, but Ye also held political ambitions that took 
precedence over a more careful, cautious, and rationale approach to politics. Second, 
Lin’s aloof and introverted characteristics that match that of a schizoid personality 
allowed Ye Qun to often act covertly and carry out political schemes without Lin’s 
knowledge. Certainly, Ye’s secretive behavior suggests that she felt concerned over the 
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potential ramifications of how Lin Biao may react, which contradicts my description of 
an introverted and ambivalent Lin Biao. However, Ye was dependent on Lin Biao for her 
political survival, and to act carelessly and risk rejection by Lin Biao would be political 
jeopardy. Lin’s passive and constant absence from the ongoing melodrama of Maojiawan 
though enabled Ye Qun to act. Even more importantly, Lin’s passive and carefree attitude 
associated with schizoid personalities permitted Ye to not inform Lin at all since an 
assumption could be easily made by Ye that Lin Biao would most likely not care about 
the matter anyway or that he simply did not wish to have a social interaction to learn of 
the political details of the ongoing Cultural Revoluion. Exacerbating Lin’s capability of 
obtaining the appropriate information required during such a politically turbulent and 
sensitive time period was caused by Lin’s social anxiety disorder. Lin struggled daily to 
meet and have pleasurable social interactions with people who could be considered 
trustful and respectful. Lin’s secretaries and staff members were confined to brief 
meetings with Lin Biao on a daily basis. This greatly contrasts with the more politically 
active Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai who would often spend countless hours working into 
the late nights and early morning hours. Although Lin’s briefings, as discussed further 
below, contained news about new developments in the Cultural Revolution, Lin’s 
struggle to meet socially for long periods of time with his secretaries led to an inefficient 
and less enlightened political acumen than Mao or Zhou. In terms of attending social 
functions, on the surface Lin Biao appeared to have no problems. He is widely 
remembered as the classic military man; brandishing the Little Red Book next to Mao on 
the rostrum at Tiananmen. But Lin suffered heavily in this role too. Lin loathed attending 
public functions, a definite requirement of a man with such a high-ranking position. This 
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disgust was not hidden from the Chairman’s knowledge and such knowledge 
undoubtedly led to Mao’s questioning of Lin Biao in the role of Vice Chairman. And 
what might be argued as Lin’s greatest downfall is Lin’s constant struggles could have 
led to Mao’s own suspicions of what Lin Biao’s true intentions were. Mao, as a masterful 
strategist on the political battlefield, likely could have read Lin’s introverted, aloof, and 
detached personality as passive-aggressive, thus shifting Mao’s mistrustful mind into 
overdrive leading him to doubt Lin’s loyalty. This chapter will now move to probing the 
inner halls of Maojiawan, closely scrutinizing the available evidence and offering 
examples that corroborate my argument that Lin Biao did indeed suffer from two 
personality disorders that affected his capacity to perform to the level of political 
position.    
Understanding Lin Biao: The Man 
The darkness, enigma, and secrecy that shrouds the private life of Lin Biao is 
exposed through the memoirs and recollections of Lin’s Secretary, Zhang Yunsheng, who 
served for Lin from August 1966 to late 1970, and Ye Qun’s personal assistant Guan 
Weixun. Emerging from the vivid memories of these individuals are intimate experiences 
that reveals the fallacies, bizarre rituals, personality blots, backbiting, and unstable nature 
of Lin Biao and his family. Lin is revealed as a private, quiet, and introverted man; a man 
who remained aloof from others and showed little actual interest in domestic or foreign 
policy decision-making. This passive persona can be seen as a political tactic for survival 
during the Cultural Revolution. But, as seen below, Lin’s behavior in private was 
peculiar, and meets the criteria for schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety 
disorder.  
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   Lin’s solitude and preference for limited human interaction forces us to consider 
the behavioral observations of the other members of Lin’s family as well. In particular, 
Lin’s wife, Ye Qun, played a prominent role as the leading secretary of Lin’s personal 
office. She was also appointed as general secretary, with Mao’s approval, of the Military 
Affairs Council (MAC), one of the top-level decision-making bodies of the military, in 
1960. Ye’s primary role as head secretary can be seen as managing the day-to-day affairs 
of the Maojiawan household. As head secretary and Lin’s major advisor, Ye was in 
charge of monitoring current issues and reminding him of what should or should not be 
said on different occasions. Ye Qun was responsible for a variety of tasks, both major and 
seemingly minuscule, such as instructing Lin’s secretary Li Wenpu to insure that Lin 
would always carry the “little red book” in his hand at all public appearances. 
Guaranteeing that Lin’s secretaries and assistants could perfectly time the arrival of Lin 
Biao during public appearances with the Chairman, such as standing atop the rostrum at 
Tiananmen together to receive millions of fervent Red Guards, also fell into Ye Qun’s list 
of to-dos as Lin’s political coordinator. For public appearances, Lin could not arrive 
before the Chairman since it would upstage him, nor could Lin arrive long after him since 
this would force the Chairman to wait alone, an overt sign of disrespect. Since Mao lived 
in Zhongnanhai and Lin resided within Maojiawan, Mao’s geographical distance to 
Tiananmen was closer than Lin. Under Ye Qun’s direction, Lin’s personal assistants 
would allow Lin to depart two minutes following the news of Mao’s departure from 
Zhongnanhai to Tiananmen. Lin’s secretaries would also remind him not to stand too 
close to the Chairman but also not too far away. Standing too close might be perceived as 
an attempt to block Mao or his view, while standing afar could potentially be 
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apprehended as ignoring the Great Helmsman. Being more than less cautious, Lin was 
always reminded to keep an appropriate distance, finding the perfect balance between 
smothering Mao’s personal space and disassociation.
16
 That Lin trusted Ye to coordinate 
such activities certainly illuminates how powerful she was as a political conductor and 
the level of trust that Lin had for his wife. Ye’s position also highlights the seemingly 
babying nature and constant guidance Lin constantly needed.   
Ye’s respected, influential position is highlighted by the memoirs of Lin’s 
secretaries. In fact, the memoir of Zhang Yunsheng could also be labeled as “A Memoir 
of Ye Qun’s Secretary,” as a great deal of the study is filled with Ye Qun’s mischievous 
double-dealing and everyday interests. The daily interactions that Ye Qun had with Lin’s 
secretaries compels us to also examine her behavior and actions within the Lin Biao 
household. Ye was headstrong and virulent, striking fear into the hearts of her assistants 
and Lin’s secretaries. She also would take regular covert trips to Diaoyutai to associate 
with Jiang Qing (who she looked up to as a model), Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda; these 
field trips were often completely contrary to Lin’s wishes. Ye’s position influenced the 
transmission of information and decisions to the aloof Lin Biao too. Even the most 
sensitive family drama was kept from Lin Biao by Ye Qun, such as the two attempts at 
suicide by their daughter, Lin Doudou. Indeed, Ye acted as a filtration system, carefully 
assessing what information and news should be passed along, or deciding what new 
political revelations needed to reach Lin Biao. Sifting through documents and deciding 
which ones should be passed on to a superior is indeed the duty of a secretary, however, 
Ye’s sneaking around without Lin’s knowledge leads to the conclusion that Ye possessed 
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ulterior motives contrary to the desires of Lin or simply unknown to him due to his 
reclusive and solitary confinement.  
 The politically prominent position that Ye held is further impacted through Lin’s 
acute dependency on Ye Qun. Aside from the brief thirty minute daily meetings Lin held 
with Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, Lin would deny others from seeing him. Ye though was 
one of the few individuals who had easy access to Lin and, as Lin’s wife, one of the few 
individuals Lin genuinely trusted. Lin would often ask Ye Qun to attend political 
meetings in place of him. His dependency on Ye Qun extended into even the most 
peculiar realms.  In one interesting and rather bizarre incident when Lin Biao and Ye Qun 
were residing at their seaside resort at Beidaihe, one of Lin’s secretaries came barging 
into Ye’s resting room where she was having her hair brushed by one of her personal 
assistants. In a panic, Lin’s secretary asked quickly whether or not Lin should spit out the 
phlegm he had coughed up. Ye, frustrated with being disturbed, vehemently replied “spit 
it out!”
17
 This incident, while bizarre, is particularly enlightening. What is crucial is that 
Lin Biao could not make a decision in this instance and shows a sense of neediness and 
dependency on Ye Qun. A key characteristic of schizoid personality is that the individual 
is care-free and often devoid in decision-making. Lin’s secretary needed to gain some 
sort of approval from Ye before Lin would spit out the phlegm he had coughed up. This 
is a rather shocking and profound example, but one that illuminates Lin’s ambivalence 
and what appears to be insecurity. Lin could not make a decision that any normal 
thinking rational person could perform on his or her own. As seen further below, this 
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ambivalence was constantly present and allowed Ye to make certain decisions and push 
Lin Biao in certain political directions.      
 Lin and Ye’s son, Lin Liguo, also had a prominent role within the family. He 
received special treatment for his family connections. Lin Liguo, for instance, served as 
deputy head of the combat department of the PLAAF and held a concurrent position as 
PLAAF office committee assistant director. For a twenty four year old, with only two 
years of enlisted experience, this is an extraordinary powerful position. Official Party 
histories state that Lin Biao directed PLAAF commander Wu Faxian for Lin Liguo’s 
promotion. Lin’s secretary Zhang Yunsheng reports, though, that Lin Biao did not know 
of his son’s promotion, and Zhang was specifically ordered by Ye Qun not to tell him; 
“You [Zhang Yunsheng] should not say anything about the matter of promotion; the 
shouzhang [Lin Biao] will not agree.”
18
 This example and others, including Lin Biao’s 
disinterest in his son’s selection of a wife, are more evidence that bolsters the argument 
that the private Lin Biao was aloof, and is a display of Lin’s impaired social skills—
characteristics of schizoid personality disorder.  
 If the private Lin Biao was effete, the public figure is remembered as a fiery and 
robust military strategist whose mastery for combat is paralleled by his wicked political 
maneuvering. As Ebon notes, “He [Lin Biao] is its [the CCP] most successful army 
commander….He is a strong man in his own right. Within his slight frame exists a steely 
determination….To Lin Biao, life is warfare.”
19
 A sycophant of Mao, Lin Biao’s 
adulation for the Chairman was officially recognized in a special paragraph of the new 
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Party Constitution which lauds him for “consistently holding high the great red banner of 
Mao Zedong thought and has most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended Mao 
Zedong’s proletarian revolutionary line.”
20
 Such recognition was so grand that it solved 
Mao’s question of succession. In contrast, below this study will offer alternative views of 
both Lin Biao and Ye Qun. As Nie Rongzhen has noted, “Lin was a fatuous and self-
indulgent ruler (hunjun) Ye Qun was the real master of his affairs.”
21
 This analysis of 
Lin’s private life and the behavior of his family members bolster Nie’s statement made in 
1980.  
Physical Health and Personality Complications 
 Any discussion of the private life should begin with an understanding of his or her 
home. Lin Biao’s residential compound, known as Maojiawan, is a private remote setting 
where we will stage our analysis and reveal Lin’s personal lifestyle. Unlike Mao Zedong, 
Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Zhu’s gun toting wife Kang Keqing who all lived within the 
Zhongnanhai compound and were only a brief three minute stroll away from each other, 
Lin Biao, preferred isolation and chose a completely separate residential compound.
22
  
 The atmosphere surrounding Maojiawan contrasted with the hustle and bustle of 
Zhongnanhai as well. Guan Weixun, Ye Qun’s personal assistant and secretary, remarked 
that Maojiawan’s courtyard and compound was silent, similar to an intensive care unit at 
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a hospital. Guan even questioned if Lin actually worked at Maojiawan, commenting that 
the empty atmosphere of the area forced one to think if Lin actually lived in Zhongnanhai 
and not Maojiawan.
23
 Unlike the endless hours of work that were exhibited at 
Zhongnanhai throughout the late night hours, Maojiawan had very few lights illuminating 
the residence. Guan Weixun notes “How does Vice Chairman Lin command?”
24
 In one 
interesting incident Guan Weixun, shortly following his arrival at Maojiawan, entered a 
restroom that was designated for use by staff members. The restroom was dirty and only 
had a single squat pot installed for dozens of secretaries and staff members to use. Guan 
noted that while in the restroom he saw a stash of newspapers, some of them torn and 
ripped, laid on the bathroom floor. The papers were filled with photographs of Chairman 
Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.
25
 What is particularly striking in this case is that somebody, 
whether be a staff member or secretary, behaved in a blasphemous fashion completely 
disrespecting both the Chairman and Vice Chairman. If witnessed by anyone outside of 
Maojiawan, the consequences would be devastating, most likely leading to accusations of 
counter-revolutionary behavior and of opposing Mao Zedong and Vice Chairman Lin 
Biao in the paranoia that had engulfed China during the Cultural Revolution. Yet, within 
the inner walls of Maojiawan, lifestyles greatly contrasted traditional assumptions held by 
the public.  
 Lin’s secretaries when first beginning their position had the rare opportunity to 
meet Lin Biao. Typically these encounters included an informal aloud reading of a 
political report detailing the current foreign or domestic situation. The secretary classified 
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as an office administrator, has duties which included: receive, dispatch, classify, type, 
print, encode and decode, and report documents.
26
 But simply having a clear, 
understandable dialect is not enough. As General Zeng, Vice Commander-in-Chief of the 
Shenyang Military Region, told Zhang Yunsheng upon his appointment, “choosing a 
secretary for Lin Biao is more difficult than selecting the top candidate of the [ancient 
imperial] palace examinations.”
27
 This is certainly not an understatement, to qualify one 
had to have: previous service in Lin Biao’s [Fourth] field army, no connections with 
high-ranking cadres in Beijing, Mandarin speaking ability, good personality, no 
busybodies, good education but not a high ranking cadre, good family background [i.e. 
worker-peasant-soldier], and good health.
28
 The expectations placed on secretaries for 
employment indirectly speaks to the sensitivity surrounding elite political life in China. 
The first three aforementioned requirements are reflections of personal loyalty. In the 
competitive and unstable world of Chinese politics, particularly during the Cultural 
Revolution, loyalty is an absolute necessity for survival. The final requirement of good 
health however is particularly interesting. Considering Lin’s ubiquitous concerns for his 
physical health, discussed at greater length below, this minimal prerequisite is not 
surprising. Also, when considering the multitude of standards required to becoming a 
secretary and that Lin Biao still, despite the degree of trustworthiness exhibited by 
secretaries, preferred not to be in the presence of a secretary offers further credence to the 
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argument that Lin Biao suffered from debilitating health problems and a continuous 
desire to be alone.     
Zhang’s first encounter with Lin Biao was not one that is particularly eventful, but 
somewhat telling. After reading a brief excerpt from a report extolling the close 
relationship between Mao and Lin, one of the first questions from Lin was if Zhang was 
in good health and if Zhang could sleep at night.
29
 Ye Qun’s personal servant, Guan 
Weixun, only after working in the Maojiawan residence for an extended and long period 
of time, was allowed to meet Lin Biao. Guan records that the encounter was short and 
was not impressed with Lin Biao’s overall appearance or ability to make conversation. 
Guan described Lin as being pale, thin, and sickly. During the meeting Ye Qun controlled 
the conversation, constantly answering questions for Lin Biao, speaking before Lin Biao 
could answer, and digressing from topic to topic. The entire engagement did not last more 
than five minutes.
30
 Other assistants in Maojiawan shared equally unimpressive meetings. 
One secretary states that while perusing around the hallways he viewed a man sitting in a 
chair, head dropped back, and eyes shut. To his surprise, the man was Lin Biao. Lin was 
awakened by another secretary who had been reading a report to him. Upon coming to, 
Lin simply stated, “You manage it.”
31
  
Lin Biao, in these three examples, again presents a picture that illuminates his 
lack of social skills, emotion, and general interest in carrying an in-depth conversation. 
Lin appears as a cold and detached figure. What is also noted is Ye’s demonstrative 
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behavior as she interjected periodically answering questions for Lin Biao and switching 
topics constantly. Like a great conductor, Ye seemingly controlled the demeanor of even 
this innocent conversation. This not only underlines Ye’s unconstrained domination of 
every situation that surrounds her husband but also construes Lin’s ambivalence and non-
existent like nature that is a primary facet of his personality. The final example, though 
brief, also reminds us of Lin’s lack of emotion and careless attitude. Even though we 
have no knowledge of the topic which the secretary was discussing with Lin, thus making 
it impossible to judge Lin’s careless attitude toward politics in this instance, it is clear 
that Lin found little interest in whatever he was being briefed on and gave unilateral 
control to his assistant to handle the matter.   
These brief meetings with Lin Biao were not limited to Guan Weixun. Even for 
Lin Biao’s key office administrator, Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, visitations were 
confined to time constraints. When Zhang began his duties as Lin’s secretary he received 
instructions concerning his daily briefings to Lin. Zhang was directed to curb his 
discussions and updates with Lin Biao to thirty minute time periods. When Zhang heard 
this rule he was dumbfounded. Since Lin was atop the hierarchy of the CCP, on average, 
Lin’s office received hundreds of documents, telegrams and reference materials every 
day. Each document contained at least two hundred characters and some, such as those 
from various ministries and government departments, contained upwards to twenty 
thousand characters. Such a massive pile of reading material equates to hours of review 
and study for even native Chinese speakers. Reviewing this deluge in depth would 
require lengthy, detailed meetings with Lin Biao. However, Zhang was instructed by his 
fellow secretary, Old Zhao, to only verbally summarize the most important documents. 
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“You have to select the most important ones to ‘summarize.’ Right now since our leader 
is not in good health and can’t tolerate long working hours, he only listens to these 
summaries about twice a day, each time for only thirty minutes or so.”
32
 Another variable 
that needed consideration was Lin’s eating schedule. Lin would not meet with his 
secretaries for any meeting directly following a meal. Lin required his secretaries to wait 
at least a half hour after he finished any eating activities before a report could be given. 
Lin argued that any meeting that violated this special schedule would lead to 
“sweating.”
33
 Old Zhao suggested that Zhang choose the reports that detailed the most 
current trends in China’s domestic situation. “Documents dealing with events relevant to 
new tendencies and developments that might result in radically new circumstances should 
be given more attention than documents covering rather routine matters.”
34
 In order to 
lighten the tremendous work load, Zhang and Old Zhao decided to divide the materials. 
Zhang summarized reports dealing with new tendencies and developments occurring in 
the Cultural Revolution, Old Zhao reported on military and international affairs. Lin also 
could not be disturbed during his sleep. Unless a major incident occurred or if the 
Chairman or Jiang Qing requested his presence, Lin was not to be awakened from his 
time of rest. If Lin was awakened for any reason, he would usually become anxious and 
begin to “sweat” upsetting the delicate cycle required for Lin to fall back asleep.
35
 
One of Zhang’s first reports to Lin Biao enabled him to see more of the odd 
intricacies of the second most powerful man in China, offers us more evidence to assess 
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Lin Biao’s personality deficiencies. One summer day, Zhang Yunsheng arrived at 
Zhejiang Hall in the Great Hall of the People. Lin enjoyed staying in Zhejiang Hall 
during the summer months since it reportedly had better air circulation, allowing Lin to 
tolerate Beijing’s sweltering summers. Upon Zhang’s entrance the first thing he noted 
was the absence of light in Lin’s room. Only a few small lamps were present. Zhang, as 
with any military soldier, did what is expected when a lower officer meets a higher rank: 
he saluted. But Lin’s reaction took Zhang aback, Lin not only told Zhang not to salute 
him, but he added that if somebody salutes him he feels uncomfortable and begins to 
“sweat” (chu han). Zhang, perplexed enough already by Lin’s dim lighting selection, did 
not know how to react, Zhang only took note not to salute Lin again. Confounding Zhang 
even further is Lin’s behavior while Zhang read his report to Lin. While listening, Lin 
picked up a box of matches and began striking each match, blowing it out, putting the 
match to his nose in order to smell residual smoke, and dropping the match to the ground. 
Lin continuously repeated this process throughout the entire meeting, pacing back and 
forth across the room, his feet plodding over extinguished matches.
36
 Even the loyal 
Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, perplexed with this encounter, commented in his memoir, 
“This is a really weird shouzhang [leader]!”
37
 Lin’s match-lighting episode is a colorful 
example that displays the complexities of Lin’s social anxiety disorder. A key condition 
to social anxiety disorder is a fear of social situations since there is an underlying fear of 
how the person will be judged. The consequent behavior can be particularly intense 
especially if the individual is forced to be in a social situation. In Zhang Yunsheng’s 
meeting, Lin lit matches, blew them out, and paced the floor. This is not simply odd or 
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aberrant behavior but a display of anxiety due to his meeting with Zhang. Likely irritating 
Lin’s anxieties even further is that Lin met with Zhang alone and Zhang was still fairly 
new to Maojiawan thus placing Lin Biao in a situation that he not only loathed but also in 
which he felt unfamiliar. There is no available evidence as to understanding the 
peculiarity of Lin’s order to Zhang not to salute him and why it makes Lin sweat. 
However, what can be deducted from this interaction is that Lin felt some degree of 
anxiety upon being saluted as he reacted with profuse sweating. What should be noted at 
this point is that it is common in those who suffer with social anxiety disorder to also 
struggle with hyperhidrosis. Hyperhidrosis is a well recognized dermatological condition 
that is characterized by excessive sweating seen in the hands, arms, or face. The 
condition has been noted of being disabling, as it interferes constantly with a person’s 
ability to carry out professional work responsibilities in public. What is alarming for the 
purposes for this work is that one particular study has shown that up to thirty-two percent 
of those individuals who have hyperhidrosis also have social anxiety disorder, thus 
illustrating a distinctive link between the two disorders.
38
 Important for this analysis, is 
that Lin Biao demonstrates both symptoms of social anxiety disorder and hyperhidrosis in 
our example as his anxieties about meeting with other people stimulated and aggravated 
his degree of comfort, consequently leading to profuse outbreaks of perspiration.  
Lin’s odd eccentricity does not end here. Lin’s bedroom in Maojiawan is not 
conventional by any means. Unlike other residential homes in China during the Cultural 
Revolution draped with Mao Zedong posters and Mao’s calligraphy written atop lengthy 
scrolls hanging from walls, Lin’s bedroom did not possess these orthodox characteristics. 
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Lin’s bedroom was surprisingly empty. He had one bed, a sofa, a couple chairs, and a 
table. One small lotus lamp framed his bedside and was the sole source of all light that 
would fill his entire room. Ye Qun’s room was the complete opposite. Her room was 
filled with Maoist statements and she even touted her own collection of Mao badges.
39
 
Lin’s bedroom windows that exposed occupants to a view of the outside courtyard were 
covered at all times by brown draperies.
40
 Lin’s diet was also bland just as he lived. Lin 
limited himself to very few Chinese dishes. He did not delve into adventurous spicy 
dishes like those from Hunan or Sichuan, nor did he eat fish or even rice. Rather, Lin 
preferred a bland diet, consuming beans and an occasional meat patty.
41
 Dark, morbid, 
and solitaire, Lin remained aloof, spending the majority of his time locked inside this 
room, allowing only certain visitors of Maojiawan to see him for brief periods. He 
received his daily political reports from Secretary Zhang Yunsheng and Old Zhao who 
were confined to thirty minute periods each.  
Lin’s anomalous behaviors are not limited to the aforementioned examples. The 
connection to Lin’s solitary confinement is partially attributed to the fears he had of three 
elements appearing in nature: coldness, wind, and water. Lin’s fear of coldness or feeling 
chilled is the foundation for his fear of wind and water. Due to Lin’s sensitivity to chilly 
temperatures, he would sense small temperature shifts in his room. Thermostats were 
installed and constantly monitored to avoid any major dips and changes in temperature. 
Should any sudden shifts occur Lin would make it apparent letting his staff know 
immediately. If Lin felt a slight chill for just an instant he would holler aloud notifying 
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his personal assistants who then would shine bright lights on Lin in order to warm him 
up.  
Lin also preferred that his clothing be kept at a certain comfort level. Lin’s 
personal assistants warmed his shoes and socks in an oven before he would snuggle his 
feet in them. Lin’s fear of cold led him to deny any item made of glass from his bedroom. 
This stemmed from his belief that glass was naturally cold to the touch, thus leading to 
Lin’s omission of anything containing glass. With the exception of Lin’s windows, his 
bedroom contained nothing made of glass. A glass table present in Lin’s room for 
instance, was without the necessary glass plate for it to function properly. Even Lin’s 
writing pencil reportedly needed to be warm before he would use it. Like the room of his 
wife Ye Qun, Lin’s room was equipped with a metal buzzer that would ring if Lin needed 
anything from his assistants. But Lin made sure to wrap the button with cloth or silk in 
order to avoid any potential risk of feeling gelidity on the button’s bare metal surface. 
Lin’s footrest, constructed of iron, was also modified for Lin’s use as it was draped with a 
wool blanket to eliminate any risk of Lin’s bare feet feeling the least bit nippy from the 
metal construction. Lin’s personal interactions with his secretaries were also affected by 
his fear of coldness. Lin, if not perambulating about the floor, would force his secretaries 
to sit at least six feet away from him during any political briefings. Even Lin’s personal 
assistants were constrained to their distance from Lin if they accompanied him even on a 
simple walk. Lin would not allow others to walk close to him or directly in front of him 
for fear of a passing breeze that he may feel and the consequent shock it would incur on 
his body.
42
 Lin’s motivation was to avoid any cool breezes that may blow his way as a 
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secretary shuffled through his papers. Maojiawan was also devoid of any electrical fans.
43
 
Lin’s drinking water needed to also be far above freezing, it was required reportedly to 
hover at about forty-five degrees Fahrenheit in order to avoid chilling the Vice Chairman. 
Lin even had a customized toilet seat created by Qiu Huizuo. The seat was cloaked by red 
velvet thus eradicating the possibility that Lin could feel a chill from the porcelain.
44
  
Alterations in temperature even affected Lin’s dressing habits. Since Lin did not 
enjoy being too cold nor too hot he only preferred certain materials to be used in his 
clothing. Typical military dress uniforms of the PLA are weaved in cotton or wool. 
However, Lin would not wear anything that contained any of the above. He would only 
wear a lighter cloth material. One of Lin’s close bodyguards and personal assistants, Li 
Wenpu, was in charge of carefully selecting the appropriate clothing for Lin to wear 
based on current atmospheric temperature.
45
  
Lin’s fear of chills led to his concomitant fear of water. Lin believed that any 
contact with water would enhance his sensitivity to any source of coolness. Lin disliked 
bathing and preferred to use damp towels to pat his face down. Even Lin’s hands were 
devoid of contact to water. Lin created his own hand-washing method by rubbing the 
palms of his hands back and forth along the arms of his sofa at a rapid speed. Like the 
timing of Lin’s match sniffing episode, Lin would typically buff his palms clean during 
the daily political reports given to him by his secretaries.
46
 While Lin’s hand-rubbing 
may seem as an odd way of supposedly washing a person’s hands, it should also be 
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suggested that Lin’s hand rubbing took place during his meetings with members of his 
staff. Lin’s hand rubbing behavior is an example of anxiousness, highlighting Lin’s 
nervousness and anxieties that he experienced whenever meeting with individuals. Like 
Lin’s match-lighting episode, Lin’s hand rubbing is a display of another form of anxious 
behavior while meeting with people in social situations. This behavior is likely linked to 
his bouts with social anxiety disorder; Lin felt nervous and heavily stressed in meetings, 
the anxiety was then materialized by perspiration and/or obsessive tendencies such as 
hand rubbing.  
Lin’s obsession and fears affected his capabilities to function as Vice Chairman, 
Defense Minister, and even as a human being. Lin did not frequent the outdoors, rather 
Lin preferred to remain inside and did not enjoy leaving his bed or his bedroom. The 
simplest, most routine tasks for normal people were challenges for Lin. For instance, Lin 
disliked crawling from beneath his piles of blankets and sheets to use the bathroom. A 
special screened area was constructed in his bedroom so that Lin would not be 
encumbered with exiting his bedroom and walking down the hallway to the bathroom. 
Lin even opined that the digestive system in the human body was naturally faulted, that it 
should have the capability to digest and utilize one hundred percent of the food and liquid 
that enters the body. 
47
  
Lin’s frustrations concerning digestion are attributed to the unchanging condition 
of diarrhea that he was forced to deal with on a fairly regular basis. Even though we do 
not have a daily record of Lin’s bathroom habits, Lin’s secretaries and personal 
assistants, as well as Ye Qun’s personal assistants, all note Lin’s vexing digestive health 
problems. If temperature fluctuations were sensed by Lin bouts of diarrhea would ensue. 
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According to Ye Qun’s personal assistant Guan Weixun, Lin’s digestive habits were 
closely monitored by a medical team on staff at Maojiawan. According to Guan, Lin had 
experienced stomach and intestinal problems ever since his return from the Soviet Union 
in February 1942.
48
 Since Lin’s digestion was irritable he chose a fairly simple lifestyle. 
Lin did not put salt or oil on any of his foods.
49
 Lin also chose to abstain from drinking 
alcohol. In one interesting episode, during Lin’s visit to Moscow in October 1950, Lin 
refused to take even the smallest sip from his glass during a toast given by Stalin. Stalin 
reportedly quipped sarcastically to Lin not to worry and that the drink “contained no 
poison.”
50
 While a medical diagnosis is impossible to perform, Lin’s struggling digestive 
system can be partially attributed to social anxiety disorder. Common in those suffering 
from the disorder are symptoms such as sweating, trembling, and diarrhea. These 
conditions are all caused by excessive anxiety in social situations. Considering that Lin’s 
social anxiety disorder played a role in his struggles with digestion, this point is 
corroborated by his preference to be given a thirty minute time period prior to meeting 
with his personal staff. Lin might also be suffering from irritable bowl syndrome, a 
condition where the descending colon goes into spasms forcing the individual to have 
excessive diarrhea or feel the urge to use the restroom. Irritable bowel is typically 
triggered in situations when the individual is suffering from anxiety over a particular 
situation. Considering these points, Lin is likely to have been a victim of this particularly 
painful disorder, as his reaction to social situations stimulated his need to use the 
restroom. Regardless it is obvious that Lin suffered from digestive problems to some 
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degree as he did make efforts to change his diet. Most likely, Lin simply did not know of 
irritable bowel or any other gastrointestinal disorder.     
Another persistent problem Lin lived with on a daily basis is “sweating.” This 
condition, though not explored to a great extent by those who knew Lin best, did not go 
unnoticed. As mentioned above, Lin ordered his secretaries to exclude the orthodox 
military practice of saluting when seeing him. If Lin did witness a salute, he would begin 
to sweat profusely. If Lin’s daily meetings with his secretaries went in excess of thirty 
minutes his perspiration would kick into overdrive as well. This physical aliment also 
hindered his capability to maintain relationships outside of his family and close 
confidants within Maojiawan. Even Mao took note of Lin Biao and his problems with 
perspiration. Late one evening during one of Lin’s public appearances with the Chairman 
upon the rostrum at Tiananmen, Lin told the Chairman that he was sweating and would 
be leaving; the Chairman’s reply was “you are human, are human beings not supposed to 
perspire?”
51
 This, again, is an example of Lin’s problem with hyperhidrosis caused by 
social anxiety disorder. In the last example, Lin’s hyperhidrosis affected his ability to 
appropriately function and meet the needs of his demanding boss: Chairman Mao. Mao’s 
angst and frustration can also be sensed here leading one to question if Mao knew that he 
had made a serious mistake when choosing him as a successor. 
Lin’s physical body seemed drained from actual energy too. Guan Weixun 
acknowledges that Lin’s muscles were so weak that he would typically stumble and fall 
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to the ground, but unlike a healthy individual, Lin could not stand back up on his own 
without the aid of another.
52
 
Contributing to Lin’s social dislocation and aloofness from the political world that 
he existed were Lin’s efforts to understand the health disorders, specifically those that 
were physical, i.e. stomach problems and excessive sweating, that plagued him. Lin 
indeed made note of his frequent health issues and seemed to show keen interest in the 
research. Like a studious scholar, Lin would spend hours perusing through books. Guan 
Weixun remarks how Lin would spend a great deal of time reading and researching 
Chinese medical textbooks searching for a way to diagnosis himself and pharmaceutical 
books that offered ancient herbal, natural remedies for illnesses and toilsome issues with 
the human body. In contrast to the often cited statements that Lin was a loyal follower to 
Mao Zedong who always studied the Chairman’s works and who always carried the 
“Little Red Book” at his side, Lin spent the majority of his time reading medical books. 
One source indicates that Lin took the research he performed with great passion, 
spending time to even look up characters in Chinese dictionaries that he did not 
recognize.
53
 Lin’s interest in medical texts even concerned Ye Qun. According to Guan 
Weixun, Ye Qun ordered that nearly all medical texts within Maojiawan be seized, 
especially at times prior to major meetings. The primary reason for Ye’s motivations to 
take Lin’s texts was that Lin’s research reportedly caused him excessive worry.
54
 Lin 
would obsess over any discoveries or revelations he made and would consistently ponder 
them in his head. Prior to major meetings or public appearances, Lin needed to focus on 
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other issues such as speech reciting, political knowledge, and carrying his copy of “The 
Little Red Book.” With wheels spinning in Lin’s mind over his vitality, concentrating on 
political trends was a challenge. Within the sensitive political context that Lin existed, 
other political matters, regardless of their importance, needed to be shoved to the side so 
that Lin’s own personal concerns could be met satisfactorily. Lin’s excessive, almost 
obsessive; displays of concern toward his health further illuminate Lin’s schizoid 
personality disorder. As the DSM IV suggests, individuals with schizoid personalities 
typically are attracted to solitary activities including those of work. Lin’s intense, 
emotional preoccupation to understanding his health problems were unitary projects that 
Lin could abscond to, away from the explosively turbulent world that he lived in during 
the Cultural Revolution.     
One element that is consistent in the memoirs of Lin’s personal secretaries is 
Lin’s aloof nature. This study will now briefly discuss the observations made and 
recorded by Lin’s personal staff members. Consistent themes are Lin’s indifference and 
lack of opinion toward political matters and overall lack of interest in politics in 
general—a primary symptom to schizoid personality. It will also be apparent how the 
benighted Lin Biao burdened his fellow Party members’ abilities to communicate with 
him. Whether it is a major foreign or domestic political development or the most trivial 
piece of government information, Lin showed little interest. For a man in such a high-
ranking position in the Party, such an approach is dangerous. Not only is Lin responsible 
to critically understand political trends, but a misstep in following the general line laid 
down by Mao would be political suicide. What is also acute is that fellow Party members 
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and personal staff were required to collaborate with and work under an individual 
difficult to contact and to have a meaningful social interaction.   
One of the most colorful examples of Zhang Yunsheng’s memoirs that highlights 
Lin’s carefree attitude in decision-making, occurred during a major crisis in Fujian. Han 
Xianchu, the military commander of the Fujian Military Region, contacted Maojiawan 
reporting on major political developments occurring at the grassroots level in Fujian 
province. Lin’s secretaries however reported to Han that Lin could not speak on the 
telephone for fear of potentially catching a cold. Lin’s secretaries advised Han Xianchu 
that he could share the new leading political trends and relay those issues to Lin Biao or 
Han could write down all the troubling matters and send them by telegram to Maojiawan. 
Han stated to Lin’s secretaries that neither option was appealing and suggested that a 
loudspeaker be connected to the Lin Biao office phone line enabling Lin to hear Han’s 
concerns without having to hold a phone receiver to his ear and mouth. The proposal was 
denied by Ye Qun. Han soon traveled to Beijing for medical treatment. While being 
nursed, Han was visited by Lin’s secretaries. Han formally told Zhang Yunsheng about 
the complications that were bearing heavily on the military, including the pervasive ultra 
leftist trends arising and the consequent affects it was having on the PLA. Other troubling 
issues existed but Han felt that if Zhang could at least relay the latter two points to Lin he 
would feel very grateful. Han also expressed that his desire to meet with Lin personally 
had not extinguished and reminded Zhang of this wish. Zhang and Han spoke all morning 
and completed their discussion by early afternoon. According to Zhang, the meeting 
between him and Han lasted about five hours. Zhang, being the diligent secretary that he 
was, made sure to narrate the content of his conversation with Han to Lin and of the 
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current irksome matters in Fujian. Zhang also divulged to Lin that his discussion with 
Han lasted for nearly five hours and that Han still wanted to meet with Lin personally. 
Lin, upon hearing this, cracked a large smile, chuckled, and stated “Five hours and he 
[Han] still hadn’t finished?”
55
 Lin also recommended that Han only need to meet with 
Zhang and that ten minutes would be sufficient for the matters concerning Han Xianchu 
and the Fujian military region.
56
 While Lin does express some emotion in this example, 
his passive approach and seemingly laidback attitude toward the crisis suggests a lack of 
concern and consideration. This emotional coldness is a common behavioral trait of 
schizoid personalities. For Han, Lin’s brief ten minute meeting, assuming it occurred, 
could possibly have affected his opinion of Lin Biao. Considering the crisis and stress 
that Han endured, Lin’s phlegmatic attitude most likely left an acerbic aftertaste. While 
there is no specific evidence of Han-Lin relations before or after this event, one should 
contemplate how Lin’s apathetic behavior from his schizoid personality disorder affected 
how other Party members viewed him.        
In another incident, during a meeting with a secretary that focused on current 
trends and recent political attacks by rebel Red Guards in Lanzhou and Sichuan, Lin Biao 
reportedly was insipid showing no emotion whatsoever. The report even included news 
of officials that were being attacked with great vigor from radical, rebel students. Lin 
then, after growing impatient through the course of the meeting, chimed in and stated 
with little emotion, “Today this province is attacked. Tomorrow that province is attacked. 
This is not news to me.”
57
 Even following Mao’s infamous Southern Tour from August 
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to September 1970, when Mao alerted local leaders to his dissatisfaction with Lin Biao 
and his followers, Lin showed little emotion. Zhou Enlai, accompanied by Qiu Huizuo, 
Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Li Desheng, in an attempt to ameliorate 
the acerbic relationship state between Lin and Mao, made a special trip to Beidaihe to 
meet with Lin and encourage him to attend a conference, at the Chairman’s request, to 
rectify the mistakes of the then error laden Party member Chen Boda. Lin, faced with a 
possible opportunity to begin taking steps for political Party survival, did not interrupt. 
Lin politely let Zhou Enlai speak and finally declined the offer simply stating, “I cannot 
participate. You all can go and examine your mistakes.”
58
 
Another illustration of Lin’s care-free attitude occurred during one of the PLA’s 
greatest scientific successes and one of China’s greatest moments as a united nation. On 
June 17, 1967, at approximately 8:20 in the morning, China successfully detonated its 
first hydrogen bomb. The bomb was a multistage thermonuclear bomb, a three megaton 
device that was dropped from a Hong-6 bomber. The bomb was an illustration that China 
had acquired and caught up with Western nations in terms of nuclear technology. The 
explosion undoubtedly shocked the world, as China’s level of strategic deterrence made 
leaps with one successful test of a weapon that melted steel plates four hundred meters 
from ground zero and brick houses that fourteen kilometers away collapsed.
59
 The event 
changed the strategic outlook for the Chinese; China could no longer be bullied by 
“imperialist aggressors” as it had in previous conflicts with the U.S. or in any potential 
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future conflicts with the Soviet bear to the north and northwest.
60
 Suddenly China needed 
to consider a military doctrine for its newly found weapon that was not far from Western 
nuclear devices in terms of power. Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, held the distinct pleasure 
of sharing this exciting news to his shouzhang Lin Biao. Lin Biao as one of China’s great 
marshals, liberators, and one of the original founding fathers of the PRC should naturally 
find the news stimulating and invigorating as the event is a hallmark of Chinese will, 
ambition, growth, and technological advancement. But, Lin showed no emotion. As soon 
as Zhang Yunsheng received word that the Hong-6 was airborne flying toward ground 
zero, he informed Lin Biao in his room. Lin, who was sitting on his sofa upon Zhang’s 
entrance, received the news with little enthusiasm. Lin only stated “good,” waved his 
hand in the air, and walked out.
61
 This episode contradicts what would commonly be 
expected from the Defense Minister of the PLA and a brilliant military strategist. Unlike 
other Party members who praised the accomplishment, Lin Biao showed no emotion. 
Consistent for this analysis is that this is another example of Lin’s emotionless persona—
a key component of schizoid personality.  
In another episode, one November evening in 1966, Maojiawan received a phone 
call from the Vice Chairman of the General Political Department Liu Zhijian. The phone 
call was received at about three o’clock in the morning by Secretary Zhang Yunsheng. 
Liu Zhijian reported that several hundred students were standing outside the Western 
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entrance to the Defense Ministry, demanding that Li Tianyu, the PLA Deputy Chief of 
Staff, be surrendered to them. The students believed that Li had been following a 
“bourgeois line.” At this point in the Cultural Revolution tension was close to its highest 
point, characterized by student Red Guards vehemently denouncing traditional authority 
figures such as parents, teachers, and government officials. Nearly one hundred students 
stood outside the compound, shouting “Long Live Chairman Mao” and “Down with Liu 
Shaoqi.” The incident was filled with such energy that a few students had even jumped 
over the walls that surrounded the compound. To protect the Defense Ministry, a human 
wall was made with soldiers inner-locking each others arms preventing a massive 
stampede by the students into the building. Liu, concerned for the safety of Li Tianyu, 
demanded to speak to Lin Biao. Zhang could not dare wake the resting Lin Biao, for 
doing so could risk a bout of sweating for Lin or severely alter Lin’s already delicate 
sleeping pattern. Zhang stated that the matter could not be reported to Lin until nine 
o’clock in the morning. Precisely when Lin awoke later that morning, Zhang reported the 
matter to Lin Biao. Accompanying Lin during the meeting were his wife Ye Qun and son 
Lin Liguo. Zhang informed Lin of Liu Zhijian’s emergency phone call and of the danger 
that surrounded Li Tianyu. Lin however, showed little interest or emotion. He simply 
pointed to Ye and Lin Liguo and quietly stated, “I don’t have any ideas. Let them [Ye 
Qun and Lin Liguo] handle it.” Ye Qun however, objected immediately. She instructed 
Lin that instructions should be given and that he should show some sort of emotion 
toward the matter, if not, the decision may appear as counter-revolutionary and damage 
the image of Lin Biao and his entire family. Ye suggested that efforts should continue to 
have the students leave the Western area of the Defense Ministry but that no arrests 
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should be made. Lin Liguo then added that the students should not be forced to make 




What is particularly interesting in this example is that Lin again showed no 
emotion when learning of Li Tianyu’s struggle and also displayed ambivalence toward 
the event. The effect is that Lin simply “passed the buck” and allowed Ye Qun and Lin 
Liguo to handle the problem. This is, again, another example of Lin’s schizoid 
personality. Ye showed some concern with Lin’s attitude and reacted by suggesting what 
Lin should do. Ye acted, in this instance, as Lin’s political lookout and advisor, a position 
that she had to take due to Lin’s ambivalence caused from his schizoid personality. The 
degree however to how much Ye actually looked out for Lin’s best interest is 
questionable though. As discussed below, Ye acted for her own self-interest numerous 
times. But in this instance, Ye and Lin Liguo sat in the political driver’s seat as Lin 
shunned at having to make a decision to the affair. Also of key importance is that Lin 
Biao appears to contradict the common often cited argument that he was simply a 
“passive” political tactician during the Cultural Revolution. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin 
Liguo were in one place at one time upon hearing the news of Li Tianyu’s struggles. 
When Lin heard the news of the disastrous situation at the Defense Ministry he simply 
pointed to Ye and Lin Liguo and asked for them to handle it. Ye then suggested solutions 
to handling the affair. It was then that Lin agreed to Ye’s propositions. If Lin was a 
“passive” political tactician and strategist Lin would have rationally thought over, at the 
very least, Ye’s proposals and either suggested alternatives or opted not to take any 
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action. But instead, Lin simply agreed to Ye’s first proposals and suggestions, even 
offering no feedback or substitute solutions. Moreover, Ye’s resolution to the problem 
contained political action that would undoubtedly be known by other Party members as 
coming from Maojiawan and consequently could possibly risk some political aftershock 
from the Center. If Lin were a politically adept and interested figure, a more plausible 
reaction from Lin would have been suggesting a discussion within the family and 
extending that discussion to other key Party members at the time, particularly the CCRG. 
But Lin’s behavior in this example certainly does not match this description and leads 
one to favor that Lin was simply uninterested as opposed to someone who might be 
viewed as purely politically docile.         
As Defense Minister and Vice Chairman of the Party during the Cultural 
Revolution, Lin was thrust into official receptions of visiting foreign dignitaries, forcing 
Lin into the public spotlight at the close side of the Chairman. Little difference could be 
seen in Lin’s attitude toward foreign guests than those trying to meet with him at 
Maojiawan. In early 1970, China received two North Vietnamese officials. The 
delegation came at the beginning of a turning point for Chinese foreign policy. U.S. 
President Richard Nixon was then expanding the Vietnam War into Cambodia, 
suggesting an expansion of U.S. military forces in the region and a complete reversal of 
his doctrine of Vietnamization—favoring  limited U.S. involvement and an increase in 
South Vietnamese forces in the conflict with the North by using U.S. weapons, advising, 
and financing. President Nixon’s policy toward Indochina and particularly the aggression 
made in Cambodia, made Mao suspect the true intentions of the U.S., forcing Mao to 
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reconsider the small diplomatic gestures then occurring between the U.S. and China.
63
 
China was also beginning to withdraw and lessen the amount of military and logistical 
aid given to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Zhou Enlai emphasized in an 
April 1969 meeting with Hoang Van Thai and Pham Hung that the DRV needs to follow 
the principle of self-dependence and self-reliance.
64
 It was a time when Beijing felt a 
push and a pull from all foreign policy directions, one day feeling growing warmth of 
openness from the U.S., the next day feeling chilly reminders of the Cold War from an 
expanding Indochina War. It is within this context that two key DRV officials visited 
China and spoke with Lin Biao. The delegation naturally had an interest to meet one of 
the heroes of the Chinese Revolution and one of the greatest military minds in modern 
Chinese history. Given the foreign policy climate and Beijing’s interest to move the DRV 
toward self-reliance, Beijing’s guests had curious minds and wanted feedback from the 
second most powerful man in China. But Lin showed little interest toward his fellow 
Vietnamese comrades. In fact, Zhang Yunsheng notes that Lin was not enthusiastic (bu 
rexin). Lin’s only comments to his foreign guests was “Facing the great strength of 
America your method must be to endure, enduring is victory” (mian dui qiang da de 
Meiguo, nimen de banfa jiu shi ao, ao jiu shi shengli).
65
 
In another example, Lin met with an Albanian delegation in 1970 shortly 
following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1969. The delegates demanded that 
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Lin come and visit them. Zhang informed Lin of their desires. Lin wanted no part, as he 
claimed his health was poor and wanted to remain at home. But Lin reluctantly went to 
the Xinjiang room in the Great Hall of the People to receive them. Lin awkwardly 
accepted the good graces and warm welcoming of the visiting party. A few photos were 
taken, which Lin shied away from, and the group chatted with Lin for approximately five 
minutes. Lin then excused himself from the meeting and returned to his residence. Upon 
returning, Lin told his staff that he really has no desire to receive foreign dignitaries.
66
  
Lin’s preference for solitude away from social situations and foreign visitors was 
even observed by the Chairman. On the evening of the May Day celebrations in 1971, 
Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai sat on the rostrum overlooking Tiananmen Square. 
Joining them was Prince Sihanouk and Madame Sihanouk of Cambodia. Lin Biao 
however, was not present. Lin, refused to go to the meeting, citing health reasons. Zhou 
Enlai attempted to ameliorate the situation by conveying Lin’s health problems to the 
Chairman. Mao, however, dismissed Lin’s health deficiencies as he always had and 
stated, “Lin is always idealistic about his health.” Ye Qun, however, cried and begged 
Lin to depart for Tiananmen, thereby making the required showing as Vice Chairman of 
the Party. Better late than never, Lin arrived but did not greet the Chairman nor did he 
stay for an extended length of time. Lin even departed without excusing himself.
67
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Lin also refused to meet with Edgar Snow in May 1970. Snow’s visit, 
remembered mainly by the historic image of him standing next to Mao and Chinese 
interpreter Ji Chaozhu atop the rostrum at Tiananmen Square during the May Day 
celebrations, was an indirect diplomatic gesture to the U.S. indicating China’s interest in 
opening the door to the West after nearly twenty years of Western xenophobia. Mao 
appealed to Lin, asking Lin to join an intimate speaking session between Mao and Snow. 
Lin denied the offer though. According to several of Lin’s assistants, Lin stated that he 
knew Snow while in Yan’an. Lin’s aversion toward attendance were his qualms about 
being questioned by Snow and consequent distress the meeting would place on his mind, 
worrying if he answered everything to the Chairman’s degree of expectation.
68
 
Lin’s dislike of meetings due to his social anxiety disorders even extended to his 
personal meetings with figures typically seen as being close colleagues during the 
Cultural Revolution. Jiang Qing for instance who Lin, at a meeting with top ranking 
cadres prior to the Armed Forces Literature and Arts Symposium hailed as “very strong 
in the politics of literary and artistic work….She has many valuable ideas that you should 
heed, that you should apply to your thinking and organized life”, attacked in one 
episode.
69
 Such statements are often observed as evidence that revealed Lin’s close 
relationship with Jiang Qing. Zhang Yunsheng however, recalls one evening when 
reading a series of documents to Ye Qun, hearing Lin Biao screaming down the hallways 
of Maojiawan, “Ye Qun, get Jiang Qing out of here!” In his memoirs, Zhang states that 
Lin could be heard jumping up and down, pounding the floor. Ye Qun later told Zhang 
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not to disclose this incident to anybody else.
70
 Despite Lin’s apparent frustrations and 
abhorrence of Jiang Qing, Ye still managed to arrange private meetings at Diaoyutai’s 
Building Number 11, the workplace of Jiang Qing. Zhang Yunsheng recalls that Lin Biao 
did feel uneasy when Ye met with Jiang Qing. One evening Lin Biao inquired about Ye 
Qun’s whereabouts. Zhang notified Lin that she went to Diaoyutai for business. Lin had 
an immediate outburst and ordered that Zhang make a phone call to Diaoyutai and 
request Ye’s return. Later that evening, following Ye’s return to Maojiawan, she 
informed the staff in private that, “The shouzhang only knows that I am at Diaoyutai, he 
does not know that I am at Building 11 (Jiang Qing’s workplace)! Building 11 is in 
Diaoyutai, but Diaoyutai is not Building 11!”
71
 Not only do we see Lin’s objections to 
Ye’s personal side trips to see Jiang Qing, which completely contradicts the normally 
asserted position that Lin maintained a close amicable relationship with Madame Mao, 
but it also displays Ye Qun’s attempted secret activities that Lin knew very little about, 
an element which I will explore further below.     
In another example, Lin was asked by the Chairman in May 1970 to make another 
public appearance on the rostrum at Tiananmen and to make a public pronouncement to 
the country during a rally. The speech was to express Mao’s support for the Indochinese 
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people and his denunciation of the April 1970 American invasion of Cambodia. Lin 
readily agreed. The rally was to occur on May 20. In order to prepare, as mentioned 
before, Lin relied on his secretaries to brief him on all foreign and domestic events as 
well as requesting his ghost writers to create a speech for him to display for his audience. 
Prior to Lin’s public appearance and speech, which was requested by Mao, Lin met with 
Secretary Zhang Yunsheng. Following Lin’s speech at the rally, Lin was to meet with 
foreign dignitaries and visitors. Lin spoke to Zhang slowly saying, “Today as I will 
participate in the rally and meeting, I need to be informed.” Unlike the typical Lin Biao 
that Zhang had known, Lin allowed Zhang to sit within six feet of him on his sofa. Lin’s 
departure of customary behavior and rules, according to Zhang, is attributed to his 
absence from political meetings for several weeks and thus Lin’s acknowledgement that 
he needed to pay close attention the matter which Zhang was addressing. Zhang began to 
read his report to Lin, detailing recent events in foreign affairs which included U.S. 
President Richard Nixon’s expansion of the Vietnam War into Laos and Cambodia, the 
current anti-Israel struggle by the Arab countries and the Palestinian people, and the new 
situation in the Soviet Union. During Zhang’s report he happened to glance briefly at Lin. 
The Vice Chairman sat on the sofa with eyes shut. Zhang let him be, believing that Lin 
was trying to concentrate and Lin attentively. But after several minutes Zhang peeled his 
eyes from his report a second time and saw that Lin remained in the same position with 
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Lin’s naptime could not have come at a worse time and is what makes this little 
incident so appealing for this discussion. Once again Lin is illustrated as a man who 
shows little, if any, interest in politics. Moreover, four hours following this episode, Lin 
made a public appearance at Tiananmen, addressing several hundred thousands who 
received him. The speech was broadcasted publicly. Zhang Yunsheng did not accompany 
Lin to Tiananmen but heard his speech from his office in Maojiawan on the radio. The 
rally began at ten o’clock in the morning. Directly following the playing of “East is Red” 
(Dong fang hong), Lin began his speech stating “In my speech I’m going to talk about 
Vietnam…two Vietnams…half of a Vietnam.” It was clear to Zhang that Lin had 
forgotten to read from the written text prepared by his ghost writers. Instead, Lin began 
speaking utter nonsense. Lin also mispronounced “Palestine” (Balean) in his speech as 
“Pakistan” (Bajisitan). Ye Qun became enraged when she heard the speech. She blamed 
Lin’s fumbled speech and the errors that occurred on Lin’s secretaries and personal 
assistants by suggesting that they had given him too many sleeping pills. Ye Qun 
vehemently scolded her staff, “This time I’ll forgive you, but if this ever happens again, 
you’ll be punished for consciously carrying out political destruction.”
73
  
There is no recorded evidence that Lin took sleeping pills, such as a personal 
assistant’s recollection of giving Lin his required prescription. But evidence exists that 
does indeed point to Lin having some symptoms of insomnia. Recalling Zhang 
Yunsheng’s first meeting with Lin Biao, Lin asked Zhang if he had any problems 
sleeping. The glass windows that framed Lin’s room, though cloaked with a brown 
curtain twenty-four hours a day, were also soundproof.
74
 Li Wenpu, one of Lin’s key 
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personal bodyguards, reminded Lin’s staff that Lin can never receive a secretary to 
receive a report late at night since the meeting will affect Lin’s ability to fall asleep.
75
 Lin 
has also been noted to take frequent midnight drives around Beijing in order to help relax 
and handle his bouts with insomnia.  
We cannot completely dismiss Ye Qun’s accusations in the former example in 
regards to Lin’s public speech. But what seems even more alarming is Zhang Yunsheng’s 
observation prior to his meeting with Lin in preparation for the May 20 rally at 
Tiananmen. According to Zhang, prior to any public appearance when Lin would have to 
“walk on stage”, Ye Qun would permit a nurse to give him an injection that would 
reportedly “lift his spirits right away.” Whenever Lin would return home though the 
impact of the injection would lessen and Lin would become weak again.
76
 There is a 
dearth of literature that details Lin’s alleged use of narcotics. What is important for our 
analysis is that Lin, again, is documented as being relatively detached from social 
situations. If narcotics were utilized, its affects of “perking” him up were no doubt 
needed to remove Lin from his “detached” state caused by his schizoid personality. 
Otherwise, Lin would not appear as an appropriate public image of Mao’s Vice Chairman 
and “closest comrade in arms”. If narcotic usage did take place, which it appears that it 
did occur, it is obvious that Maojiawan took measures to assist Lin in making required 
public appearances in a reasonable and optimistic state—one that coincided with the 
Chairman’s wishes. This not only reinforces this study’s analysis that Lin suffered from a 
detached emotional state, but also illustrates the considerable measures taken designed to 
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meet the Chairman’s wishes and insure political survival. For our analysis of Lin Biao, 
the above examples also portray the canyon between Lin’s public and private image. 
A few brief points should be highlighted for the sake of clarity here. First, many 
of Lin’s personal yeomen witnessed Lin’s odd personality and aberrant health problems. 
They had no idea of why Lin behaved in these puzzling ways, but there is no doubt that 
Lin’s schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder were key components in 
his behavioral traits. Lin, like precious china, needed to be handled with great care. The 
delicate balance needed to be maintained at all times and surely added to the stress of all 
Maojiawan staff members who would suffer the wrath of Lin’s political house keeper, Ye 
Qun. Lin’s dread toward attending a social function such as meeting with foreign guests 
indicates the anxiousness and social pressure that he felt. Although Lin did not display 
any behaviors that may be seen as typical of an individual suffering from social anxiety 
disorder in the examples offered when Lin met foreign guests, it is clear that Lin 
disdained going into public and being in a social situation for any extended length of 
time. Second, it is also evident that Lin exhibited an indifferent attitude toward politics, 
both foreign and domestic. Lin showed an emotional detachment toward any 
developments during the Cultural Revolution. It should not be argued or thought that Lin 
was completely mute toward Cultural Revolution developments or that he never 
displayed hardly any emotion, but Lin contrasts heavily with his overall level of interest 
to politics when compared to either Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong. Unlike the Premier or the 
Chairman who both toiled and slogged through paperwork deep into the midnight hours, 
Lin preferred, if he could, to sleep at night and, more importantly for this study, had no 
real opinion toward every new political development. Lin showed no interest in meeting 
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foreign delegations either, completely dismissing their presence and, at times, arriving 
late toward receptions, and necessitating an extra “push” from his secretaries or Ye Qun 
to make him attend regulatory celebrations for Beijing’s foreign company. Third, 
throughout this discussion on Lin’s health and personality there is a constantly 
reappearing character. A figure has intervened in various instances, has taken control of 
situations, and who has managed the rules, guidelines, of policy. This individual would 
also either obstruct or allow visitors to meet with Lin Biao completely at her own 
discretion. That person is none other than Lin’s wife, Ye Qun. It is her personality and 
the impact she had on Lin’s life to which we now turn.   
Ye Qun Ba Guan (Ye Qun Guarding the Pass) 
 If Lin was the aloof, private, solitary, and effete figure of the family, than Ye Qun 
was the manager, a crafty strategist and the independent and salient front woman of 
Maojiawan and the Lin Biao household. In ways, her position as major advisor and head 
of the Lin Biao office as well as the General Office of the Military Affairs Committee 
(MAC) since 1960, at Mao’s blessing, dictated that she be in command of the ebb and 
flow of information in the Lin Biao home. Ye Qun, in her position, could be regarded as 
Lin’s brain trust, offering advice on everything and would speak freely about various 
matters. What becomes pertinent for this study is the consequent ability for Ye Qun to 
take advantage of her special status and manipulate data and facts for her own political 
needs, or perhaps what she felt would be in the best interest of her family. As seen below, 
rejiggering documents and comporting general information to how she thought it might 
fit the political puzzle of the time was common. This chapter will now describe Ye’s role 
in Maojiawan, her managerial behavior both politically and within the family, and the 
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contrasting behavior and personality that illustrates the great juxtaposition between her 
and Lin.  
 
 
Personal Intricacies and Behavior  
 Unlike the quiet and reserved Lin Biao, who hardly ever dared to venture away 
from his private little sanctuary, Ye Qun was a vibrant being. She typically would 
awaken around ten o’clock in the morning. Her personal assistants always prepared her 
wardrobe, making sure that her clothing was neatly pressed and cleaned. Her aides also 
abetted by dressing her. Ye would always receive a morning breakfast that was served on 
a white enamel tray. Ye’s morning diet typically was eggs and noodles and was then 
washed down by green tea.
77
 Like Chairman Mao, Ye was particularly fond of swimming 
and enjoyed it as an extracurricular activity for cardiovascular health. Ye also had a pool 
installed at the Lin Biao family vacation home at Beidaihe and at Maojiawan. Despite Lin 
Biao’s detest for water, Ye Qun did not hesitate on the pool’s installation inside 
Maojiawan. The swimming pool that Ye had constructed was state of the art for the 
1960s. The pool measured twenty five meters in length, seven meters wide, with a depth 
that did not exceed two meters. The pools cost a reported 250,000 yuan to build and cost 
200 yuan per month in electricity.
78
 Lin Biao, so detached from the world, did not even 
know about its construction.
79
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 Following Ye’s afternoon swim her day would be finished with dinner and a 
movie. Like lunch, Ye dined on vegetable and beef dishes. According to Ye’s personal 
assistants, Ye finished her evening with a movie, some of which were imports that were 
obtained in secret.
80
 Ye also, unlike Lin, would wake at night and not be bothered by the 
interruption in sleep. Ye would typically take advantage of the situation and make late 
midnight snacks such as eggs at one or two o’clock in the morning.
81
  
 Vanity was a major issue in Ye’s daily lifestyle. As already mentioned she 
enjoyed swimming for its benefits to cardiovascular health. But she also experimented 
with diet pills that were imported into China. The pills were taken daily and were 
supposed to curb excess weight gain.
82
 Ye would also receive massages from her staff. 
Ye requested that one assistant massage her temples at night prior to falling asleep. 
According to one source, Ye’s temple massage lasted usually for twenty minutes before 
she would drift off and become comatose.
83
 Thus, quite a contradiction exists when 
comparing both Lin Biao and Ye Qun. Lin Biao was the reserved and quiet type; Ye Qun 
was an outgoing and physically active ball of energy who enjoyed her waking moments 
and took advantage of the Party perks that came with being married to such a high-
ranking figure.    
Ye Qun the Intellectual 
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 Aside from swimming, eating, and receiving massages, Ye Qun also held an 
enthusiastic attitude toward education, particularly history, philosophy, and even 
literature. Guan Weixun, a well known officer within PLAAF circles, was recommended 
by PLAAF Commander Wu Faxian’s wife Chen Suizhe. Chen endorsed Guan to become 
a Maojiawan staff member for his talents in reading, writing, and outstanding knowledge 
of history. Guan was a staff member in Maojiawan from 1968 to 1970.  
 Prior to Guan’s arrival, Maojiawan was devoid of literature. But soon after Guan 
arrived, Maojiawan became filled with literary works that were confiscated from military 
libraries in Beijing. Guan would give frequent lectures to Ye Qun. Topics would range 
from history of the ancient Greeks and the pharos of Egypt. Ye was especially stimulated 
by Egypt’s first female pharaoh, Cleopatra. Ye Qun reportedly took great interest in these 
meetings, constantly scribbling down notes.
84
 Ye’s interest in Guan was so deep she 
ordered the Maojiawan staff not to contact her while she received her history lessons 
from Guan. If a phone call came in, unless it were Jiang Qing or Chairman Mao, Ye Qun 
ordered the staff to handle the call and to notify the caller that she would contact them 
later. Ye also became enthralled by the palace-type intrigue in Shakespeare’s 




 Ye also found a great interest in Chinese cultural relics. In the midst of the 
Cultural Revolution and the destruction of the ‘four olds’ Ye seized many relics including 
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paintings and hid them inside the Maojiawan residence. The relics and paintings were all 
safely hidden from eyesight and Lin Biao was unaware of their presence in the home.
86
 
Ye Qun’s Sexuality 
 Electric toothbrushes, swimming pools, and massages aside, Ye Qun also enjoyed 
wearing lingerie and viewing pornographic videos and magazines which were imported 
and secretly obtained by private sources.
87
 Ye Qun’s attention to her appearance and to 
vanity reflects a sense that she, unlike Lin Biao, took advantage of the perks that come 
with entering elite level politics. Ye’s diva-like attitude was nothing new for her 
character. While in Yan’an she was known as one of the “eight Yan’an beauties” for her 
incredible appearance and keen political acumen, a unique package indeed considering 
the rough, rural, and ragged lifestyle that was omnipresent during the Yan’an period. One 
evening while receiving a massage from her personal assistant Tang Jie, Ye began to 
aggrandize her personal looks, buttressing her great beauty by emphasizing the soft, fine, 
white skin that she possessed.  
In perhaps one of the most strangest and intimate of all incidents in Maojiawan, 
Ye Qun personally made private maneuvers in order to achieve intimate moments with 
Chief of the General Staffs Department Huang Yongsheng. On February 10, 1970 a letter 
reportedly arrived at Maojiawan. The letter was addressed to Ye Qun but no statement 
appeared on it that omitted other secretaries opening, reviewing, and reporting it. The 
letter was from Huang Yongsheng’s wife, Ding Huilao, who shared her concern and 
suspicions of Huang Yongsheng having an affair with a maid servant working at the 
Headquarters Office of the Chief of Staffs Department. Ding requested Ye’s assistance in 
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the matter, hoping that Ye would speak to Lin Biao about the issue and then resolve it. 
Ye, upon receiving news of Ding’s suspicions, telephoned Huang Yongsheng’s residence 
and spoke with Ding. Ye reported that Lin, other than expressing his usual superficial 
attitude, felt that what is important is whether or not Huang is holding high the banner of 




Several days later, Huang arrived at Maojiawan for a meeting with Ye Qun. Ye 
met with Huang in her bedroom. Wang Landuo, a personal assistant to Ye Qun, was in 
Ye’s bathroom which was adjoined to Ye’s bedroom. Ye’s bathroom was layered with 
ceramic tile and contained a sofa, massage tables, and a one-way glass specially imported 
from Japan enabling the bathroom occupant to peek into Ye’s bedroom but eliminating 
any possibility of somebody to see inside of the bathroom. According to Wang’s 
recollections, Ye Qun and Huang Yongsheng met in Ye’s bedroom and discussed the 
rumors and suspicions about Huang’s illicit affair. Huang performed a self-criticism in 
front of Ye, calling himself and his family a great misfortune. Ye reassured him however, 
demonstrating forgiveness, showing her maternal instincts as she told him that everything 
would be fine. Huang then disclosed his wish of a successful family lifestyle like that of 
the Lin Biao family. Ye vetoed Huang’s statement and exposed her emotions of sadness 
and frustration, stating that Huang’s perception was incorrect, that the Lin Biao family 
was filled with problems. Ye uncovered her true feelings of “once being as pretty as a 
spring flower” but now feeling old. Huang reassured her, grasping her hands, stating that 
she “does not look too old, does not look too young, but is the same old alluring person.” 
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Ye concluded the meeting by suggesting that Huang and Ding come to Maojiawan for a 
friendly lunch in the future. Huang happily agreed.
89
 
Nearly five months later, on June 21, 1970, Huang and Ding came to Maojiawan 
for the lunch that was mentioned in the privacy of Ye Qun’s bedroom. Ye ordered that 
eight different dishes were to be prepared, four hot and four cold. Fish was also to be 
included on the menu. Ye also instructed her staff to prepare her best clothing and to also 
spray a small hint of perfume onto her white silk underwear. Phone messages and phone 
calls were also to be eliminated during the lunch date and after, as Ye stated that she 
needed to speak with Huang following the meal. No visitors were allowed to come to 
Maojiawan during or after the meal either. The three dined for two hours, after which Ye 
excused herself to the main secretaries’ office and reported that she must lay down in her 
chambers since she felt she had drank a bit too much. Ye’s personal assistants informed 
Ding and Huang about the reasons for Ye’s sudden departure. Ding responded by 
expressing the warmest wishes for Ye Qun and that she did not wish to stay any longer 
since she understood the level of work that Ye still needed to complete. Huang however, 




Nearly two hours following Huang’s summons to Ye’s bedroom, he reemerged 
with beads of sweat framing his face, his military cap off, and his hair in a jumbled mess. 
According to Ye’s personal assistant, Xiao Shi, who was inside Ye’s adjoining bathroom 
during Huang and Ye’s two hour meeting, Ye slinked from behind a dressing screen 
scantily clad in lingerie. Ye became emotionally unstable; weeping and sharing with 
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Huang that the public understanding of the Lin Biao family does not represent the murk 
reality. Ye imparted to Huang that there was a complete dearth of intimacy in her 
marriage to Lin Biao, as she stated to Huang, “Who is my sympathizer, who understands 
me, who is my intimate person?” (shei tongqing wo, shei lijie wo, shei shi wode zhixin 
ren) Huang reportedly embraced Ye, holding her in his arms and returned similar 
emotions, stating that he always admired Ye and had always cherished her. The two 
disrobed, and Xiao Shi witnessed Ye and Huang in filgrante dilecto.
91
 This colorful 
example may seem like gossip but for this analysis it is a telling incident. Ye’s statement 
to Huang indicates some degree of emotional disturbance. Clearly, Lin’s coldness 
affected Ye emotionally. We cannot exonerate Ye’s promiscuity as she has been rumored 
as being a sexually vibrant being, but when factoring Lin’s preference for isolation from 
everyone, including his family, then there is little doubt that Lin’s schizoid personality 
affected his marriage to Ye. For this study, it is particularly revealing as the DSM IV 
specifically cites lack of sexual desire or intimacy as a primary symptom of schizoid 
personality disorder.
92
 Moreover, when we consider that Lin Biao was socially 
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 Ye’s recorded sexuality between her and Huang did not terminate here however. One evening Ye Qun 
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disconnected with his staff and preferred being alone, this behavior could have extended 
into his relationship with Ye Qun. Ye’s alleged affair with Huang, if it did indeed occurr, 
illustrates a manifestation of feelings and emotion on Ye’s part, feelings that point toward 
a need for intimacy and a feeling of needing to be desired. These feelings could be 
interpreted as partially stemming from Lin’s relative absence from Ye’s life as a husband 
due to his schizoid personality.     
 Though Ye’s ordeal may seem like tantalizing gossip that parallels the dirtiest of 
Western tabloids and smut rags, the incident gives us some insight into both the character 
of Ye Qun and indirectly exposes the character of Lin Biao. On the surface, Ye’s private 
love affair is an obvious example of her independence and free will. She did not feel that 
her behavior should be constrained by the powerful position that she was placed in by 
being Lin’s wife. She was not only a vibrant risk-taker, but also devious and furtive. The 
political ramifications of such an affair during the Cultural Revolution would not only be 
devastating to her, but to the entire Lin Biao family, as the Chinese consider the family a 
single, solitary unit. In relation to understanding Lin Biao however, we should mention 
briefly his own relationship with Ye and how the two perceived each other. Lin Biao, 
according to the sources that are available, did have strong emotional feelings for Ye. 
During Lin’s post in the Northeastern region prior to the outbreak of the Chinese Civil 
War, Lin would make sure that Ye, then pregnant and confided to an antiquated hospital, 
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would receive bowls of chicken soup on rainy nights. Lin also expressed his love for Ye 
in a poem he wrote one evening in Maojiawan that stated:  
To My Endeared Wife: 
My blood is as warm as yours 
Though the color of our hair is not the same, 
Our bodies will be buried in the same tomb 
Though we were not born in the same place 
Lin Biao
93
   
 
Lin also enclosed a note with the poem indicating his desire to have his ashes with Ye 
Qun upon their deaths. These issues aside however, Lin also had moments when he 
scolded Ye Qun and physically attempted to harm her, such as when he attempted to push 
her out of a moving car, an event that Mao later laughed about after her appeal to him. 
94
 
Lin also loathed having conversations with Ye. So annoyed and vexed by her long 
winded and detailed discussions Ye would have with Lin, he took some initiative and 
ordered his secretaries to write a message on a scroll to hang on the wall which stated “In 
work, do not exceed your authority; in speaking do not be long winded and wordy [zuoshi 
mo yuequan, shuohua mo luosuo].”
95
 Ye however, differed in her opinion of Lin Biao. 
Most of Ye’s behavior seemed highly superficial toward Lin. It constantly seems, at least 
from a secretary’s perspective, that the atmosphere which Ye brought to her encounters 
with Lin seemed to be all about “business.” In Zhang Yunsheng’s memoirs for instance, 
Ye, instead of referring to Lin by his name, referred to him constantly as either 
shouzhang (leader) or 101. Ye remarked once that “There is little difference between me 
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and the palace maids of ancient times.”
96
 Aside from Mao’s unremitting snide remarks 
about Lin’s health, Ye also held the dubious distinction of being a critic of her husband’s 
aforementioned medical problems, as she noted in a diary in 1961 while staying in 
Fuzhou, calling Lin “a living corpse.”
97
 These remarks certainly hold an acerbic tone to 
them. There can be little doubt that Lin’s continuous medical battles made him a 
perennial vexation for Ye Qun. Not only did Ye need to manage Lin’s office, her private 
life with Lin most likely held little actual romance or intimacy. Not only was there a 
considerable age gap of about fifteen years, Lin was, as mentioned before, struggling 
with a personality that was detached socially. Furthermore, as noted in the DSM IV, 
schizoid personalities do not have a sex drive. While Lin’s age may be the sole reason for 
his lack of intimate physical contact with Ye as she asserted to Huang, we must also 
consider the other numerous instances when Lin displayed no interest in social functions, 
close interaction, long-winded conversations, and overall emotional detachment.  
Managing the Family 
 From what we have discussed thus far, personal observations tell us that Ye Qun 
was a vibrant and busy figure. Whether her interests spread into scholastic literature or 
focused on maintaining her personal beauty, Ye was not the secluded, shy personality 
like her husband. Her busybody nature even continued into the realm of managing the 
family, such as finding a spouse for her and Lin’s son, Lin Liguo. In a rather bizarre 
series of events, Ye personally orchestrated Maojiawan staff members, including Zhang 
Yunsheng, to find a wife for Lin Liguo. When two potential wives were found they were 
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invited to Maojiawan where Ye Qun personally interviewed them. Ye asked for the ladies 
to recite a quotation from “Quotations from Chairman Mao” which they did successfully 
in a low trembling voice. Lin Biao, as usual, showed no emotion to either lady or to the 
situation in general. He simply looked on. He did not move, he did not say anything. 
98
 
This little episode is not only another illustration of Lin’s ambivalence but also gives 
offers an example of Ye’s position as a key coordinator of the Lin Biao family.
99
 Lin 
Biao showed no emotion and no interest, a typical characteristic of schizoid personality. 
Ye Qun though, as the conductor of the Lin Biao family, took keen interest in the event 
and continued her search for Lin Liguo’s spouse.  
Like her son Lin Liguo, Ye Qun also took an interest in finding a future husband 
for her daughter, Lin Liheng (Lin Doudou). Unlike the collaboration and agreement 
between Ye and Lin Liguo in finding a spouse, Lin Doudou had no interest in getting 
married, much less having her future spouse chosen with the help of Ye Qun. Both Ye 
Qun and Lin Doudou had a dysfunctional and extremely abnormal relationship. Ye 
constantly demanded that Doudou follow Ye’s every word without question. Doudou was 
a very stubborn female. When Ye ordered Doudou to perform a task or even asked her a 
simple question, Doudou would ignore Ye, and either not follow through on Ye’s request 
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or by refusing to give an answer. This behavior would enrage Ye. Guan Weixun reports 
that Ye would virulently scold and scream at Doudou for her obstinate attitude that would 
sometimes lead to violent beatings.
100
  
In perhaps one of the saddest and disturbing incidents in CCP elite political life, 
Ye Qun attempted to find a husband for Doudou, which led to one of two of Doudou’s 
suicide attempts. Ye felt that Doudou was getting far too old to be single any longer. Ye 
was puzzled that Doudou had not found a spouse, as she stated “It’s about time that 
Doudou got married. She is already twenty-three. How can she bear the loneliness? I fell 
in love even before the age of twenty. I couldn’t have waited three more years myself!”
101
 
Ye dispatched the Maojiawan staff to different areas of the country in search of the 
perfect spouse for Doudou. When Doudou met her potential match for the first time, the 
results were not good. Reportedly, Doudou knew that Ye was up to her old tricks, trying 
to play matchmaker for Doudou. Doudou supposedly confronted the young man and 
asked him questions such as “who sent you” and “who told you to say these things?” Ye 
Qun reportedly became enraged after hearing the news. In vitriolic fashion Ye screamed 
at Guo who was reporting on behalf of Secretary Wang, Ye also called Doudou’s 
prospective spouse a bastard (wandan).
102
 
Not long after this affair, Doudou became angered, upset and emotionally 
overwhelmed with her mother’s constant control. Shortly following an intense argument 
between the two, which reportedly involved Ye pummeling Doudou until her head began 
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to bleed, Doudou locked herself in her private room in Maojiawan.
103
 Doudou did not 
remerge from her room for three days, not even for food. Ye stood by Doudou’s door 
periodically, pounding on it and demanding that Doudou unlock it. After three days of 
Doudou’s self-entrapment, the lock on the door was broken and Ye and a few Maojiawan 
staff members found Doudou passed out with her mouth open, framed by white foam. 
Doudou had overdosed on sleeping pills. Ye panicked but quickly took Doudou to the 
local hospital. Fortunately doctors were able to revive her. According to Zhang 
Yunsheng, Doudou had taken twenty sleeping pills.
104
 Ye ordered the Maojiawan staff 
not to report the incident nor say anything to anybody about what occurred. She also 
instructed all staff members not to report the incident to Lin Biao.
105
 Ye’s demonstrative 
and controlling behavior in this instance suggests again the primary role that Ye played in 
the Lin Biao family. Unlike Lin, Ye Qun was an omnipresent force who always felt a 
need to know every tidbit of information and personal matter occurring inside the family. 
Lin’s schizoid personality and social anxiety disorders, no doubt played a prominent role 
in enabling Ye Qun to manage the family in such a way as he was largely absent from the 
family and from being a father figure in the traditional sense.     
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There are questions that still exist in this little episode of elite political life that are 
left unanswered. No evidence exists that can confirm why Doudou would not simply run 
to Lin Biao and tell him of her continuing troubles with her mother. One assertion though 
is that Doudou had no realistic opportunity of meeting with Lin Biao since he preferred 
being withdrawn from others. If any meeting would occur it was overseen and controlled 
by Ye Qun. Another contention could be made, though closely related to the former, that 
Lin’s indifference and ambivalence toward nearly everything that came his way, either 
political or personal, would discourage any meaningful attempt by Doudou to maliciously 
report to her father about her mother’s contentious actions. Another point that needs 
consideration is the concept of the family unit in Chinese culture. Filial piety, though 
hardly exhibited in Doudou’s conflicts with her overbearing mother, could possibly have 
weighed heavily on Doudou’s conscience and thus deterred her from sharing her dilemma 
with Lin. Doudou’s overall respect for her father, the key figurehead in the Chinese 
family, might also have an affect on her decision not to share her problems with Lin. 
Taking into consideration Lin’s overbearing personal problems that he dealt with daily, 
Doudou’s abstention makes further sense as she most likely, out of respect to her father, 
wished not to disturb or upset him.      
   One conclusion drawn from the above instances is that Ye Qun acted 
independently. Ye pulled the strings and held the reigns during important familial affairs 
and would occlude the dissemination of information to Lin Biao. Lin held little, if any, 
actual interest in the “beauty contests” that Doudou managed for their son and daughter. 
Furthermore, Ye’s interest in finding a spouse for Lin Liguo and Lin Doudou represents 
her interests of extending the Lin Biao family into the future. Like any powerful family, 
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its continued success and survival hinges on the capability of the next generation to carry 
out and perform necessary tasks for survival and eventually superseding the older 
generation. Ye Qun, potentially foreseeing a powerful family dynasty, controlled the 
search for a spouse for her two children. Moreover, Ye’s choice for the appropriate 
spouses is for political reasons. Ye could not afford to have a mate for her children who 
were from heinous class backgrounds or appeared as a weak representative for the Lin 
Biao family, nor could she afford anybody that would potentially rebel against the family. 
Two elements seen in this chapter will extend into the next: Ye’s active, independent 
decision-making with very little participation or input from Lin Biao; and Ye’s personal 
coordination and filtering, altering, and obstruction of information. Like Doudou’s 
suicide attempt, Ye restricted what she wished Lin to know and what she wished he 
didn’t know. In the instances below however, Ye’s blockage involved politically 
sensitive materials and decisions. 
Controlling the Flow and Managing Affairs 
 Ye Qun’s unique position as major advisor to the Lin Biao office places her into a 
special position. Ye personally commanded what documents and information would be 
received by Lin Biao during her own private encounters or in the duration of a brief thirty 
minute meeting from Lin Biao’s secretaries. Ye chose courses of action that she felt 
would suit her family the best, insuring its survival or enhancing its prestige.  
 Ye’s obstruction and control of information can be seen in several episodes that 
occurred throughout the Cultural Revolution period. In one instance, Lin Biao agreed to 
travel to Nanchang where he was to meet with Jiangxi provincial governor Cheng 
Shiqing. Ye strongly disapproved of Lin’s meeting with Cheng, fearing what potentially 
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digressive political influences the meeting may have on Lin Biao. While flying to 
Nanchang to meet with Cheng, Lin fell asleep. While Lin dozed off, Ye ordered the plane 
to continue onward, completely bypassing Nanchang and skipping ahead to the next 
destination on Lin’s tour. When Lin finally awoke, Ye reported to Lin that they had 
already passed Nanchang. There is no objection noted on Lin’s part to missing the 
meeting with Cheng Shiqing. Taking into account Lin’s previously documented disgust 
with social situations, an absence of objection on Lin’s part is not surprising.
106
 
 Forgery also became a common trend inside Maojiawan. Ye, after receiving a 
document from the Chairman in 1967 related to Jiang Qing’s Proletariat status, phoned Li 
Genqing, Maojiawan’s forgery expert, and demanded that he come to visit. Ye Qun, 
when asked why Lin Biao could not comment on the document, replied, “The shouzhang 
[Lin Biao] needs to rest. We cannot go and disturb him with this matter right now.”
107
 Li 
Genqing soon thereafter arrived and began to make multiple attempts at matching Lin’s 
handwriting. Ye ordered that Li write “Salute Jiang Qing’s Proletariat Knowledge.” Lin’s 
secretaries closely observed Li’s forgeries and commented that the writing appeared to be 
too small to be Lin Biao’s penmanship. Ye was hardly as picky as Lin’s secretaries 
though, and ordered that twenty copies be made.
108
 In another manipulative instance, Ye 
Qun would utilize Lin’s sensitivity to temperature to her advantage. At times, Ye Qun 
would want to leave Maojiawan without informing Lin of her whereabouts or reason for 
departure. Ye, according to Lin’s secretaries, would alter the temperature inside 
Maojiawan, consequently vexing Lin’s health and preventing any potential chance of him 
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roaming the residence in search for her. Ye also created a small, hidden exit inside her 
resting room, enabling her to dispatch from the residence without being heard through 
Maojiawan’s hallways.
109
 If Lin did happen to inquire about Ye’s whereabouts, the Lin 
Biao staff was instructed simply to state that she was sleeping. 
 In one of the most colorful incidents illustrative of Ye’s obfuscation of 
information during the Cultural Revolution is directly following the Ninth Party 
Congress. This incident not only illuminates Ye’s manipulative behavior, but shows that 
Ye was perfectly willing to act against Lin’s wishes. Before the Ninth Party Congress 
Mao commented that Jiang Qing should not be a Politburo member, which would 
consequently eliminate any chance of Ye’s candidacy on the Politburo due to Jiang’s 
higher status within the Party hierarchy. Moreover, such a decision would cause Lin to 
deny any support for Ye’s Politburo membership. Ye could not tolerate the thought of not 
being promoted to the Politburo. As one of her secretaries recollects, Ye felt that the 
opportunity had arrived and it could not be dismissed since the chance would not 
return.
110
 A three man group consisting of Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Huang 
Yongsheng had been appointed by Mao to assemble a list of candidates for membership. 
The three men did not believe that Mao would be so bold as to block his own wife, a 
powerful, key Central Cultural Revolutionary Group (CCRG) member, from Politburo 
status. Thus, the three men included Jiang Qing in their list. Mao was agreeable to the 
decision when informed, but sent the men to see Lin Biao to confirm and finalize the 
ruling. On the evening that the three men visited Maojiawan to speak to Lin however, Ye 
                                                 
109
 Wen Feng, Shentanxia de Lin Biao (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) pp. 
54-56 
110
 Guan Weixun, Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue 
chubanshe, 1993) p. 220 
                 73 
Qun stated that Lin was ill and could not be seen by anybody, thus bypassing any 
potential risk that Lin might possibly object to Jiang’s nomination to become a Politburo 
member. As Guan Weixun notes, this incident made many of the secretaries in 
Maojiawan conclude that it was easy for Ye to conspire and act behind the scenes without 
Lin’s knowledge.
111
 It has also been noted in another source that Ye spoke to Lin Liguo 
and uttered her concerns for the future of the Lin Biao family by suggesting that Lin’s 
health is only worsening and the continued and future success of the family lays in Ye’s 
attainment of high-ranking Party status.
112
   
Maintaining Close Relations with Jiang Qing 
 Critical for this analysis is the role that Jiang Qing played in Ye Qun’s life and 
their relationship. As Ye Qun was the key pragmatist for the Lin Biao family, Ye sought 
to build a firm relationship with Jiang Qing. Doing so would aid in the political survival 
of the Lin Biao family. As a leading member of the Central Cultural Revolutionary 
Group and Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing held high esteem within the Party. Jiang, often viewed 
as a close collaborator with Lin Biao in the purge and removal of Party members during 
the Cultural Revolution, is quite the contrary to what existing evidence now illustrates. 
As with other venues seen thus far—family politics and political participation in certain 
major events—maintaining a close relationship with Jiang Qing and Diaoyutai fell on the 
shoulders of Ye Qun. The level of participation, admiration, and pleasure that Ye took 
toward her relationship with Jiang Qing illustrates a keen interest in potential power and 
influence that could be gained by maintaining good guanxi with Jiang. There is also little 
doubt that Jiang and Ye took advantage of the crass violence of the Cultural Revolution 
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for their own political machinations and the elimination of potential rivals as we will see 
in the following chapter. As Jiang told Ye, “Now it is chaotic, you go and capture 
enemies for me, I will go and capture any enemies for you.”
113
  
 Ye Qun held a high level of respect for Jiang. Like the careful rules of following 
the Chairman, Ye did not wish to disrespect or “show up” Ye in public meetings. As Ye 
Qun stated, if Jiang Qing, “goes there, I will go there. If she does not go there, I will not 
go there.” On the eve of National Day in 1967, Ye waited at Beijing airport for a visiting 
Albanian delegation to arrive. Jiang Qing however was not present and consequently was 
not able to receive the incoming guests. Instead of greeting the delegation upon their 
arrival, Ye chose to leave before their entrance, fearing that her presence would upstage 
Jiang politically.
114
   
 Ye also did not shy away from helping Jiang with matters that were politically 
sensitive concerning Jiang’s past as doing so only enhanced the level of trust between the 
two. In the summer of 1966, Jiang Qing became worried about her past from Shanghai 
artistic circles in the 1930s. Both Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao chose to closely 
collaborate with Ye Qun in obtaining past evidence that could be used to implicate Jiang 
and tarnish her political image as a “pure” revolutionary. Ye Qun was requested by Jiang 
to obtain the evidence and upon hearing of the opportunity Ye jumped at the chance and 
ordered Wu Faxian to stage a “household confiscation” of the evidence, which consisted 
of diaries and letters, in Shanghai. Ye and Wu orchestrated a staged seizure of the home 
of Wang Jiangxian by Red Guards under the command of Jiang Tengjiao. The seizure 
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was successful and, according to Zhang Yunsheng, the evidence found was returned to 
Beijing where it was then placed in a secure area in an Air Force office that contained top 
secret information. A month later, both Ye Qun and Xie Fuzhi reportedly burned the 
documents at Jiang Qing’s request.
115
  
 As witnessed above, Lin’s relations with Jiang within the private realm were less 
than cordial. Ye however, capitalized on Lin’s absence, by both currying favor and 
respecting Jiang, Ye tried to maintain a bridge between Maojiawan and Diaoyutai. 
Although a certain degree of Ye’s motive can be seen as the need to insure political 
survival, especially considering Jiang’s powerful political position within the Cultural 
Revolution Group, it should also be noted that both Ye and Jiang viewed their 
relationship as mutual and symbiotic, complementing each other and enhancing their 
status insuring their survival within the Party. As illustrated in the following chapter, Ye 
and Jiang’s elaborate scheming extended to Party purges and influencing political trends 
during the Cultural Revolution. However, what must also be considered is to what degree 
Ye was acting as to follow current political trends occurring in the country.  
Unmasking the Private 
 This chapter will now briefly review and conclude with the findings uncovered. A 
review of the basic characteristics that make up schizoid personality disorder is 
necessary. As described in the DSM IV, when considering Lin Biao, schizoid personality 
disorder is shown in Lin as:  
• Lin Biao rarely shows any desires nor does he seem to enjoy close 
relationships, including being an intimate member of the family 
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• Lin Biao almost always chooses to be in solitude and prefers performing 
solitary activities 
• Lin shows little, if any, amount of intimacy and interest in of being 
intimate with Ye Qun 
• Lin takes pleasure in few, if any, activities 
• Lin Biao, with a couple of notable exceptions, lacks close friends or 
confidants   
• Lin Biao appears indifferent to the praise or criticism of others 
• Lin Biao shows emotional coldness, detachment, or flattened affectivity. 
Lin rarely shows or illustrates any feeling toward political matters and 
matters of the family. Communication thus is virtually non-existent.   
Several observations will now be made to conclude this chapter. First, an extremely 
private and introverted Lin Biao caused by his schizoid personality and social anxiety 
disorder has been illustrated. This image of Lin Biao as seen by his secretaries and 
personal assistants is hardly the picture normally associated with him: a man brimming 
with political energies, completely intoxicated by his growing political status and the 
unstable political and economic affects of the Cultural Revolution. In this analysis 
though, Lin is aloof and has no desire to have any sort of intense physical or emotional 
intimacy with anyone. Instead, Lin preferred living in the quiet solitude of his bedroom, 
locked away from others, his room cloaked with drawn curtains keeping in rays of 
sunshine from entering his room. On the rare occasions when visitors were allowed to see 
Lin, the meetings did not last long. Lin’s secretaries, who gave political reports on 
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current trends, were confined to small thirty minute time periods—hardly enough time to 
grasp the current trends in Party politics.  
 Second, Lin’s attitude toward politics can be characterized as ambiguous, 
indifferent, and carefree—a facet of schizoid personality disorder. For example, Lin, 
when hearing some of China’s greatest accomplishments such as the successful 
detonation of China’s first hydrogen bomb in June 1967, responded to this news with 
hardly any emotion. Any news that Lin heard from his secretaries was usually scoffed, 
completely ignored, or Lin became so disinterested that he fell asleep. While some may 
label this behavior as being politically passive, the evidence that reviewed has indicated 
in several instances that Lin was not passive but carefree and seemingly clueless. As we 
should recall, upon hearing of Li Tianyu’s problems at the Defense Ministry, Lin’s only 
response was, “I have no ideas,” and then allowed Ye Qun to decide and make a solution. 
Ye’s answer involved political action. If Lin wanted to fly low on the political radar 
screen he should, at the very least, have offered other alternatives to his most private and 
trusted folk. But Lin simply agreed with Ye and showed no displeasure or grievances 
toward her suggestion and expressed little concern over any potential consequences. 
Indeed, often Lin seemed more clueless than a political strategist who preferred laying 
low as part of an overall strategy for survival.    
 Third, while Lin was nearly devoid of the lives and political drama of his family 
and of the Cultural Revolution, Ye Qun became the master commander, catalyst for 
change, and political housekeeper within Maojiawan. The jarring contradiction between 
the two can be highlighted by Lin’s private, reclusive behavior and Ye’s outgoing, social, 
and domineering actions. From the perspective of her personal assistants, Ye seemed to 
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enjoy the “court” like lifestyle that accompanied her powerful position in the Party. Ye’s 
daily affairs such as swimming in her own personal pool, having a private poetry and 
history tutor, and full body and temple massages are all illustrations of the commodities 
Ye, unlike her husband Lin Biao, took advantage of being near the top of the CCP 
plateau. Lin’s dysfunctional personality and daily struggles with social anxiety disorder 
also had an enabling affect on Ye Qun, as she could make decisions for Lin.  
Fourth, Lin’s social and emotional detachment crossed over family boundaries, 
affecting the level of intimacy between Lin and Ye Qun. There is no direct, available 
evidence of Lin’s sexual activities with Ye Qun. However, Ye’s vivid sexual promiscuity 
and affair with Huang Yongsheng does reveal that Lin was most likely largely removed 
from any amount of intimacy with his wife. Moreover, Ye expressed some feeling of 
loneliness and sadness as she confided to Huang Yongsheng asking “Who is my 
sympathizer, who understands me, who is my intimate person?” This statement is 
illustrative of the emotional coldness that existed between Lin and Ye. We cannot firmly 
conclude that Lin had no sexual contact with Ye, but considering Lin’s emotional 
partition from family and associates as well as Ye’s private statements to Huang 
Yongsheng, we can assume that Lin and Ye’s relationship lacked a large degree of 
affection. Crucial for this analysis is that when contemplating Lin’s emotional and sexual 
disassociation from Ye Qun, Lin appears to meet criterion three to schizoid personality 
disorder.     
Also, utilizing the private observations of Lin’s secretaries and Ye’s personal assistants, it 
is evident that Lin private behavior resembles that of an individual suffering from 
schizoid personality disorder. Lin meets criterion one, two, three, six, and seven. 
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Fifth, Ye’s position as major advisor in the Lin Biao office and the MAC along 
with her sneaky behavior affected the flow of information into and out of Lin Biao’s 
hands. While Ye did not have an extraordinary amount of influence upon other top-
ranking Party members, she served as Lin Biao’s official mouthpiece and manager—in 
the political and familial realms. Not only was Lin Biao limited to the information he 
received caused by his own personality blots, Ye Qun’s control of the flow of 
information further hindered Lin’s overall knowledge. However, to what extant did Ye’s 
information to Lin even matter? Indeed, even if it is assumed that Ye loyally followed her 
position as major advisor and meticulously reported every minor and major detail to Lin, 
what difference would that have made given Lin’s schizoid personality disorder and 
social anxiety disorder? The ambivalence, lack of emotion, and reluctance to be in social 
situations that Lin lived with deterred him from making any solid policy decisions that 
were of political value. 
By utilizing the private observations of Lin’s secretaries and Ye’s personal 
assistants, it is evident that Lin meets criterion one, two, three, six, and seven for schizoid 
personality disorder.  
Lin’s life then was extremely problematic during the Cultural Revolution. Lin could not 
tolerate the required meetings that would come with his high ranking Party position either 
they be with his trusted secretaries or with visiting foreign delegates nor could he afford 
to remain completely disengaged from politics. Given the unstable nature of politics 
during the Cultural Revolution, Lin needed to follow closely the ever changing barometer 
set by Mao. But given the available evidence, it becomes doubtful if Lin had the 
capability to do just that or if he even had any desire or interest to perform the required 
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duties that were called upon him. Lin rarely cared little about policies or ongoing trends 
that came about during the Cultural Revolution. This was not because of political 
passiveness but because Lin’s schizoid personality overruled his ability to make firm 
decisions as well as to have any interest in current political trends. This study must now 
place Lin’s intrapersonal behavior discussed in this chapter within the context of his 
interpersonal relations and actions during the Cultural Revolution. The following chapter 
will highlight the tragic impact that Lin’s personality disorders played in his decision-
making, or lack thereof, as the Cultural Revolution unfolded. The following chapter will 
also offer further evidence of the enabling affect that Lin’s personality difficulties had on 
Ye Qun. This study will now turn to specific cases, and witness how Lin’s personality 
and social problems dramatically impacted his eventual downfall. We will also view how 
Lin’s personality and dislocation affected his depth of involvement in inner-Party 
political struggle. What is particularly shocking is that Lin’s role is virtually non-existent 
in most cases due to his personality own struggles to interact with other peoples. It is 
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Thus far this study has probed the private life of Lin Biao. This examination has 
offered a detailed overview of the behavior and personality that Lin expressed toward the 
most intimate people in his life. Thus far it is also evident that Lin Biao has personality 
quirks that may or may not inhibit his ability to appropriately govern the position as Vice 
Chairman. The previous chapter has also illustrated the juxtaposition between Lin and his 
wife Ye Qun. While Lin Biao preferred to spend his days sitting in solitude and only 
coming into contact with individuals for limited amounts of time; Ye Qun was a social 
butterfly who always babbled and spoke with everyone ranging from the Maojiawan staff 
to Party big shots like Jiang Qing and Chen Boda. Lin Biao resided and spent the 
majority of his time in a bedroom with a dearth of decorations; Ye Qun’s décor was all 
Maocentric as she hung the Chairman’s calligraphy and posters on her walls and even 
boasted an impressive collection of Mao buttons. If ever there was an odd couple in 
Chinese history, Lin Biao and Ye Qun accurately fit the description.  
 This chapter will take this study to the next level. This study must now turn its 
attention to the public sphere and seek to understand the role that Lin Biao played in a 
series of cases where Lin has been traditionally viewed as a maniacal, devious political 
plotter in order to gain power inside both the Party and the PLA. This chapter will take a 
case study approach and will focus on the “active” (1966-1969) phase of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
  Several critical points should be made here. These points will serve as important 
guidelines to keep in mind while reading about the politically puzzling and bizarre cases 
presented in this chapter. First, throughout this chapter, one must consider the actual role 
that Lin plays in each case. In several instances, this chapter may seem to stray away 
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from Lin Biao, the primary subject under investigation. However, the absence of Lin 
through a great deal of this chapter not only highlights the remarkable disassociation 
from social interactions that he preferred but also allows us to consider the engagement 
that other actors played in each respective case. This chapter will also illustrate that Lin, 
at times, did indeed act politically with either his own best interests, interests of the PLA, 
or interests of the Chairman in mind. However, Lin’s political behavior should be seen as 
primarily reactive rather than proactive. Second, while slogging through this chapter one 
must also keep in mind the discussion of Lin’s private life. Keeping this notion in mind 
will illustrate the increased primacy of Ye Qun in many of the political feuds and 
altercations discussed below. Finally, this chapter will not only reweigh the political 
salience of Lin Biao in the Cultural Revolution, but also illuminate facets of Chinese elite 
politics under the direct control of Chairman Mao. We will also see that petty 
contradictions and animosities rather than political policy differences paved the way for 
elite conflict. In addition, each actor discussed below existed and strived for continued 
survival by aligning and bandwagoning with various cliques and groups, all the while 
attempting to interpret the wishes of Chairman Mao.  
The Attack on Lu Dingyi 
 The case of Lu Dingyi is one of the greatest examples of palace intrigue that 
occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Lu Dingyi, as an alternate Politburo member, 
member of the Central Secretariat, and head of the Central Propaganda Department, had 
been accused of cooperating with Peng Zhen in an effort to curb the debate surrounding 
Hai Rui Dismissed to a purely academic one. In addition, in Mao’s view, Lu’s interest 
and spirit toward the Party rectification campaigns in the 1960s were seen as weak, not 
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possessing the amount of fervent emotion that the Chairman wished for. The official 
accusations against Lu are: opposition to Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought; 
opposition to the Cultural Revolution; and persecuting the Lin Biao family.  
 For the purposes of this discussion, the primary concern is the last charge. The 
accusation was based on a series of anonymous letters that were written by Lu Dingyi’s 
wife, Yan Weibing. From March 1960 onward, Yan Weibing wrote several epistles 
slandering Ye Qun. The letters contained acerbic accusations that exposed Ye’s personal 
life and family. The first letter accused Ye Qun of maltreating Lin Biao’s eldest daughter, 
Lin Xiaolin, who was from Lin’s first marriage to Liu Xinmin.
116
 The letter also accused 
Ye of participating in a promiscuous lifestyle prior to her marriage to Lin Biao. The letter 
specifically accuses that Ye had an affair with the counterrevolutionary Wang Shiwei and 
was not a virgin at the time of her marriage to Lin Biao.
117
 In addition to her affair with 
Wang, Ye Qun is also noted as having an affair with a Guomindang military drill 
sergeant and her Russian tutor while Lin was in Harbin in 1945.
118
 Ye Qun was accused 
of living in a decadent lifestyle too, a “feudal aristocrat and member of the privileged 
social class.”
119
 Finally, Ye Qun’s Party authenticity was placed in question as Yan 
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 The case of Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing is important for this study since it is a 
primary example of the initiative that is taken by Ye Qun during the Cultural Revolution 
as well as being an excellent example of how seemingly trivial, personal matters crossed 
into the political sphere resulting in violence. Ye’s initial reaction to the letters was 
absolute terror. She informed her staff members that the content of the letters is a matter 
of “national security.” Ye reportedly began to weep noisily one evening due to mental 
stress caused by the spread of the letters. Lin Biao, upon hearing the noise, decided to 
investigate. When Lin entered Ye Qun’s room, Ye dropped on the floor screaming, “you 
must rescue me, otherwise I might as well die.”
121
 Lin consoled Ye, telling her that he 
will inform the Public Security Bureau immediately to find the anonymous author. By 
summer 1963, six handwriting specialists were brought to Maojiawan. The specialists 
studied the letters and confirmed it was the handwriting of Yan Weibing.
122
 
 Ye Qun did not waste time in formulating a counterattack against Lu Dingyi and 
Yan Weibing. Ye wrote a series of essays and circulated them throughout the Party. The 
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 Guo Xiyou, a former lover of Ye Qun during the 
Yan’an days, confirms that Ye had an affair with Wang Shiwei. According to Wang Landuo, Guo Xiyou 
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documents written by Ye were entitled “Eight Major Points on Lu Dingyi and Yan 
Weibing’s Counterrevolutionary Letters.” The content accused both Lu and Yan of 
whimsical crimes. One accusation argued that Lu and Yan objected to Lin Biao as 
Defense Minister since their son’s name contained the same “de” as seen in “Peng 
Dehuai”. Ye believed that this represented their longing to bring back Peng as Defense 
Minister.
123
 Ye also revised and influenced the punishment that was to be inflicted upon 
Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing for their crimes.  
In September 1966, Chen Boda issued a series of punitive measures against Lu 
Dingyi that did not permit Lu to have more than twelve yuan a day, a sofa, a bed and a 
writing desk, and he was required to be judged by the Red Guards. The material had 
passed through Maojiawan and was approved by Lin Biao. Ye Qun however, felt that the 
punishments were not harsh enough and far too humane. One morning, Ye awakened 
early and made a personal trip to Diaoyutai to visit Chen Boda. Ye informed Chen that 
revisions needed to be made to the document. Chen challenged Ye, arguing that the 
document had been approved by Lin Biao. Ye however countered and argued that Lin 
Biao always marks “agree” (tongyi) on everything.
124
 Shortly following Ye’s visit, 
changes were made to how Lu’s punishment should be carried out, violent interrogations 
and being deprived of cold drinking water was included in the revisions.
125
   
 Ye Qun’s role in the Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing case even extends further as she 
showed interest in viewing Yan and Lu’s struggle sessions under the control of Red 
Guards. One afternoon, after learning that a Red Guard rally would be held where Lu 
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Dingyi would be denounced, Ye said, gritting her teeth, “Today’s rally will condemn Lu 
Dingyi and Yan Weibing. It serves them right since they once attacked our leader [Lin 
Biao] and me. I plan to have a good time watching them be denounced.” The rally was 
held at a sports stadium in Beijing where Red Guards were everywhere. Ye and her 
associates viewed the rally and the violence that ensued. In the midst of the murderous 
onslaughts that were occurring, Zhang Yunsheng walked over next to Ye Qun and could 
hear her murmuring to herself, “How come we haven’t seen Yan Weibing?” When 
returning to Maojiawan, the entire car was in complete silence except for Ye Qun 
growling, “What a pity, we didn’t see Yan Weibing there.”
126
 
 Lin Biao’s role in the Lu Dingyi-Yan Weibing case is minute, as Ye Qun took 
control of the situation and exercised her own political machinations and showed clear 
intense hatred for the Lu Dingyi family. Lin showed some concern for Ye Qun and the 
content of Yan Weibing’s letter. For instance, Lin met with Ye Qun and asked her if the 
substance of Yan’s letter was true. Lin also ordered the handwriting to be studied so that 
the authors of the letters were found. While Lin can be perceived as taking hold of the 
situation, his actions were more reactive than proactive. As in other instances, when Lin 
acted politically it stemmed from the influence of another. In this case Lin’s wife was 
under attack. If Lin hadn’t acted it could have led the family down a path of disgrace and 
trouble. But, this matter aside it is important, again, to keep in mind that Lin was not 
proactive but reactive, as he needed a source of stimulation for him to act.  
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Ye Qun denied that there was any authenticity to the letters and argued that Lin 
and her were married at the time under question.
127
 It is also clear that Lin, even though 
he approved the punishments that were to be inflicted on Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing, 
had no actual input on what was formally decided. As seen in other cases Lin simply 
agreed (tongyi) with what was given to him. One example of Lin showing a degree of 
significant interest in the Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing case is that Lin wrote a letter 
personally, which confirmed Ye Qun’s virginity at the time of her marriage to Lin Biao. 
The letter very plainly stated, “Ye Qun was a virgin,” signed Lin Biao, and was circulated 
to the Party on May 20, the date of Lu Dingyi’s self- criticism. Lin’s action though 
signifies nothing more than a basic defense of Ye Qun, not an attack on Lu Dingyi or Yan 
Weibing. Perhaps the most spectacular example though of Lin Biao defending Ye Qun’s 
honor however is his outlandish and blatant statement to Lu Dingyi during the May 20 
Politburo meeting when Lin exclaimed to Lu, “I’d love to shoot you.”
128
 Wang Li 
however notes a more tepid Lin Biao, noting that Lin Biao never stated, “I’d love to shoot 
you” but rather the exchange involved Lin questioning Lu, “Why are you harming me? I 
like you. What is your intention?” Lu responded, “I truly did not know [about Yan 
Weibing’s letter]”. Lin Biao then banged his hand on the table and stated, “You sleep in 
the same bed, how is it possible that you did not know?”
129
 Both interpretations indicate 
that Lin had some interest in defending Ye’s honor. However, the primary political player 
was Ye Qun, as she made personal efforts to revise the punishments against Lu Dingyi 
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and Yan Weibing and even made attempts to see them during their torturous struggle 
sessions. While Lin Biao was clearly well informed of what was occurring in the Lu 
Dingyi-Yan Weibing case, the available evidence shows that he made little efforts that 
formally pushed for their purge and removal. Lin, for instance, did not formulate the 
charges against Lu Dingyi-Yan Weibing, nor did he spread malicious rumors throughout 
the Party or take pleasure in viewing their struggle session as Ye Qun attempted to do. 
While this does not exonerate Lin Biao, it noticeably illustrates that other characters are 
accountable for Lu and Yang’s purge.   
The Luo Ruiqing Case 
The Luo Ruiqing affair is an incident in Party history that is remembered as Lin 
Biao’s offensive elimination of a potential rival in the PLA power chain and the 
beginning formations of a Lin Biao and Jiang Qing clique. The common source of 
tension between Lin and Luo resided, as Lin saw it, in the latter’s challenge for Mao’s 
admiration, the contrasting principles of strategy and warfare between the two, and the 
extension of power that Luo had throughout the military. Luo, retorting against the 
slogans of Lin Biao such as the “Peak Theory” stated, “You mean to say Marxist-Leninist 
Mao Zedong Thought will no longer develop? To treat the theories of our revolutionary 
mentor as the ‘peak’ is in itself a negation of Mao Zedong Thought.” In terms of war 
strategy, a contradiction also existed as Lin Biao expounded that politics should be placed 
in command, that Mao Zedong Thought should be studied, practiced, and applied on the 
battlefield. Lin’s position deemphasized the importance of weaponry and instead insisted 
that Mao Zedong Thought is the only weapon needed. Lin labeled large scale military 
exercises in the PLA as “disrupting politics.”  Luo rebutted Lin’s objection, arguing that 
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“Politics is in command, for political work ought to guarantee that military tasks can be 
accomplished. On the other hand, talking every day of emphatic politics will never 
improve our duties and tasks.” Luo placed greater value on modernization and 




Ideological squabbles aside, the Lin-Luo conflict also reportedly arose from Luo’s 
extended power permeating throughout the PLA. Luo’s position and influence by the 
1960s was firmly rooted in his achieved status during the Long March in 1934 when he 




The crimes that Luo was accused of were:  Opposition to Mao Zedong Thought 
on the grounds that he had openly challenged Lin Biao’s statements on the matter. 
Second, Luo was accused of having intentions to take over Lin Biao’s position as defense 
minister. The third accusation is that Luo attempted to implement a bourgeois military 
line by advocating military training over political training. Fourth, Luo was accused of 
collaborating with He Long to usurp power in the army and the navy over which they had 
little influence. In addition to these crimes, Luo was also accused of other minor 
infractions such as opposing the argument that Soviet-like revisionists had entered the 
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Party and needed to be removed. Luo’s effectiveness as a Party member was also 
questioned as he was accused of cutting others off in speech and holding long grudges 
over petty disputes against Party members.
132
  
The basic assumption consequently made based on the aforementioned crimes is 
that a sense of jealously and threat was felt on Lin Biao’s part when confronted with the 
Luo Ruiqing problem. Jealously, since Luo was close to the Chairman and had a long 
term working relationship with him; and threat, since Luo’s power extended seemingly 
everywhere within the PLA infrastructure. Consequently, Lin felt it necessary to remove 
a potential opponent striving for his position in power. The motivation for Luo’s purge is 
thus based on personal, private matters. Again, the realm of the private and public 
intersect. The net effect is that the contrast between the public reasons for Luo’s purge 
and the private reasons become apparent.   
A hefty amount of these feelings stems from Luo’s personal abhorrence toward 
Lin’s powerful political positions. These convictions held by Luo were expressed in 
several instances. In one episode, Luo Ruiqing expressed his animosity toward Lin Biao 
to former People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) commander Liu Yalou. The 
exchange between Luo and Liu took place following the third session of the National 
People’s Congress in January 1965 when Lin was chosen to serve as Vice-Premier and to 
serve concurrently as Minister of Defense. Luo, antagonized by the decision, privately 
confided to Liu Yalou stating, “I cannot believe that this person has comeback….After 
today, our bombs will not fly and I will die.”
133
 By February 1965, shortly before the 
death of Liu Yalou, Ye Qun visited Liu who conveyed the following message to Ye Qun 
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about Luo Ruiqing. The message stated from Liu stated that Luo felt, “Everybody has to 
retire from politics sooner or later. This applies to Lin Biao too, Ye Qun should take care 
of Lin Biao’s health. Lin Biao should concentrate more on his work at the Center, and 
Luo would take care of the army. Luo would reward Ye Qun, if she performed this 
service for him.”
134
 PLAAF commander Wu Faxian also expressed that Luo had opposed 
Lin Biao’s appointment as Defense Minister, replacing Peng Dehuai in 1959. Luo’s spite, 
according to Wu, emanated from one instance when Lin Biao was unable to meet with 
Luo due to an illness. Luo reportedly had lashed out against Lin, shouting, “If he’s sick 
so often, how can he be responsible for anything? Let someone else take over his job. 
Don’t stand in the way.”
135
  
The reigns of the movement against Luo Ruiqing were under the direction and 
control of Ye Qun. The first offensive move came on November 30, 1965 when Ye Qun 
personally visited the Chairman in Hangzhou. Ye brought with her a letter that expressed 
Luo’s disenchantment with politics in the military. Ye met with Mao for several hours in 
Hangzhou. Consequently, Mao reportedly sided with Ye stating, “Those who do not 
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believe in putting politics in command and only give lip service to the idea are trying to 




A large part of Ye’s initiative came from personal animosity she held toward Luo. 
Ye, due to a number of memorable personal interactions with Luo, felt that Luo disliked 
her and occluded her advancement within the military and the Party. Following the 
Liberation of the country in 1949, Ye received frequent military promotions. By the early 
1960s, Ye had been promoted to colonel, a high rank within the PLA hierarchy but not 
meeting her expectations of being elevated to senior-colonel. Luo Ruiqing, as Chief of 
the General Staffs Department, had been in control of Ye’s promotion to colonel and 
made his decision based on military standard operating procedure. Ye however, fumed 
over Luo’s lack of recognition of her. In another instance, in spring 1965, Lin Biao was 
to distribute the “Five Principles of Special Politics,” Luo Ruiqing suggested excising 
any mention of Ye Qun’s name in the document.   
Ye’s meeting with Mao in Hangzhou was successful from her perspective as the 
Chairman, on December 2, 1965, publicly announced a war against Luo Ruiqing stating 
that “these men do not believe in the prominence of politics, in public they believe in 
politics but in private they do not.”
137
 Mao also added in his speech that Luo Ruiqing 
“treats Lin Biao as an enemy. Luo also does not ask for instructions from me and he does 
not respect fellow marshals….Luo is a careerist.”
138
 A conference was convened by mid-
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December in Shanghai which was managed by Mao and which Luo was ordered to 
attend. With the exception of Mao, Lin, and Zhou Enlai, nobody knew that the 
conference concerned Luo Ruiqing’s political errors. On the second day of the 
conference Ye Qun spoke on behalf of Lin Biao.
139
 Ye spoke several times during the 
course of the eight day emergency meeting and she was consequently regarded as the 
“heavy artillery” of the meeting. One of Ye’s speech-lasting ten hours-vehemently 
attacked Luo Ruiqing at the conference, suggesting that Luo opposed Lin Biao and 
opposed politics in the military. Ye’s comments also focused on Luo’s ulterior motives to 
take control of Lin’s position within the military, which was Ye’s primary source of 
bitterness toward Luo. As Ye anxiously retaliated against Luo during the meeting 
feverishly stating:  
Luo Ruiqing came to possess great authority over the armed forces. He 
also controls the power of public security. If there is any untoward 
happening, the loss will be great. His individualism has reached the 
stage of an ambitious schemer. He will not stop until comrade Lin Biao 
yields the defense ministership to him. But if he were to be defense 
minister, he would want to be something higher still. There is no end. 
Ever since 1964, Luo Ruiqing has been pressing Comrade Lin Biao to 
yield to his position. After the last national holiday, Luo Ruiqing came 
to our house to see Lin Biao saying loudly, “You are sick. Do not 
disturb yourself. Let some other virtuous one take over for you! Let 
someone take over for you!” As he was leaving, he kept shouting, 
“Don’t block the way!”
140
 
   
 Following Ye’s condemnation of Luo, the members of the meeting decided to 
order Luo, who was not at the meeting but making in an inspection tour in the south-
western military region, to fly to Shanghai. Luo, upon arriving, was forced to announce 
his crimes to the Party. Both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping assisted in managing the 
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discussion. Luo begged to speak with Mao and Lin face-to-face in a meeting but Zhou 
Enlai would not meet his request.
141
 The outcome of the meeting was Luo’s removal 
from his positions and the appointment of General Yang Chengwu as Chief of the 
General Staffs Department, thereby replacing Luo Ruiqing.
142
  
Despite the dismissal of Luo made at the enlarged Politburo meeting in December 
1965, criticism and attacks against Luo continued. Zhou Enlai managed a central small 
group in charge of investigating Luo’s mistakes and errors.
143
 From March 4 to April 8, 
Mao decided to convene a month long criticism session against Luo Ruiqing at the Jingxi 
Guesthouse in Zhongnanhai which was managed by Xiao Hua. The attendees included 
members of the Military Commission, Ministry of Public Security, National Defense 
Science Committee, Military Science Committee, and the Military Academy of Science. 
By March 22, the meeting also included members of the Central Committee which made 
the total number of attendees ninety-five. Ye Qun and Wu Faxian also attended. The 
meeting denounced Luo as an opponent of the Party and of Mao Zedong thought. The 
conference also accused Luo of being a “conspirator” alleging that during the anti-
Japanese war he had followed the right opportunist line represented by the so-called 
counter-revolutionary’s Wang Ming and Peng Dehuai. Luo, in the midst of his 
denunciations and undue psychological torture, leaped from a second story window 
attempting suicide but which resulted in only a pair of broken legs. On May 16, at the 
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enlarged meeting of the Politburo managed by Liu Shaoqi, Luo was formally dismissed 
from the Central Committee, stripped of all his positions, and a lengthy list of Party 
members all offered attacks against Luo Ruiqing.
144
  
Luo’s tribulations were not easy either. Shortly following Luo’s leap from the 
second story of a building breaking both legs, Luo was taken to a small, unknown solitary 
space with only a hard board bed and a small square table. Luo received a beastly and 
distasteful diet of grass and crushed stone mixed together, an abominable concoction that 
echoed times of the famine ridden countryside of the Great Leap Forward. Luo’s diet and 
living conditions were formally decided by Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi.
145
 
When reviewing the evidence of the Luo Ruiqing case and the supposed decisions 
made by Lin Biao that decided Luo’s fate, there is no direct evidence linking Lin to Luo’s 
dismissal. In contrast, the typical view of Lin Biao in reference to the Luo Ruiqing affair 
is best summarized by one Party historian who states, “Lin Biao treated him [Luo 
Ruiqing] as an infirm ignominious enemy, a criminal who tried to use suicide to express 
‘opposition to Party and to country.’ Lin Biao clearly delighted in Luo Ruiqing’s 
calamity and pushed him further into despair.”
146
 However, as this review of evidence 
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suggests, rather than Lin the available data seems to point directly to Ye Qun and Mao. 
First, Lin did not pen the infamous letter which listed Luo’s supposed crimes that Ye 
shared with Mao while visiting him in Hangzhou. The authors of the damning epistle 
were People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) political commissar Li Zuopeng and 
deputy head of the Military Operations Department of the Chief of the General Staffs 
Department of the People’s Liberation Army Lei Yingfu.
147
 There is also evidence from 
personal assistants of the Lin Biao office that suggest Lin was not fully aware of the 
current events surrounding Luo Ruiqing. According to Guan Weixun, during a meeting 
Lin held with his secretary the topic of Luo Ruiqing was brought up. Lin inquired about 
the events surrounding the question of Luo Ruiqing. Ye Qun, sitting in with Lin during 
the meeting, quickly took the secretary and escorted him out of the room, thereby keeping 
Lin from bringing up the affair any further during the meeting.
148
 Guan himself noted that 
Ye Qun played a big role in the Luo Ruiqing case.
149
 Luo Diandian, Luo Ruiqing’s 
daughter, noted that Lin Biao was so aloof that it caused difficulty for Luo to interact 
with Lin. As Luo Diandian recalls: 
[My father’s] biggest problem was when and how to report on his work to Lin 
Biao. If he didn’t phone first, but just took the car, he would be stopped at the 
door and told Lin wasn’t feeling well and couldn’t see him. If he phoned first, 
the reply would be “How many times do I have to tell you that you don’t have to 
make an appointment to report on your work but can come at any time.” Then if 
[my father] really just went there, [Lin] would say it was an ambush, and that he 
didn’t have time to mentally prepare himself…and that because he was ill it 
made him all apprehensive and break into a sweat. The next time, if [my father] 
phoned he’d be told later that because of the phone call Lin hadn’t been able to 
get to sleep but had been awake all night.
150
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Relevant in this example is that Lin was difficult to contact and meet with on a regular 
basis. Like Lin’s secretaries, Party members were also forced to deal with Lin’s erratic 
behavior. Luo experienced difficulty in meeting with Lin to discuss political and 
managerial matters in the PLA. Concomitantly, Lin’s erratic behavior affected Luo’s 
perceptions of him. While Luo Diandian’s records are heavily biased against Lin Biao, it 
is evident that Lin’s personality disorder, even in Diandian’s skewed sources, 
corroborates the evidence presented in the memoirs of Zhang Yunsheng and Guan 
Weixun. Luo Ruiqing, like other Party members, only knew half of the story regarding 
Lin Biao. While difficulty in contacting Lin is perceived as a political tactic utilized in 
order to aid in the removal of Luo, this is inaccurate and is a clear example of how easily 
perceptions can be formed based on the limited public knowledge gathered of 
individuals.  
Lin also never made any condemning references to Luo Ruiqing in public. With 
the exception of Lin’s May 18 speech that focused on coups and which made a brief 
reference to the problem of Luo Ruiqing, Lin Biao never attacked Luo publicly. Utilizing 
Lin’s May 18 speech as evidence of Lin’s intentions against Luo is doubtful as CCRG 
Party radical Zhang Chunqiao penned the majority of the speech. In contrast, Ye 
Jianying, Xiao Hua, and Xie Fuzhi all made public vilifications of Luo Ruiqing. General 
Yang Chengwu also attacked Luo. Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai also followed the 
trend at the enlarged Politburo meeting in December and subsequent meetings in early 
1966, despite the questionable validity of the charges against Luo. In addition, Lin is not 
recorded as a willing participant in either public meetings or celebratory banquets 
following Luo’s dismissal based on available evidence. In contrast to Ye Jianying who, 
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as mentioned above, sang a song following the dismissal of Luo in the December 
meeting, most likely since he knew of his pending ascendancy, Lin however was not 
present at the banquet. Ye Jianying’s ambitions are highlighted even further when 
considering that he headed a special investigative team delving into the crimes and errors 
that Luo committed in an attempt to absolve him of any wrongdoing. Of course, no 
evidence was found by Ye Jianying exculpating Luo of the charges against him.     
Another key source that historians argue regarding Lin’s removal of Luo is that 
Luo’s contradicting beliefs in the role of politics within the military is a key source of 
tension and prompted Lin’s urge to remove Luo from his position. It is certainly true that 
Lin showed little interest in military modernization, for instance, Lin did not attend, 
despite his invitation, the joint military exercises by the Beijing and Jinan military 
regions conducted under the unified command of Luo Ruiqing, Yang Yong, and Yang 
Dezhi near the Ming tombs in June 1964. However, given Lin’s reluctance and hesitant 
attitude to public appearances this is certainly not surprising. Moreover, Lin most likely 
did not wish to risk showing an interest in the role of weaponry since this position 
challenged the role that ideology, Mao’s own personal baby, played in military policy 
and action. 
In addition, as mentioned above, Lin Biao did not have any input regarding the 
living conditions and treatment during Luo’s imprisonment; rather these matters were 
decided by the radical Xie Fuzhi. In fact, it is highly unlikely that Lin had any idea of 
what officially happened to Luo due to his introverted personality and the lack of 
complete transparency and information from Ye Qun.  
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The removal of Luo Ruiqing can also be viewed as a movement initiated and 
assisted, not by Lin Biao, but by the Chairman. When reviewing the evidence Mao is a 
primary actor. The emergency December meeting held in Shanghai for instance was not 
planned and held at Lin’s request, but by the Chairman. Moreover, there is personal 
evidence that suggests Mao’s disdain and hatred toward Luo stemmed from Luo’s 
outright push for modernization in the military in opposition to stressing politics and Mao 
Zedong Thought. As Mao quipped to Dr. Li Zhisui one afternoon, “Luo isn’t worth the 
clothes on his back.”
151
 A well placed historian in the PLA completely dismisses the 
notion that Ye Qun came to Hangzhou to inform Mao of the Luo problem. This historian 
notes that it would be “naïve to believe that Mao would simply accept Ye’s story. In fact, 
it was Mao who summoned Ye to Hangzhou and expressed his discontent with Luo on 
the political work issue.”
152
 This transforms the argument from one based on personal 
jealousies and animosities in the Lin Biao camp to a political issue based on Mao’s 
disgust with Luo. Whatever the case may be, Mao’s initiative is clear and became quite 
apparent when he issued his statement on December 2, claiming that there are those in the 
military who “do not give prominence to politics.” Thus, Lin’s position against Luo 
based on ideological differences, assuming that Lin was even fully aware of the current 
political trends of the time, can be viewed as a loyal following of the Chairman’s wishes. 
As Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun have noted, “the clear political logic for all 
concerned was to give Mao what he wanted.”
153
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The Attack on He Long 
 Like Luo Ruiqing, He Long became a marshal in 1955 and was a recognized hero 
of the country for his duties in the Liberation Army during the Sino-Japanese War and 
the Chinese Civil War. He Long later became a victim of the Cultural Revolution. His 
downfall is normally attributed to the personal plot laid against him by Lin Biao. 
According to Party history, Lin began to formulate accusative letters against He Long. 
The force behind Lin’s decision, like Luo Ruiqing, is the trepidation that Lin felt because 
of the power He held throughout the PLA. As one Party historian notes, Lin reportedly 
told Wu Faxian, “He Long puts his oars in everywhere—chief of general staff, navy, air 
force, the Institute of Politics. The air force is a tantalizing morsel that whets the appetite 
of most people. He Long is sending people to usurp your power. You must pay attention 
to this and take preventative measures.”
154
 The fabricated material reportedly created by 
Lin soon reached Mao who held a meeting with He Long to review the list of charges 
against He. Mao suggested that he still supported He Long and reportedly told him “I will 
be your protector.”
155
 Later, in another meeting, Mao suggested that He go speak to Lin 
and sort their problems out. At the subsequent meeting between Lin and He, Lin 
questioned He, asking him who he supported. Lin, hoping that he would have swayed He 
to his camp, was disappointed when He replied, “Whoever opposes Chairman Mao I will 
oppose.” Reflecting on He’s response; Lin understood the statement as He’s opposition to 
Lin’s clique and only support for Mao. Consequently, Lin ordered Wu Faxian, Li 
Zuopeng, and Song Zhiguo to escalate their attacks against He Long, thus commencing a 
major political offensive against the old marshal. By January 1967, He Long was 
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escorted to the hilly country outskirts of Beijing with his wife Xue Ming to reside 
temporarily. He consistently hoped that either Mao or Zhou would pay him a visit. But, 
by mid-year, He had lost all hope as Lin reportedly tightened his control of He Long. 
He’s living conditions paralleled that of a prison, with curtains pulled tight blocking out 
any light. He was also forced to sleep on a hard board bed. He was also told that a 
shortage of water had occurred. When it rained, He and Xue Ming were forced to collect 
water in face basins, buckets, and even water glasses. He’s living conditions only 
exacerbated even further from this point. By spring 1969, He, living on a steady diet of 
vegetables cooked only in hot water without oil or salt, and spongy turnips and tough 
beans, only complicated his diabetic medical condition. By June 8, 1969, He Long had 
entered a state of continued vomiting and quickened breathing. On June 9, 1969, He 




 A review of available evidence however contrasts the picture shown in Party 
history. Unlike the active, scheming, and plotting Lin Biao who clearly holds a personal 
vendetta against He, the illustration that we will discuss and examine shows strong 
personal animosities being held by Ye Qun toward He Long. Ye’s actions in the 
following discussion will not only serve as a clear indicator of the dominating role she 
played in politics in the Lin Biao family due to Lin’s constant social distance caused by 
his social anxiety disorder, but will also clearly depict her insidious behavior. In addition, 
Lin is relatively absent from the ongoing drama and seems to be mostly on the periphery 
of political affairs. 
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 The strong source of friction held by Maojiawan against He Long rests in the 
questionable past of Ye Qun. Ye Qun was born into a humble family in Fuzhou. Her 
father became a Guomindang military general though and Ye followed in her father’s 
footsteps, joining the Guomindang and later becoming a radio announcer for a 
Guomindang broadcasting station in Nanjing. Ye also trained as a youth in battlefield 
tactical fighting.
157
 Ye’s status in Guomindang circles continually grew as she won a 
speaking contest on the theme “There Is Only One Party in China [the Guomindang] and 
Only One Leader [Jiang Jieshi].”
158
 Prior to her switch to the Communist Party Ye Qun 
knew Xue Ming, the future wife of He Long. Upon Lin’s return to China from Moscow 
in 1942, Lin wrote a personal letter to Ye. The epistle openly expressed Lin’s desire to 
wed Ye. Ye took the letter lightly and with very little emotion, reportedly sharing the 
letter’s content with her fellow girlfriends and giggling about its message. He Long, by 
this time spouse to Xue Ming, advised Xue to communicate to Ye that she should 
respond to Lin and stop giggling about, what was supposed to be, Lin’s private letter to 
Ye. According to Xue Ming, when she approached Ye about the letter, Ye “didn’t say 
whether she would keep the letter private or not. She didn’t say one way or the other. She 
just kept skipping stones over the river.” What should be noted from this incident is that 
personal tension existed early on between the Lin Biao, He Long, and their spouses. This 
tension soon worsened by 1942.   
In addition to the potentially disastrous knowledge held by Xue Ming about Ye’s 
childish pre-matrimonial behavior regarding Lin’s private letter, Xue also became well 
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aware of the questionable Guomindang past that Ye had. The personal blots on Ye’s past 
came to light during Mao’s Rectification Movement in Yenan in 1942. Both Lin Biao and 
He Long were away in Chongqing. While the two husbands were away the wives did 
indeed play as Xue approached Ye and advised her to expose her past mistakes that 
would exonerate her of her troubling Guomindang past. Ye declared that Xue was 
attempting to frame her in Lin Biao’s absence. Xue ignored Ye’s fury and dragged her to 
the Party Organization Department head Wang Heshou. When He Long and Lin Biao 
returned to Yan’an, He Long told Lin, rather casually, “There are problems with your 
wife and Xue Ming has exposed them. This is good.” Then He Long, patting Lin on the 




The events that took place before Liberation carried their weight as Ye Qun and 
Xue Ming did not speak again for nearly twenty years. Bitterness persisted into the 
summer of 1966. Ye Qun, according to Zhang Yunsheng, met privately with Song 
Zhiguo, the chief of Lin’s personal security force, multiple times in August. In one 
instance, the two spoke privately for hours. Following the meeting, Song emerged and 
entered the office of the Lin Biao staff requesting writing paper. Zhang casually inquired 
if Song was practicing calligraphy to which Song replied, “No! Director Ye has given me 
a very important assignment.” Zhang later received documents from Ye that were labeled 
as “Top Secret” but permitted him to view. Zhang discovered that the content of the 
documents contained defamations against He Long. Zhang, testing Ye Qun, inquired if 
Song Zhiguo had written the statement. Ye confirmed Zhang’s inquiry, and even added 
that Song had done so completely unilaterally. Zhang knew better though, based on his 
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recent brief exchange with Song Zhiguo who stated that “Director Ye has given me a 
very important assignment.” What confirms Zhang’s point further is Ye’s behavior at the 
Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee at which Ye, believing she 
saw He carrying a pistol, shrieked and accused He of being armed. To Ye’s 
embarrassment though when He Long was frisked by security they only found a tobacco 
pipe.
160
 Immediately following the meeting, Ye Qun spoke with Jiang Qing who told Ye 
that she appeared as if she had “seen a ghost.” Ye then expressed her concern to Jiang 
over He Long as well as the knowledge that Xue Ming possessed concerning Ye’s 
troubling past in the pre-Liberation years.
161
   
In the days directly following Song’s repeated visits to Maojiawan to meet with 
Ye Qun in early September, Ye Qun was remembered as “running around in circles” 
making personal field trips to visit the leaders of the PLAN, PLAAF, the Armored 
Forces, the Engineering Corps, and the Second Artillery Division [Nuclear Forces]. 
According to Zhang Yunsheng, Ye was delivering the slanderous material that had been 
written by Song Zhiguo.
162
 The content of the material was accusatory statements against 
He Long, branding He as a conspirator who was extremely close to Luo Ruiqing, Hao 
Zhiping, Peng Zhen, and Yang Shangkun who were commonly seen in secret 
conversations with He Long. The accusations also stated that He did not stress 
appropriate training tactics for military personal. It was also suggested that He Long’s 
home telephone had been bugged with a listening device. Outlandish accusations were 
included too, such as He reportedly sleeping with a gun under his pillow and always 
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carrying a gun with the intent to kill Chairman Mao at his first available chance. Kang 
Sheng also added that He secretly wanted to travel to the Soviet Union to covertly plan 
for a coup attempt against Mao.
163
 
Ye’s paranoia and concern over the He Long issue is further reflected by the 
meeting held between Lin Biao and He Long. Mao, after receiving the fabricated 
materials poolside at Zhongnanhai by Wu Faxian, suggested directly to He a visit to 
Maojiawan to smooth things over with Lin Biao. He took Mao’s advice and requested a 
meeting with Lin Biao. Upon hearing He’s request for a meeting Ye Qun quickly 
panicked and ordered several personal security guards to arm themselves with pistols and 
prepare to ambush He Long in case he should attack Lin Biao. Ye’s delusional sort of 
behavior and concern for Lin’s safety stemmed from the aforementioned rumors stating 
that He concealed and carried a pistol with him at all times. Ye Qun and Maojiawan’s 
security force reportedly hid secretly behind a curtain during the meeting between He and 
Lin. The tension in the room was thick, the security personnel placing their hands on their 
guns ready to draw and storm the room at Ye Qun’s signal. Ye ordered the guards that 
nobody could cough and nobody could make a sound. Ye, drawing back the curtain 
slightly to make sure she could view part of the meeting, decided against an outlandish 
offensive attacking He Long. In addition, despite Ye Qun’s heavy concerns for Lin’s 
safety, no attempt on Lin’s life by He were made.
164
 In fact, the overall tone of the 
meeting was bland and reportedly held very little stimulating rhetoric. In typical Lin Biao 
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fashion, Lin again showed his ambivalence and lack of emotion as Lin told He, “I have 
no opinion of you.”
165
 
In the above examples discussed it is evident that Ye Qun played a prominent role 
in the steps taken in removing He Long as well as his wife Xue Ming from the Party. 
Ye’s motivation and animosity was rooted in the fear of her past blemishes being exposed 
and consequences thereafter. Other evidence suggests that there were sources of agitation 
between He Long and the Party that are not directly linked to Lin Biao. First, it is 
questionable how much trust still existed between He and the Party shortly following the 
dismissal of Luo Ruiqing. At the enlarged Politburo meeting in Shanghai in December 
1965, He expressed his support for Luo Ruiqing, arguing that Luo was not a 
counterrevolutionary. Following the meeting, He was stripped of his duties as managing 
the day-to-day work of the Military Affairs Commission, his most significant position 
within the Party. Nearly a year later, at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth 
Central Committee, Mao noted that He held back during meetings which struggled 
against Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao had asked He if he had joined the struggle 
meetings but He replied that he could not make such allegations with the same amount of 
intensity as those offered by other Party members.
166
 The source of this tension lay in 
He’s lack of motivation, belief, and aggrandizement of the Cultural Revolution. 
Following the infamous “Bombard the Headquarters” poster issued by Mao in late 
August, a series of posters began to appear along the streets of Wangfujing. The posters 
specifically targeted Liu Shaoqi and condemned him. He however, disagreed with the 
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rising tide exclaiming “This is not appropriate! Liu Shaoqi is our state president!” In 
addition, He told the students at Qinghua University that Liu Shaoqi’s wife, Wang 
Guangmei, is “the wife of our nation’s president. You need to support the work that she 
does.”
167
 He also openly expressed disenchantment with the Cultural Revolution students 
as he vehemently denounced two factional student parties clashing in the Beijing 
gymnasium. The student groups fought and in the process of their struggle obliterated 
sporting equipment. He reportedly commented on the incident critically stating 
“destroying the sporting equipment serves no principle. No matter what the situation is 
we cannot permit the destruction of our nation’s belongings.”
168
 
Some scholars point to Lin Biao and the MAC meeting he convened in September 
1966 which addressed the He Long problem. Though this seems to show initiative on 
Lin’s part, the meeting was Mao’s initiation and ordered Lin to “criticize first and then 
protect” (yi pi er bao).
169
         
There is also evidence that cites He’s distaste for Lin’s ascendancy and positions 
within the Party. Like Luo Ruiqing, He Long also expressed bewilderment at Mao’s 
decision to put Lin Biao in command noting his frequent health problems and virtual 
absence from politics. In one source He is noted as stating privately, “At Lushan, Mao 
was the Chairman and Deng was a key commander, everybody recognized Deng as a 
successor. Now Lin Biao is the designated successor. I supported the Chairman’s 
decision. But Lin Biao does not have the prestige and he does not have the energy.”
170
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Another element that illustrates the parallel between Luo and He is their mutual interest 
in military modernization. He labored and tried to convince other Party members of the 
need for modernization in the national defense industry. After inspecting and 
investigating the state of military industry in 1960, He concluded that aircraft fuselage 
and aircraft engine production were very poor. He argued that the approach being used to 
produce aircraft materials-fast and numerous-hindered quality. He stated that, “When 
there is a choice between quality and speed, you must favor quality.” He also closely 
collaborated with Luo and the need for appropriate military training for the PLA. In terms 
of training He argued that the PLA must continually strive to be “the cream of the crop 
(jianzi).”
171
 Although He was never formally charged and cited with carrying out a 
“bourgeois military line” He did support military modernization and, with his overt 
references for the need to enhance the quality of military production by sacrificing 
quantity, denied the importance of the Maoist theory of “more, faster, better.” He’s 
position, similar to Luo’s, exacerbated an already fragile relationship between him and 
Mao following the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee as well as 
his lack of overall interest and support of increased radicalism at the onset of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
There is also considerable evidence that Jiang Qing had motivations to remove He 
Long from his position. Given the already intense hatred by Ye Qun toward He and the 
obvious need for Jiang to receive the support from Lin in order to gain influence within 
the PLA’s culture and arts arena, the He Long problem may be viewed as an opportunity 
for Jiang to enhance her image to Maojiawan. Publicly, Jiang certainly made her strong 
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distaste for He, as she launched a public attack on September 8, 1966, calling He a “bad 
person” and a “big butcher.”
172
 It is also noted in another source that Jiang pleaded to the 
Chairman demanding that he permit her to attack He Long, asking, “Why won’t you let 
me expose He Long? I have piles of material that is conclusive evidence. He is a bastard! 
He wants to perform a coup….his wife is also a bad person!”
173
 And on December 30, 
1966, Jiang Qing spoke at a mass rally, calling for the people to oppose He Long and to 
support his removal from the Party.
174
 Clearly, Jiang became a key driving force for He’s 
removal from the Party. Kang Sheng also played a prominent role in the removal of He 
Long as Kang, along with Ye Qun, established a special case group on November 8, 1966 
aimed at gathering slanderous, defaming material against He.
175
  
In reviewing the above evidence we have found that the events leading up to He’s 
purge cannot be blamed squarely on Lin Biao. Clearly personal antagonisms held by Ye 
Qun were motivating factors for her to steal the initiative and begin gathering outlandish 
evidence to be used against He and his wife Xue Ming. Ye needed to make a move before 
He in order to ensure that Ye’s troublesome past, which could have easily jeopardized her 
place within the Party, was not revealed during the paranoid and rumor filled Cultural 
Revolution. To what degree of intimate knowledge Lin held of Ye’s collection of 
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blasphemous material is not certain. There is little doubt that Lin knew to some degree of 
the movement to remove He, as he himself suggested the removal of He’s close 
colleagues Wang Shangrong and Lei Yingfu following the appearance of the poster 
“Bombard Yang Chengwu.” However, following this suggestion during the late August 
meeting, Lin completely disappears from the political radar screen. The prominent 
players in He’s downfall from September through December are Jiang Qing, Ye Qun, and 
Kang Sheng. In addition, the Chairman clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with He, 
which stemmed from his lack of enthusiasm to the radical tides at the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution to the close relationship with Luo Ruiqing and support for military 
modernization, thereby dismissing the importance and need for Maoist ideology in 
warfare. Lin’s role, as with other cases, seems to be strictly from the sideline with 
minimal support or interest in the purges that were occurring. Even the September MAC 
meeting that Lin convened was done at the request of the Chairman and followed Mao’s 
order to “first criticize then protect.” In addition, Lin abstained from making vicious 
comments about He, only noting that He had “problems.” In contrast to Lin, Jiang Qing 
launched most of the artillery at the meeting at He. What should also be mentioned and 
be kept in mind is that He had very little political authority and influence within the PLA 
by the time of the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. Not only had Luo Ruiqing been 
removed, but He’s position of running the daily affairs of the MAC had been cutoff at the 
emergency Shanghai meeting in December 1965. Thus, the accusation that Lin felt 
threatened by He’s political power and prominence in the PLA lacks credence.  
Overall, there is little factual, direct evidence that specifically links Lin to He’s 
purge. What seems to be more precise, is that Ye’s own personal concerns of being 
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exposed led her to push for the removal of a potential muckraker, while Mao, Jiang Qing, 
and Kang Sheng all viewed He as a key opponent to enhancing the struggle and 
radicalism of the Cultural Revolution. Lin’s actions, when Lin does act, seem to be 
merely following the decisions or emotions of Mao. Once again the Chairman’s feelings 
are the paramount priority when making key political decisions and Lin’s political 
behavior is reactive rather than proactive.        
The Attack on Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao’s Ascendancy 
 The removal of Liu Shaoqi and subsequent rise of Lin Biao leads many to believe 
that Lin had a keen interest in Liu’s close position with the Chairman. However, this 
analysis portrays a different Lin Biao, one who does not appear to have any interest in the 
position itself. It is not necessary to rummage and repeat the details of Liu’s purge here; 
one should only mention that the violence against the Liu Shaoqi family was the 
orchestration of Mao and the dangerous Jiang Qing and CCRG radicals.  
In assessing Lin’s attitude toward his position under Mao it is first necessary to 
offer Lin’s attitude toward Liu Shaoqi and his attitude toward the void he needed to fill 
following Liu’s removal. Lin’s personal feelings also illustrate a contradiction between 
the official understandings of Lin’s involvement in the removal of Liu Shaoqi. According 
to Lin’s daughter, Lin Doudou, Lin Biao felt that both Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping 
were good comrades. In addition, after learning of his promotion to second on the 
Politburo, Lin plead illness and decided not to attend the conference announcing his new 
position. In an attempt to reverse the decision of moving Lin to second on the Politburo, 
Lin wrote an emotional letter to the Chairman, beseeching Mao for another Party member 
to take Lin’s place. Lin also declared that he did not have the political acumen and 
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admiration to hold such a high place within the Party. Mao reportedly received the letter, 
commented on it, and returned it to Lin denying him his request. Lin reportedly ripped 
the letter up in frustration and threw it into a spittoon.
176
 Lin also loathed the title of Vice 
Chairman, preferring its non-usage in official documents. In one instance Lin, while 
reviewing a document with his secretarial staff that was in circulation and had already 
been seen by the Chairman and Zhou Enlai, saw that he was referred to in the document 
as “Vice Chairman” and “Glorious Example.” Lin, when hearing that he had been labeled 
with these two titles objected stating, “Cross it out.” Ye Qun intervened however and 
stated “Do not cross it out!” Lin then stated, “Okay, okay, do not cross it out, this point is 
alright.”
177
 In addition to Lin’s obvious distaste for being labeled “Vice Chairman” or 
“Glorious Example” is the demonstrative behavior of Ye Qun, always interposing her 
strong views upon Lin Biao and he easily swayed due to his ambivalent nature.   
Lin’s public rhetoric also suggests no particular bitterness toward Liu. As his 
remarks illustrate which concluded the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central 
Committee, Lin showed no hostilities toward Liu but rather only mentioned that 
“mistakes in policy line led to a hindrance that was set upon the Great Cultural 
Revolution,” but that the “Chairman reversed the situation and enabled the Cultural 
Revolution to continue.” Unlike Lin, Chen Boda expressed a more stringent and acerbic 
speech, fiercely attacking the mistake in line committed by the work groups, a clear 
indicator that Chen attempted to point the finger at the fallacy performed by Liu and 
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Deng.
178
 The absence of an even mildly pernicious attack on Liu by Lin is even more 
striking when one considers that Liu himself admitted his own errors of policy line 
regarding the work groups at the beginning of the conference. Moreover, Mao’s 
explosive diatribe in “Bombard the Headquarters” published August 5 overtly set the tone 
and attitude for others to follow. Lin’s statement at the conference was merely nothing 
more than an echo of the position that Mao and the radical Chen Boda took. Lin offered 
nothing new to the attack on Liu and his rhetoric was hardly tainted with hostility.   
In some ways, through Liu’s purge we can deduct that Lin had some 
understanding of Mao’s tactical way of operating. Assuming Lin understood Mao’s 
ambivalence Lin most likely took the safe political road, always obeying the Chairman 
and always agreeing with the Chairman. As Wang Nianyi has indicated, Lin took the 
attitude of, “If the Chairman circles, I circle it. If the Chairman agrees, I agree.”
179
 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Lin’s ambivalence and lack of emotion is partially 
attributed to the mental condition known as schizoid personality disorder. This aspect is 
particularly relevant as Lin had no inkling of the current decisions that were about to be 
made at the plenary session. Also, even if Lin had an idea of what decisions were going 
to be made, Lin absconded to Dalian and requested not to attend the conference due to 
health reasons. Mao personally ordered Wu Faxian to go to Dalian and escort Lin to 
Beijing. Wang Dongxing arranged for the conference to be held in the air-conditioned 
Zhejiang Hall of the Great Hall of the People which would permit climate control in the 
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room to meet Lin’s required temperature setting.
180
 We cannot accurately say if Lin was 
or was not ill at the time. Recalling Lin’s anxious nature when in the company of others 
though, discussed in the previous chapter, it would not be difficult to fathom that part of 
Lin’s reason for absence is due to the physical and mental toll such a public gathering 
may have upon him. It is thus difficult to put any sort of smoking gun in Lin’s hand for 
the purge of Liu Shaoqi. Furthermore, there is simply no evidence that directly points to 
Lin as being a key plotter or decision-maker in the drop of Liu’s status within the Party 
and his own ascendancy. The attack on Liu is purely one that was directed by key Central 
Cultural Revolutionary Small Group (CCRG) members such as Jiang Qing and Chen 
Boda; Party radicals such as Kang Sheng; and militant youths such as Kuai Dafu.  
Lin thus, inherited a position that was one which he actually had little aspiration 
to hold. Lin was thrust into the seat of Vice Chairman and second in stature on the 
Politburo at the Chairman’s request. Ambivalence abounded too, as Lin now stood on the 
side of the Chairman whose political barometer constantly changed, who would 
frequently argue one point but quickly make a one hundred and eighty degree turn and 
head in a completely different direction. For Lin, a man who showed little interest in 
politics, little actual emotion or clear stance, and who preferred anonymity due to 
schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder, a position close to the Chairman 
was hardly something that can be perceived as favorable. How Lin handled the coming 
chaos is the issue which this study now turns to.     
Extending Chaos throughout the Country-August 1966-December 1966 
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 Disorder shortly followed the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central 
Committee meeting as Mao endorsed disorder to take hold of the country in order to 
thoroughly criticize and remove the bourgeois reactionary line represented by Liu Shaoqi. 
As Mao stated on August 23, 1966, “The principal question is, what policy should we 
adopt regarding the so-called disturbances in various areas. My view is that we should let 
disorder reign for a few months….Even if there are no provincial Party committees, it 
does not matter.”
181
 New mass organizations were soon formed by radical students 
named Red Guards who became the instruments of disorder. The Chairman officially 
baptized their creation as he wore a Red Guard armband and wrote a letter to Peng 
Xiaomeng, the first person to organize a Red Guard group. A proliferation of Red Guard 
and rebel organizations soon followed. From August 18 through November 26, Mao 
personally reviewed millions of Red Guard organizations in public. The chaos that 
ensued is memorable and remains one of the saddest incidents in modern Chinese history. 
Red Guard organizations followed the call to attack the four olds: old custom, old culture, 
old habits, and old ideas. Street names were renamed such as the street where the Soviet 
Embassy sat which became “anti-revisionist road” (fangxiu lu), the old Dongan (Eastern 
Peace) market was renamed Donghong (East Wind) market since it was believed that the 
east wind represented socialism and the west wind represented capitalism. Historical 
monuments and relics were also destroyed as these pieces represented China’s past 
bourgeois feudal ideas. In Beijing, which has 6,843 classified historical sites, 4922 of 
them were damaged or destroyed from August to September 1966.
182
 Valuable paintings 
and old books were ripped apart, obliterated, and then burnt in an effervescent cloud of 
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smoke. Well known writers, artists, actors, and scholars all suffered horribly as Red 
Guards attacked them, condemning them as revisionists and for being culpable for 
carrying out a bourgeois reactionary line. The Ministry of Culture came under intense 
attack as over two thousand people were persecuted to death.  
 For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to now look at the impact that this 
period had on the PLA and Lin Biao’s role. The PLA, like the universities around China, 
had work teams in place during the fifty day period under Liu Shaoqi in the summer of 
1966. On August 7, following Mao’s “Bombard the Headquarters” poster, Mao ordered 
that the work teams be removed from universities. The General Political Department in 
the PLA followed the Chairman’s order. However, contrary to civilian units, the PLA 
confirmed that the Cultural Revolution would be directed by Party committees. The PLA 
also issued a series of rules and regulations restraining Cultural Revolution activities in 
the PLA and by students in military schools. The PLA thus contradicted the civilian 
sphere in that behavioral boundaries were clearly delineated for soldiers and students in 
military academies to follow and which could not be crossed. The ability of the PLA to 
participate in the Cultural Revolution was severely limited as it was argued that order 
needed to be maintained in some arenas.  
 In reaction to the restrictions placed upon military academies, PLA schools 
responded with a desire to participate in the “radicalism” (zaofan). Many military 
students traveled to Beijing and demanded that they receive the same amount of power as 
civilian students thereby granting them the right to engage in opposition to the bourgeois 
reactionary line. These demands were reported to Lin Biao by his administrative staff. At 
the same time, according to Zhang Yunsheng, a Red Guard representative from the 
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Second Military Medical School in Shanghai came to meet with Lin carrying a coat 
stained with blood and demanded Lin’s support. Lin was moved by the meeting and soon 
met with the directors of differing Cultural Revolution committees. Lin brought the coat 
to the meeting, pointed to it, and stated, “We would be committing a big error unless we 
supported these students.” Lin then gave an order to rehabilitate all students in military 
academies that had been accused of being revisionists by the then dismissed work groups. 
Lin also ordered that all the “black materials” relating to the students be destroyed. Lin 
gave permission to the students to engage in the “four bigs” (sida)-big character posters, 
great debates, airing one’s views, and contending in a big way-to criticize the bourgeois 
reactionary line. Lin ordered that a document be drafted stating his demands. Directly 
following its drafting by Liu Zhijian, Mao looked the document over approved it, and 
stressed its importance.
183
    
 The document came to be known as the October 5 directive. The directive clearly 
stated:  
There is still the phenomenon of suppressing democracy….Therefore, 
based on the recommendation of Comrade Lin Biao, the cultural 
revolution movement in army academies and schools must do away 
with all the bonds that have shackled the mass movement…and there 
must be full development of democracy, with great blooming, great 
contending, big character posters, and great debates; and the army 





Lin, thus extended the movement into the military by permitting students at military 
academies to initiate, respond, and behave in similar fashion to the increasing radicalism 
occurring throughout the country by the Red Guards. The order reflected the position of 
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the Cultural Revolutionary Group in abolishing excessive Party committee control over 
PLA educational units. The order was widely distributed as it reached all schools 
including those that were non-military.   
 Although Lin’s can be viewed as being a primary initiator and extender of the 
Cultural Revolution into the military, his decision was heavily influenced by the current 
political tendencies of the time period. First, Lin was not the only firm supporter of the 
order. Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Ye Jianying all 
buttressed the widespread proliferation of the document throughout the country and were 
present at multiple public readings of the document. On October 1, 1966, during the 
National Day Review, Mao stated atop the rostrum at Tiananmen that he would continue 
the Cultural Revolution at all costs, noting that no Party committees should be able to 
occlude its progressive transformation. As Wang Li recalls, the Chairman stated, “The 
Cultural Revolution must be carried through to the end. If anyone is to be shot for it, I 
will be shot along with you.”
185
 Wang noted in one source that “it seemed that the more 
rebuffs the Chairman met, the more determined he was to continue.”
186
 Mao possessed a 
constant seemingly never ending desire for extending the revolution. Initially, in 
February 1966, the Chairman held a limited vision of the Cultural Revolution and its 
length, believing that only a three month period was required to make the necessary 
cultural transformations in the Party and society. Wang Li notes that by October, when 
the bourgeois reactionary line was officially recognized within the Party, Mao favored a 
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one year Cultural Revolution.
187
 Implicit for this discussion of Lin Biao and the October 
5 directive is that Lin made his decision for extending the revolution into the military 
academies during a time period that was shrouded with the Chairman’s lust to prolong the 
fervency of the revolution. We can thus view Lin’s promotion of the directive as 
reactionary, or somewhat crafty, as Lin flowed with the political winds which were 
brewed by a radical Mao.    
Lin Biao’s role within the growing trend to have representation to mass 
organizations is confined to merely repeating rhetoric that reflected the Chairman’s own 
views, as he publicly backed the position of Mao and the CCRG radicals. Lin’s most 
radical behavior during this time is the criticism he made against Gu Mu at several 
Central level meetings which were coincidentally accompanied by attacks from radical 
Wang Li against Tao Zhu. With the exception of mentioning Tao Zhu by name at the 
meeting, no record of Lin actually denouncing Tao Zhu exists, rather, Lin’s attacks were 
limited mainly to Gu Mu, which can be viewed merely as finding a point of contention in 
order to show some sign of disgruntle so that his views matched the Chairman’s. 
Moreover, Lin did not attack Zhou Enlai either, even though the Premier had assigned 
Tao Zhu and Gu Mu to draft, under Mao’s orders, what became a blasphemous anti-
Cultural Revolutionary document. Unlike Lin, Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng fervently 
attacked Tao Zhu. Officially, Tao was charged with objecting to the stoppage of 
production to engage in revolution. Tao, unlike Jiang, also supported the insertion of 
Deng Xiaoping in a photo that appeared throughout the country on the seventeenth 
anniversary of National Day. The source of the position that Lin eventually took must 
also be considered in our reexamination. One Party historian notes that the October 5 
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directive, a document that clearly was a catalyst in Lin’s radical position which continued 
through December and which liberated students in military academies to participate in the 
Cultural Revolution, stemmed from a discussion at the rostrum at Tiananmen where Lin 
Doudou, Tao Shiliang (Tao Zhu’s daughter), and Mao’s daughter discussed and was 
critical of the suppression of army institutions. Lin Doudou then reportedly relayed the 
content of the conversation to Ye Qun who then ordered her to “blow wind in Lin’s ear” 
on the matter and make it seem as if it came directly from Mao. If there is validity behind 
this claim then it illustrates two important points for our discussion. First, Ye is again 
acting as a political tactician, orchestrating and directing her family to manipulate and 
shape the views of Lin Biao. Second, we see Lin attempting to shape Lin’s opinion. This 
suggests a Lin Biao who could be molded and was politically malleable. Once again, 
Lin’s schizoid personality plays a role as his emotional detachment and lack of a clear 
stance on any particular issues allows those closest to him to steer him in certain 
directions. If this is indeed the case, then the majority of Lin’s position from October 
through December—during the ongoing controversy surrounding the extension of the 
Cultural Revolution—can be perceived as being a reflection of Ye’s own political, 
revolutionary agenda. Moreover, when we consider the desires by Ye Qun to gain favor 
from Jiang Qing and the CCRG radicals, then Ye’s intentions becomes even more 
obvious as she not only is bolstering the position of the Party radicals but also one of 
Jiang’s primary enemies—Tao Zhu.
188
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The role of Lin during the later months of 1966 can be viewed again as peripheral 
rather than a central figure. As we have seen, Lin’s behavior is more reactive rather than 
proactive. Lin’s October 5 directive can be viewed as a reflection of the Chairman’s 
current wishes rather than Lin’s own personal desires. In addition, Lin showed little 
interest in struggle sessions or outright attacks against fellow Party members. Lin for 
instance did not chair the struggle session against his friend Tao Zhu and he only briefly 
mentioned Gu Mu by name during a Party meeting attacking Tao. Moreover, after 
reviewing available evidence, the actual movement against Tao Zhu is primarily initiated 
by Jiang Qing for personal reasons, and the CRG members Kang Sheng and Chen Boda 
who loyally followed Jiang’s lead. Even Lin’s own reaction, after learning of Tao’s 
attack against Jiang, was expressionless and showed no indication that Lin felt an attack 
on Tao should be commenced.       
Coping with Chaos January-March 1967 
 Following the rise of mass organizations in November and December 1966, the 
New Year ushered in a massive movement around the country that called on the masses 
to overthrow the existing organs of power and to seize power for themselves. On 
December 30, Jiang Qing at Qinghua University issued a call commanding that in 1967 
we “must begin an attack on every front.”
189
 This message set the tone for January 1967, 
as an editorial quickly followed after the New Year stating, “This is the year of 
nationwide class struggle.”
190
 At the heart of this movement was Mao’s vision to create 
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“great alliances” known as “revolutionary committees.” The committees were an 
amalgam of military representatives, members from mass organizations, and veteran 
Party cadres. The seizure of power and struggle, in Mao’s eyes, represented a thorough 
cleansing of the Party that would exorcise the bourgeois, revisionist line of Liu Shaoqi. 
The concept of power seizure was inspired by the events in Shanghai where rebels 
declared power over local municipal Party committees. The movement witnessed a series 
of strikes by rebellious workers that led to the desertion of Party posts which 
consequently allowed the rebels to seize power without disrupting the functionality of the 
economy. The Chairman blessed the movement, stating the rebels in Shanghai should be 
emulated by other revolutionaries throughout the country. On January 16, Mao 
authorized the publication of a Red Flag article, calling for Red Guards to seize control of 
organizations throughout the country. As the article notes, “to wrest power from these 
persons means the revolution of one class to overthrow another class…i.e. a revolution of 
the proletariat to overthrow the bourgeoisie.”
191
 Mao’s approval quickly paved the way 
for other attacks upon municipal authorities throughout the country. Power seizures 
occurred at the provincial level as well, as Shanxi’s provincial Party committee was 
removed on January 14, in Guangdong and Jiangsu on January 22, in Guizhou on January 
25, in Anhui on January 26, in Beijing on January 28, and in Heilongjiang on January 
31.
192
  The Party hailed the power seizures as “an extremely great pioneering 
undertaking,” a “great event without precedent in mankind’s history, a great event which 
has bearing on the future of the world and the destiny of mankind.”
193
 Nobody was 
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immune to the violence, regardless of their rank within the Party. The minister of coal 
Zhang Linzhi was beaten to death. The secretary of the Shanxi provincial Party 
committee, Wei Heng, committed suicide after having been imprisoned and tortured by 
Red Guards.  
 The PLA was no exception to the increasing radicalism occurring throughout the 
country at this time. PLA cadres were both attacked and abused by surging forces 
throughout the country. Veteran cadres were criticized in harsh struggle sessions. In 
Beijing, large crowds surrounded Zhongnanhai where rebels demanded that military 
cadres Chen Yi and Li Xiannian emerge to meet the militant youths. In the official view, 
Zhou Enlai is seen as a protectorate of the old marshals, asking the fuming Red Guards to 
cease their harsh attacks upon the military veterans. For instance, the old marshal Zhu 
De, life-long comrade to Mao and former commander-in-chief of the Red Army during 
the pre-Liberation period, faced stringent attacks by Red Guards but was rescued by 
Zhou. The situation only exacerbated as soon as the aforementioned January 16 article in 
Red Flag appeared calling for the seizure of power from a handful of capitalists in the 
Party.  
Within this atmosphere, orthodox histories perceive Lin as a figure who supported 
the inciting attacks on the PLA and utilized the continuous anarchy as a means to 
strengthen his position within the military. However, as with many cases thus far, the 
official version contradicts what Lin’s true intentions are.   
 Beginning in early January and continuing through February 1967, an enlarged 
meeting of the CMC was held at the Jingxi Guesthouse and at Huairen Hall. The 
meetings placed CMC members and CCRG radicals against one another. The 
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congregation was filled with emotion and intensity as Marshalls Xu Xiangqian and Nie 
Rongzhen denounced the radicalism occurring throughout the country, arguing that it had 
debilitating affects on the production of agriculture and industry, and the ability of the 
PLA to effectively operate under such stringent conditions.  
On February 11 at Huairen Hall, a Politburo meeting was held and was attended 
by CCRG members. The engagement quickly turned into another fierce attack between 
the Marshalls and the CCRG. On February 13, Ye Jianying attacked the CCRG, 
exclaiming, “You have caused chaos, you have caused chaos in the government, in 




 Tan Zhenlin wrote a personal letter to both Mao and Lin Biao which expressed his 
complaints about the developments of the Cultural Revolution and the continuous torture 
that Party cadres had experienced stating, “Nearly all [Party cadres] have struggled, worn 
the dunce cap, and rode the airplane.”
195
 Tan pointed out that the cause of the disaster 
was due to the evil acts of a few people who hoped to usurp power for themselves. Tan 
also mentioned Chen Boda and Jiang Qing by name, saying that they should be held 
accountable.  
 On the evening of February 16, the day that witnessed the most virulent attacks 
upon the CCRG, Yao Wenyuan, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Li reported 
the events of the day to Jiang Qing. Jiang composed a quick letter stating, “Chairman, 
Zhang, Yao, and I have a very important matter to report to you. I hope that you will see 
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us quickly.” Only a few hours later, at 10 p.m., Mao received them and listened to their 
report concerning the events that transpired. The Chairman did not respond to the report 
from Zhang Chunqiao, Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Li, he only smiled.
196
 
However, Mao soon became concerned. Consequently, on February 18, the Chairman 
convened a Politburo meeting where he expressed his support for the CCRG. Mao 
claimed that the CCRG is wrong “one, two, three percent of the time but correct ninety 
seven percent of the time.”
197
 The Chairman also suggested that “Whoever opposes the 
CCRG, I will firmly oppose them!” Ye Qun, who was attending the meeting on behalf of 
Lin Biao, was told by the Chairman, “Comrade Ye Qun, you go and tell Lin Biao that his 
position is not secure, there are people who want to take his place. He and I will go back 
to Jinggangshan and then wage a guerilla war!”
198
  
This study will now examine Lin Biao’s role within the January-February period. 
As the evidence below shows a Lin Biao contradicts the typical image of a man who 
supported continuing chaos in order to bolster his own power position in the PLA.  
It cannot be denied that Lin knew of the ensuing chaotic situation occurring 
throughout the country in January, as well as the increasing pressure and violence the 
PLA experienced from student radicals. As Zhang Yunsheng recalls, several reports came 
into Maojiawan. One report detailed the attacks that eight military commanders in the 
region had been subjected to from various military academies. Commander Xu Shiyou’s 
situation had become so bad that he constantly drank and threatened to kill himself if he 
                                                 
196
 Wang Li, “Yi nian ling liangge yue de huiyi—1966 nian 6 yue zhi 1967 nian 8 yue.” (Memoirs of a 
Year and Six Months—June 1966 to August 1967), Unpublished Manuscript appearing in Chinese Law and 
Government no. 6, 1994, p. 47 
197
 Wang Nianyi, Dadongluan de niandai (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 
1988) p. 216 
198
 Ibid 
                 127 
were touched. A report came from Shenyang, in which the Vice Commander of the 
military region, Tang Zian, was reported to having been assaulted and almost tortured to 
death by radicals. Commander Han Xianchu of the Fuzhou military region reported to 
Maojiawan that radical students had done nothing but “fool around, causing all kinds of 
chaos and trouble that has interfered with our preparation for war. If this continues, I’ll 
go up into the mountain and engage in guerilla war.” In Beijing, military leadership 
organs all around the city were subjected to attacks.
199
 In reaction to these broadcasts, Lin 
was not apathetic but rather decided to take action. Lin personally gathered all the 
telegrams he received from the varying military regions to give to the Chairman for 
examination. On January 20, 1967, Lin held an urgent meeting with Marshals Ye 
Jianying and Nie Rongzhen, Xu Shiyou, and Chief of the General Staff Department Yang 
Chengwu. The meeting, according to Zhang Yunsheng, was a detailed discussion of the 
attacks that were occurring on PLA leaders throughout the country and the need to outlaw 
any attacks made upon PLA leaders.
200
  On January 24, Marshal Xu Xiangqian 
personally visited Maojiawan and spoke with Lin Biao. Lin and Xu were not particularly 
close. Both knew each other from their days as students at the Huangpu Military 
Academy during the pre-Liberation period, but both Lin and Xu fought on separate fields 
of battle during the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. Moreover, Xu, like 
Lin, was known to struggle with intra-Party personal relationships. However, these 
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detriments did not hinder collaboration between Lin and Xu in response to the anarchy 
thundering its way through China.
201
 As Xu Xiangqian recalls:         
On January 24, 1967 after dinner, I sat down with Lin Biao at 
Maojiawan. I went straight to the point. I told Lin about the present 
chaotic situation in the military and told him that the military needed 
stability. When chaos is like this it is not good. Lin Biao nodded in 
agreement and stated, ‘Yes, there cannot be chaos in the military. I will 
make a document.’ At that time Lin left immediately and ordered his 




 Seven points were drawn up and passed to the Chairman for his approval. 
According to Xu Xiangqian, Lin personally took the points to the Chairman at 
Zhongnanhai on the evening of January 28. Mao reviewed the points, readily agreed, and 
added another—“Educate the Children of Cadres.”  The Eight Points stipulated that:  
The question of assaults on military leading organs which had already 
taken place should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. If assaults 
were made by counterrevolutionaries, they should be suppressed, but 
no action was needed if leftists were responsible for the attacks. 
Henceforth no assaults or exchange of revolutionary experience shall 
be permitted in units of the armed forces dealing with war preparation 
systems and security….Armies, divisions, regiments, battalions, 
companies and special units designated by the Military Commission 




The Chairman approved the Eight Points, stating, “The Eight Points are very good. Have 
them issued.” Reportedly following the Chairman’s approval, Lin Biao 
uncharacteristically burst into emotion and shouted, “Long live Chairman Mao! Long live 
Chairman Mao! (wan wan sui)”
204
 What is significant in our analysis is that in January 
1967, Lin Biao supported a political move that would counter the chaos that was then 
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consuming the military. Unlike the Lin Biao that is seen in orthodox Party histories, the 
Lin Biao seen in this study, actually reacted and responded to the calls for help to reduce 
the chaos occurring in the country, particularly against the military. However, what 
should also be kept in mind is that Lin, again, did not create the Eight Points proactively 
but rather reactively after meeting with Xu Xiangqian and hearing about the continued 
troubles that PLA figures were encountering throughout the country.   
 Within the context of the politically tumultuous time of January-February 1967, 
Lin failed to take a clear, defined stance without knowing the position of another first. In 
the context of Tan Zhenlin’s critical letter, mentioned above, the Chairman became 
concerned over the direction that the February meetings were taking after receiving Tan 
Zhenlin’s letter, however Lin showed no reaction to the blasphemous comments made in 
Tan Zhenlin’s letter. In fact, Zhang Yunsheng specifically states that Lin initially ignored 
Tan’s letter and that it was not until after a February 19 meeting when Mao publicly 
denounced the behavior of certain military officials that Lin wrote stinging remarks about 
Tan. Lin commented on the letter he sent to Mao that Tan’s thoughts “are becoming 




Lin’s passive behavior contradicts the demonstrative role of Ye Qun during this 
time period. During a visit made to Maojiawan by Jiang Qing and Wang Li on February 
18, Jiang informed Lin Biao and Ye Qun about the events at Huairen Hall. Lin did not 
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respond to anything Jiang stated. Following this meeting Ye Qun quickly went to 
Diaoyutai and reportedly stated, “Those old men, they oppose Chairman Mao, attack the 
shouzhang [Lin Biao], and slander Jiang Qing. They want to perform a coup.” Later, Ye’s 
personal assistant came upon materials from Party radicals Wang Li and Zhang 
Chunqiao. The documents were filled with inflamed details that were outrageous 
exaggerations of what truly transpired at Huairen Hall in early February.
206
 Ye, as noted 
above, also attended the Chairman’s meeting where he expressed his continued support 
for the CCRG. According to Wang Landuo, Ye stated that Lin was not permitted to go to 
the meeting since he is not coping well with the issue.
207
 Ye Qun, according to Zhang 
Yunsheng, was also remembered as playing both sides of the political game. Zhang 
Yunsheng recalls a conversation held between Ye Qun and Marshall Ye Jianying who 




Shortly following the Chairman’s public support of Party radicals, the CCRG did 
not forget the salvos of criticism from early February. From late February through March, 
Huairen Hall hosted the CCRG’s return attack upon the PLA Marshalls. Kang Sheng led 
an attack stating, “Xu Xiangqian, the military is not yours. Do you want a reversal of 
verdicts for Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping? Do you wish to oppose the Party?” It was 
also added that the PLA Marshalls had “slandered Chairman Mao,” “opposed Chairman 
Mao’s revolutionary path,” “opposed the Great Cultural Revolution,” “denied the Yan’an 
Rectification movement,” and “protected the old cadres, protected the rebels, and 
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protected the spies.”
209
 On March 10, 1967, Wang Li, Qi Benyu, and Guan Feng 
accompanied Tan Houlan to the Agricultural College where they participated in attacks 
against Minister of Agriculture Tan Zhenlin.
210
 
 According to available evidence, Ye Qun, on behalf of Lin Biao, attended the 
meetings which attacked the PLA Marshals. One source notes that Ye Qun recalled 
receiving a dirty look during one meeting from Marshal Ye Jianying. During the period 
that witnessed the reversal against the Marshalls, Ye Qun warned the Maojiawan staff 
that Marshals Nie Rongzhen or Ye Jianying may attempt to visit Maojiawan in order to 
meet with Lin Biao. Ye ordered the staff to turn them away so that Lin would not have 
any interaction with them.
211
 Despite Ye Qun’s control of the flow of information into 
Maojiawan, one source indicates that Lin Biao did offer some sympathy to Marshal Ye 
Jianying in March 1967, when Ye was forced to participate in harsh struggle sessions. 
Lin reportedly learned that Ye Jianying requested a period of rest since his health was in 
poor shape. Lin Biao averred his appeal and also told his secretary to inform Ye that he 
can take time to think over the issue concerning the struggle he was currently entangled 
in. Lin allegedly intimated to his secretary that Ye Jianying is a heroic soldier and has 
done many meritorious deeds.
212
 
Similar to other events thus far reviewed throughout this chapter, Lin Biao is not 
seen at the forefront of the political battle. Lin is aloof and rarely formulates an opinion 
or stance. Ye Qun however is a vibrant political actor. Ye’s control of information to Lin, 
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ordering the Maojiawan staff to forbid visits from PLA Marshalls has also been observed. 
Indeed, in this section it is evident that Ye Qun would frequently ba guan (guard the 
pass). However, perhaps what is most striking after the review of the January-March 
1967 period is that Lin did respond to his fellow Marshals’ calls for assistance in creating 
an order that would deny continuing violence upon military leaders. The behavior seen by 
Lin is a contrariety to the more standard account damning account of Lin that historians 
have become accustomed to. But, as alluded to earlier, Lin’s behavior is seen as reactive 
rather proactive. Just as Lin was easily swayed by the demands and positions of his wife, 
so to was Lin formed and directed by his fellow Marshals. What is telling in this behavior 
is that Lin, most likely, was reactive since he most likely lacked an overall position. The 
lack of position on Lin’s part can be partially attributed to Lin’s lack of political acumen 
and, most likely, his overall lack of emotion or feeling—a key trait in schizoid 
personality disorder.  
The Wuhan Incident, the Arming of the Left, and Countering the Left 
 The infamous Wuhan Incident which witnessed the attack on Wang Li and Xie 
Fuzhi by a “conservative” faction backed by local Wuhan military commander Chen 
Zaidao, led to a radical upsurge that disseminated prolific attacks against PLA units 
throughout the country. By August-September, following months of excessive violence 
and disorder, a reigning in of the left occurred in policy leading to a resumption of PLA 
and Party authority.  
 Lin is seen as a primary instigator of the continuing extension of lawlessness 
throughout the country following the July 20 Wuhan incident in Chinese sources. 
Western sources are less grating on Lin though as they tend to present him as a figure 
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who vacillates between the pursuit of increasing radicalization by the CCRG and the need 
to provide some form of stability in the military.  
First, it should be noted, that Lin declined to attend the welcoming reception for 
Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi on July 22, two Party members portrayed as heroes due to their 
actions in Wuhan. On July 26, at the Jingxi Guesthouse, Zhou Enlai managed an 
organized criticism and dismissals of Chen Zaidao and Zhong Hanhua. Marshal Xu 
Xiangqian, General Peng Shaohui, and first political commissar of the Wuhan military 
Wang Renzhong were also relieved of their positions at the meeting for having been 
accused of supporting Chen. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Lin showed little 
enthusiasm to the revolutionary fervor surrounding the removal of Chen Zaidao. As 
Zhang reported the news of that the Jingxi guesthouse had been surrounded by fervent 
demonstrators shouting, “Down with Chen Zaidao,” Ye Qun responded, “This is a 
revolutionary deed which we should support.” Lin, unlike Ye, remained silent, choosing 
not to comment on the situation.
213
 As we have seen in previous examples throughout this 
chapter, Lin chose not to attend the public function, shying away from making a public 
appearance. In fact, Lin asked Zhou to preside over the criticism session of Chen Zaidao 
for him, further illustrating Lin’s aversion to attend functions and to be in social 
situations—no doubt due to Lin’s social anxiety disorder.
 214
 Not only does Lin’s absence 
from the meeting speak volumes concerning his interest in political matters, it also 
questions the validity of the commonly seen perspective that Lin wanted to remove Chen 
for reasons dealing with Lin’s ability to control Chen and his loyalty to Lin. As most 
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would assume, if Lin viewed Chen as an uncontrollable military regional head, he would 
most likely exhibit some form of emotion to his removal. But, in typical Lin Biao 
fashion, he showed little interest to Chen’s removal.
215
  
Perhaps one of the most vivid illustrations however that should be considered in 
lessening the amount of blame upon Lin is Lin’s infamous letter to Mao in 1967. In the 
letter, Lin brandished his concerns for the proliferation of weapons amongst the masses, 
completely contradicting the persona of a man aimed at continued violence and chaos for 
his own political means. Lin, assessing the situation, declared in the letter that, “the issue 
at the moment is still one of opposing factions and escalating armed struggles…. In 
particular, there is the matter of the theft of rifles from the armed forces. Such thefts are 
already occurring in five provinces in the south. This seems to be a growing trend and we 
urgently need to find a way of putting it to an end.”
216
 The letter was transferred to 
Diaoyutai where it was reviewed by Qi Benyu, Guan Feng, Chen Boda, and Yao 
Wenyuan. The letter was flown direct to Mao, who was still in Shanghai, where he 
responded most optimistically. According to Mao, there was no need to worry about the 
weapons seizures, feeling that the appropriate measures would be taken at the appropriate 
time.  
Lin also showed little zealousness for Mao’s “arming the left” policy in public. In 
a public speech made on August 9, Lin made no reference to Mao’s policy, opting instead 
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to focus his comments on giving praise to Lieutenant General Zeng Siyu and Major 
General Liu Feng, the newly appointed heads of the Wuhan military region. Lin’s only 
mention of the deluge of mass arming throughout the country was an interjection he made 
during a report on the situation in Wuhan by Zeng and Liu. Lin jeered, “It is very clear 
how they viewed the situation; we [on the other hand] must comply with Chairman Mao’s 
instructions, arm the left and distribute rifles to the masses.”
217
 Implicit in Lin’s footnote 
to Zeng and Liu’s speech for our purposes is that whatever backing that Lin gave to the 
movement, it was merely to follow the wishes of the Chairman who felt that the growing 
turmoil possessed propitious qualities.  
Another point that must be considered is that by mid-August, Lin absconded to 
Beidaihe leaving matters in the hands of Ye Qun and Wu Faxian. Lin therefore missed 
the formal appointment of the Military Commission Management group on August 17, an 
organization composed of Ye Qun, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo, and Zhang Xiuchuan. The 
organization was created by Jiang Qing, under an order from Zhou Enlai, and was meant 
to oversee the Cultural Revolution in the military and to report directly to the CCRG. 
Thus, in Lin’s absence, Ye Qun took control of formal political issues. Once again, we 
see Lin Biao existing outside the political perimeters of Beijing and his disinterest overall 
in politics. Ye Qun, again acting as Lin’s political housekeeper, was put in his place 
during the meeting, in all likely hood due to Lin’s despising of public functions and lack 
of emotion toward politics in general.   
What is perhaps the most clear, delineating factor that exonerates Lin from the 
disruption and violence following the Wuhan incident is the degree of responsibility that 
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should be placed upon Mao for the continuing anarchy. Existing evidence clearly shows 
that the Chairman had keen interests in the masses continued pursuit of radical action 
against conservative mass organizations and the military. As Mao noted in an August 4 
letter to Jiang Qing, Mao stressed that there existed an urgent need for the dismissal and 
attack on elements in society that had begun to tilt toward the political right. According to 
the Chairman, more than 75 percent of the PLA officer corps “supports the [civilian] 
right” and “by arming the [civilian] left on a massive scale” and by having “the masses 
exercise dictatorship,” so Mao told Jiang, “the left will gain great fame and high prestige, 
while the arrogance of the right will be kept in check.”
218
 When amalgamating both Lin 
and the Chairman’s position, we clearly see a contradiction between two key Party 
figures: Lin Biao was a key member concerned about the pejorative violence occurring 
throughout the country, and Mao, who favored the continued engendering of armed 
chaos. What is key for this analysis of Lin Biao is that he attempted, uncharacteristically, 
to take initiative and address his concerns for the country which was drowning in a welter 
of gunfire and strife. This was evident in Lin’s proclamation of the Seven Points, though 
his decision may have been influenced by Xu Xiangqian, his letter to Mao regarding the 
increasing violence in August, and the display made in public on August 9. Thus, 
labeling Lin as liable for the radical expatiation of violence in the summer months of 
1967 is questionable as the initiative for instability can be clearly linked to Mao and Lin 
showed some tendencies to curb excessive violence currently occurring throughout the 
country.  
Regarding the formal removal of Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu, Lin also 
does not appear to have played any significant role. In fact, Lin did not even respond to 
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Yang Chengwu who visited Lin in Beidaihe to report about the situation. Reportedly, 
upon hearing of the situation, Lin simply shook his head. Yang asked if Lin had any 
instruction regarding their dismissal to which Lin denied.
219
 Furthermore, the removal of 
Wang, Guan, and Qi should be considered purges that were exercised by Mao in order to 
curb the excessive violence in the country that had begun to be too much even for Mao’s 
taste. Wang, Guan, and Qi were simply expendable pawns in Mao’s brutal political game.   
The Yang-Yu-Fu Incident 
The Yang-Yu-Fu case erupted as part of the growing power the PLA possessed following 
the removal of Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu and the movement to decrease 
excessive leftism. In late 1967 and early 1968 Yang Chengwu had been responsible for 
resolving provincial disputes and assisted in the “appropriate” formation of the new 
provincial revolutionary committees.
220
 Yang supported a “conservative” coalition of 
military units and mass organizations, thus following the trends of the new “anti ultra-
left” policies favored by Chairman Mao. But these activities inevitably led to conflict 
with the CCRG radicals who began to fear a “rightist verdict of reversals.” In terms of 
purposes of political power, it is commonly assumed that Lin supported the removals of 
Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi since his their replacements were Huang 
Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, and Wen Yucheng respectively, all close supporters of Lin Biao. 
 These three generals and their mysterious dismissals remain one of the most 
bizarre and troubling events of the Cultural Revolution. There mistakes were summarized 
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by Lin Biao on the evening of March 24, to an audience that contained Zhou Enlai, Jiang 
Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, and Ye Qun. The 
content of Lin’s speech focused primarily on the three serious errors of Yang Chengwu: 
1) mountaintopism 2) Yang’s double dealing and two faced nature 3) Yang’s gross 
distortion of Marxist-Leninism. Lin only briefly mentioned the mistakes committed by 
Yu Lijin and Fu Chongbi. Puzzlingly, Lin never mentioned the alleged conservative 
stance that Yang-Yu-Fu took toward the Cultural Revolution which was then being cited 
as a possible oncoming “second February Adverse current.” The speech itself that Lin 
provided was an outline provided by Mao. Thus, again, we see the key, central role that 
Mao and the CCRG plays in dictating policy and the political direction of the country.   
 According to Lin Biao’s speech, Yang’s “mountaintopism” was a betrayal of 
communism, as it supported the mentality that only a small few can be trusted—a direct 
betrayal of the Communist Party and the historical fact that the Chinese Revolution was 
won by the entire Party. Yang’s error and the source of Lin’s accusation stemmed from 
Yang’s refusal to employ cadres unless they had worked with him in the Shanxi-Rehol-
Hebei military region during the Chinese Civil War period.  As Lin Biao stated, “The 
total military victory was achieved by the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Field 
Armies.”
221
 Lin noted that “mountaintopism” leads to “all kinds of bad behavior. This 
kind of backward thinking can evoke traitorous behavior—some of this has already 
become a reality.”
222
 Lin buttressed the argument that Yang, together with Yu Lijin, had 
plotted the overthrow of PLAAF commander Wu Faxian, and Beijing political commissar 
and head of the Beijing revolutionary committee Xie Fuzhi. In addition, Yang was also 
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 The next element of Yang’s crimes was his “double-dealing” and “two faced” 
behavior. As Lin stated, “Yang Chengwu’s political character is evil. He is a two-faced, 
three sworded man.”
224
 Lin accused Yang of giving the appearance of opposing Luo 
Ruiqing, He Long, and Peng Zhen, but, had in fact, sided with them and their beliefs. 
“Everyone thought that Yang Chengwu opposed Luo Ruiqing, but in fact he was a Luo 
Ruiqing element—he followed closely behind Luo….He took part in the struggle against 
Peng Zhen, but actually he supported Peng Zhen.”
225
 In addition, Lin stated that Yang 
had pretended to support Jiang Qing and the actions of the CCRG, but, in actuality, Yang 
had collected material about her for which he intended to utilize in order to expose her 
and contaminate her reputation.  
 The article Yang Chengwu had written and appeared in People’s Daily on August 
24, 1967, entitled “To Establish the Absolute Authority of Great Mao Zedong Thought” 
was also used against Yang during Lin’s speech. According to Lin Biao, the Chairman 
disagreed with Yang’s application and terminology of “absolute authority”. As Lin noted 
in his speech, “Chairman Mao said, ‘This way of bringing up absolute authority is not 
proper, for never has there been separate absolute authority. All authority is relative; all 
absolute things exist within relative things.’ Marxism does not recognize isolated 
absolutes.”
226
 With this statement, Yang’s errors officially extended into an ideological 
realm, as he was accused of foul interpretations and ideological deviations of Marxism.  
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 Lin Biao also prosecuted Fu Chongbi for having led two trucks full of armed 
soldiers into Diaoyutai with the intention of arresting people. Interestingly, Lin did not 
directly address any wrongdoings by Yu Lijin, although his name was mentioned briefly 
as a figure in Yang’s plot to usurp power from Wu Faxian and take control of the 
PLAAF.  
 While reading Lin’s public statement that was given on March 24, 1968, can be 
interpreted as conclusive evidence that Lin obviously knew of Yang’s downfall and his 
own belief that he was attempting to commandeer control of the military, more 
specifically the PLAAF, a critical review of available evidence invites other 
interpretations and factors that must also be carefully considered.  
 Before critically reviewing this case it is important to briefly mention the close 
inner-working personal relationship that existed between Lin Biao and Yang Chengwu. 
Lin and Yang had contact with each other as early as 1930. In the Jiangxi base areas, 
Yang acted as commander and political commissar of a division under Lin Biao’s 1
st
 
army corps. On the Long March, Yang also served as one of Lin’s subordinates. Their 
relationship extended into the post-Liberation period as Yang and Lin reportedly 
developed a close working relationship following Lin’s appointment as Defense Minister 
in 1959. After the purge of Luo Ruiqing in 1965, Yang’s power, influence, and intimacy 
with Lin grew even more as Yang became Chief of the General Staffs Department. Yang 
was thus, as in the words of Barnouin and Yu, “Lin’s man”. Yang’s career was made 
possible principally by Lin’s backing and trust.
227
 With this in mind, the argument that 
Lin removed Yang to replace him with an individual who was close to him, in this case 
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Huang Yongsheng, becomes highly questionable. According to official sources though, 
shortly following the onset of the unstable and tumultuous Cultural Revolution the 
camaraderie and trust seeped slowly away between Lin and Yang. Lin’s gradual 
disappearance in trust for Yang, though not formally stated in Lin’s accusations of March 
24, was a key primary motivator for his dismissal and is the first point of discussion and 
reconsideration here. In addition, the role of Ye Qun in Yang’s dismissal also is apparent 
as she, most likely, supported the move to purge Yang in an effort to continue to curry 
favor to Jiang Qing and the CCRG. As seen further below, the Yang-Yu-Fu purge fell 
within the context of curbing a possible return of rightism in the Party.   
 In July 1967, Yang was assigned to escort the Chairman to Wuhan, where he 
would accompany him and help insure his safety and security. The purpose of the 
Chairman’s trip was inspection; the Chairman personally planned to speak with varying 
military and civilian Party figureheads. During the inspection tour, Mao made several 
comments pertaining to Cultural Revolution trends. First, Mao noted that the Cultural 
Revolution needed to occur for a total of three full years, thus concluding in 1968. 
Second, Mao made several complimentary remarks about several old marshals who had 
recently been under heavy fire during the Cultural Revolution. Mao remarked that Zhu 
De, was a red commander in chief; Ye Jianying, during important moments had made 
good contributions; Chen Yi is a good comrade; Nie Rongzhen is an honest man; 
Commander Xu should not be persecuted; He Long was the banner of the second front 
army.
228
 The third comment made by the Chairman occurred in Shanghai. The Chairman 
noticed a newspaper which had the “four greats” plastered all over its front page in Lin’s 
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calligraphy. After seeing this, the Chairman confided to Yang asking who gave him the 
title of the “four greats”. The Chairman also noted the slogan “forever healthy” 
(yongyuan jiansheng), a slogan that was popular due to Lin’s rumored health problems, 
that accompanied the “four greats” in the headline. The Chairman questioned the validity 
of “forever healthy” asking, “What is ‘forever healthy”?” The Chairman also inquired if 
it were the “forever healthy” (a nickname for Lin Biao) that had given him the title of the 
“four greats”. After the Chairman’s critique, he emphasized that the “four greats” should 
no longer be propagandized, rather the focus and praise should be placed on Marxist-




 Yang Chengwu, under orders from Zhou Enlai and Mao, did not relay Mao’s 
statements to Lin Biao. Yang’s obstruction of information from Lin is the first source of 
tension that caused for Maojiawan’s relationship with Yang to turn sour. One evening, 
Ye Qun met with Yang and inquired about his southern tour with Mao. Lin Biao was not 
present during the meeting, but at the seaside town of Beidaihe trying to relax. Yang 
mentioned nothing of Mao’s crucial comments concerning the Cultural Revolution or of 
his praise for the old Marshals. The meeting reportedly was warm and cordial though. 
Following the discussion, Ye Qun met with Wu Faxian. Ye requested that Wu meet with 
Yang and inquire about the Chairman’s actions during his southern tour so as to make 
sure Yang had disclosed everything. Wu, reportedly, casually asked Yang about what 
criticisms the Chairman had of Lin and what comments he had made. Yang simply 
dismissed the question, responding that no negative statements had been made, thus 
illustrating that Yang covertly had no intention of disclosing what Mao had stated.  
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Yang’s non-disclosure of pertinent information initiated an ever decreasing spiral 
of suspicion of Yang’s intentions toward Maojiawan. Beliefs began to form toward Yang 
as to a possible usurpation of power in the military. In addition to Yang’s lack of 
information sharing, oft-handed comments quickly turned into venomous accusations and 
poisoning thoughts that only exacerbated the situation. In one incident, Wu asked Yang, 
“There is so much chaos occurring throughout the country now. Do you know what can 
be done to stabilize the situation?” Yang affirmed the omnipotent position of Mao stating 
“Whatever the Chairman decides and agrees to. If the Chairman wants chaos, only the 
Chairman can stabilize it”. Wu countered Yang’s statement, saying “No, there is still 
Vice Chairman Lin” to which Yang blasted, “The key is Chairman Mao!”
230
  
The second source of hatred and animosity toward Yang Chengwu stemmed from 
his decision to avoid any personal backing for Ye Qun during her plight with the 
anonymous letters written by Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing. As mentioned above, the 
letters vitiated Ye Qun’s image, accusing her of being a “sham Party member” alleging 
that she had failed to pass through the procedures which were required to join the Party 
and that she had lucid and profound connections to the Guomindang prior to the 
liberation of the country. Lin Biao, in an effort to clear his wife’s name, telephoned Yang 
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Chengwu and met with him about the matter. Lin appealed to Yang, asking him to write a 
letter and circulate it to the Party that would explicitly avouch Ye Qun’s Party 
authenticity. The letter, Lin implored, needed to state that Ye Qun had joined the Party at 
the age of sixteen. Lin added that he had dispatched a series of investigators to confirm 
the matter and mentioned they had found conclusive evidence which professed Ye’s 
membership in the Party but that these individuals did not hold high esteem in the Party 
thereby making the claim questionable. Yang Chengwu, to Lin’s dismay, denied Lin’s 
request, pointing out that he did not know Ye Qun at the time in question. Yang stated 
that he had only truly gotten to know Ye in 1960.
231
  
 Lin was also taken aback in early 1968 when Maojiawan received a report from 
the Management Affairs Group of the Central Military Commission written to Lin Biao 
and the Chairman, which contained information on the promotion of an army vice 
commander in one military region to the position of full army commander in another 
military region. At the end of the report were the signatures of Yang Chengwu and Wu 
Faxian. Lin, after reading over the report, ordered Zhang Yunsheng to research the 
individual being promoted. After learning that the man being promoted had been a 
member in the North Field Army, a key area of influence and connection for Yang 
Chengwu, Lin ordered the report to be filed away and only commented, “What’s the 
point of promoting him [the officer being promoted] into another region instead of giving 
him a promotion within his own region where he has already served?”
232
 This example 
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may be interpreted as an episode where Yang is practicing “moutaintopism”, a key crime 
that led to his dismissal. While Yang’s behavior in this instance is an indication that he 
favored certain comrades over others, thereby also following the common principle of 
guanxi (connections) in Chinese politics, we must also consider that Lin, while showing 
some interest, ordered that the file be put away and thereby ignored and inhibited others, 
i.e. Ye Qun, from obtaining it and possibly utilizing it. Lin’s irritation over Yang’s 
alleged “moutaintopism” is highly questionable since he decided to dismiss his concern 
over the promotion. This is another example of Lin’s lack of concern in political affairs 
and his overall lack of emotion, both illustrations of his schizoid personality. The fact that 
Wu Faxian, a close subordinate, intimate comrade of the Lin Biao camp, and member of 
the Fourth Field Army, did not object to Yang’s push for his colleagues promotion is also 
striking as it completely undercuts that factional organizations were forming within the 
PLA. Wu’s signature of approval on the promotion also illustrates that Wu had little 
concern for Yang’s alleged interests in seeking power within the military. 
233
 This latter 
point, in particular, raises questions if Yang actually had intentions of usurping power 
within the PLA.  
Yang’s accused crime of “moutaintopism” is questionable when considering Lin’s 
relationship with Yang directly prior to his removal. Prior to Yang’s downfall, Lin and 
Yang shared intimate conversations with each other, both expressing their feelings on 
certain political and military matters. On the evening prior to Yang’s arrest for instance, 
Zhang Yunsheng notes that Lin met with Yang at Maojiawan. Lin, commenting on the 
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current situation in Beijing, reportedly told Yang, “It is very important to pay attention to 
what is going on in Beijing. If we close our eyes to the chaos, it [the current situation] is 
only going to become a big joke”. What is even more striking is that Lin also openly 
discussed military appointments with Yang. Lin’s comments included his feelings toward 
Li Xiannian and Xu Xiangqian, two major military comrades who Yang championed to 
his side. “Regarding commander Xu, I can feel at ease. I do not feel at ease with Li 
Xiannian, he seems to be trustworthy but in fact he is not.” Yang then offered, “Can we 
suggest bringing Li Tianhan into the Military Commission.” Lin, neutral as always, 
stated, “We will look into it.”
234
 Not only does the exchange illustrate that Lin supported 
some of Yang’s promotional moves, it also illustrates a certain degree of translucency, as 
Lin and Yang both chatted about military matters. Moreover, it is questionable that Lin 
Biao would be so transparent to a key PLA figure such as Yang if he did not trust him. 
Lin expressing his feelings about the current chaos in Beijing and his feelings concerning 
other key PLA members illuminates a certain degree of trust to Yang.   
 Like other political cases examined, it is also questionable as to what extent Lin 
knew the details of Yang’s errors and if he agreed with them or not. For instance, on the 
day of March 24, when Yang’s crimes were formally announced by Lin, Zhang 
Yunsheng recalls that Maojiawan was engulfed in an atmosphere of hustle and bustle; 
two hours before Lin’s infamous speech no draft or script had been written. The content 
of the speech itself was composed, not by Lin Biao, but by Wang Fei and Zhou Yuchi 
under the direction of Ye Qun. Ye herself listed the crimes that Yang committed and 
ordered Wang and Zhou to include them in the speech. Ye also asked Li Chunsheng, a 
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secretary for Lin Biao, to select a few quotes from Marx and Lenin and from Chairman 
Mao’s works.
235
 Not only was Lin uninformed of the subject matter of the speech and had 
no direct input regarding its content, he was also befuddled at Yang’s supposed crimes. 
Following the meeting Lin’s daughter, Lin Doudou, asked her father, “What problems are 
there concerning Yang Chengwu? Why overthrow him?” Lin agreed and retorted, “Yes, 
what is the problem with Yang Chengwu?” Doudou then inquired, “Everybody heard 
your speech, how can you not know what problems there were with Yang Chengwu?” 
Lin then answered, “Yes, well what did I say? Call Ye Qun and ask her what problems 
there are with Yang Chengwu”. Doudou later said to one of Ye’s secretaries, “You see, 
this is our Vice Chairman, he has already spoken and dismissed Yang-Yu-Fu but he still 
doesn’t know what the problems with Yang Chengwu are”.
236
 Moreover, the general 
comments made by Lin Biao on March 24 were not as stringent and stinging as those 
made by Zhou Enlai and CCRG radicals.  
Thus, it remains questionable of Lin’s actual involvement and personal action 
toward removing Yang. As before, Lin appears to have little if any actual knowledge as 
to the details of what Yang’s crimes are. Furthermore, it appears that based on existing 
evidence, Yang and Lin were still sharing fairly amicable relations in early 1968, as Lin 
and Yang met just days prior to his removal and spoke about fairly sensitive military 
issues. The only source of friction between Yang and Lin appears to be petty, personal 
matters. Although these issues should not be ignored, there is no direct evidence which 
links Yang’s removal to these matters.  
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Another incident in the Yang-Yu-Fu case concerned Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin 
on the one hand, and Wu Faxian on the other. In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, 
Yang Chengwu received two anonymous letters from the PLAAF Headquarters. The 
letters accused four Air Force officials who were close and under Wu Faxian’s command: 
Zhou Yuchi, Liu Peifang, Yu Xinye, and Wang Fei, as having had sexual relations with 
unmarried women and who had become pregnant as a result. Yang Chengwu wasted no 
time and quickly delivered the letter to Lin Biao for his review.
237
   
Exacerbating this soap opera even further is that Wu Faxian soon discovered via a 
love letter, that Yu Lijin’s secretary had an affair with Yang Chengwu’s daughter, Yang 
Yi. Yang Yi had recently taken a position as an editor for the Air Force Daily (Kongjun 
ribao). Wu Faxian suggested that an investigation take place to confirm the case. Wu 
telephoned Yu Lijin’s wife and inquired if she had any lingering suspicions of a possible 
affair. Yu’s wife reportedly denied the incident altogether and was puzzled by the entire 
situation. The two anonymous letters caused continuous concerns from the accused, as 
Wang Fei begged Wu Faxian to arrest Yu’s secretary. Wu rebutted Wang’s request and 
shortly thereafter Wu suffered the consequences from an ill-tempered Ye Qun, who had 
learned of the affair from Zhou Yuchi. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Ye Qun played a 
prominent role in this elite, political, sexual scandal. Ye, wanting to gain evidence that 
could be used to smear Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin’s reputations as being linked to the 
rumored affair, ordered Wu Faxian to arrest, interrogate, and gain a written confession 
from the wife of Yu Lijin’s rumored promiscuous secretary. Ye scolded Wu when Wu 
showed his hesitation, asking him, “Why don’t you do something about this girl? You 
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lead thousands of people, you have tremendous strength but you don’t know how to use 
it. What are you afraid of? I support you, arrest her!”
238
 Shortly following this meeting, 
Wu arrested the wife of Yu Lijin’s secretary. Soon thereafter, Yu Lijin’s secretary was 
placed into custody.  
Yang Chengwu’s wife, Zhao Zhizhen, did not ignore the invidious incidents that 
had recently occurred which concerned her daughter Yang Yi. Initially, Zhao made 
personal phone calls to Maojiawan. Ye Qun did not take the phone calls and ordered her 
secretaries to tell Zhao, “Ye Qun is busy now; she cannot take your phone call. But I will 
report the issue to her. I will also report it to Vice Chairman Lin.”
239
 Shortly thereafter, 
Zhao made several personal trips to Maojiawan in order to clarify and express her 
concern of the rumors and character defamation of her daughter. Yu Lijin accompanied 
Zhao. The meetings were well received from Ye Qun, who did her best to act normal and 
not to give any indication of the potential involvement she had regarding the slanderous 
remarks and investigation currently being carried out by Wu Faxian. Zhao informed Ye 
that her daughter had just recently started working at the Air Force Daily and that there 
was nothing abnormal about the relationship between Yang Yi and Yu Lijin’s secretary. 
Zhao reportedly trembled when speaking, adding that she believed that Wu Faxian 
harbored evil intentions and cannot be trusted. Yu also objected to Wu’s actions, noting 
that he should have spoken with other Party members before taking Yu Lijin’s secretary 
and his secretary’s wife into custody. Shortly following the meeting and Zhao and Yu’s 
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departure, Ye requested Wu’s presence at Maojiawan. Ye informed Wu of the meeting 
with Zhao and Yu, and urged Wu, “You must stand your ground. You cannot give in.”
240
  
 Aside from this infamous sexual scandal, Yu’s problems with Maojiawan were 
similar to Yang’s in that Yu also accompanied the Chairman during his southern tour in 
July 1967. Like Yang, Yu was under direct orders from Zhou Enlai, failed to report to 
Lin about the various events that had taken place as well as the Chairman’s important 
comments that he expressed during his tour.  
 In assessing the evidence of the case against Yu Lijin, there is no direct evidence 
though that links Lin Biao to his removal. Unlike Yang Chengwu, where some petty 
minor infractions occurred which are seen as potential motives for his removal, Lin 
appears to hold no personal animosities toward Yu. Ye Qun, based on available evidence, 
made concerted efforts to dismiss Yu Lijin from his position within the PLAAF. While 
her motivations cannot be precisely pinpointed, consolidation and solidification of 
continuing influence within the PLAAF under Wu Faxian seems as a most likely 
stimulant as well as her efforts to participate in the movement to illustrate her continued 
support for Jiang Qing and the CCRG. Unfortunately for Wu, who showed reservations 
of launching the political offensive against Yu Lijin, he was stuck in the middle of Ye’s 
imaginative counterattack and simply followed Ye’s lead, carrying out the political plan 
after being scolded from a nagging Ye Qun. In addition, as witnessed above, Ye Qun 
asked her secretaries to inform Zhao Zhizhen that the matter would be reported to her and 
Lin Biao. While this appears to be a rather small, anecdotal piece of information, it 
should be contemplated. When considering that Lin was unable to accurately address the 
crimes that Yu had committed when asked by Doudou, it is valid to argue that it is 
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entirely doubtful that Ye Qun either never discussed the ongoing political melodrama 
concerning Zhao Zhizhen and Yu Lijin with Lin as she said she would, or Lin simply had 
no interest in the rumored sexual affairs, shying away from any discussions dealing with 
the issue or simply not wishing to take the time to meet with anybody to be informed 
about the issue. Also, as Zhang Yunsheng revealed in his memoirs, Lin Liguo told Zhang 
in confidence that Ye Qun is a very “curious person” and that she “loves to know about 
the affairs and details of other people.”
241
 Lin Liguo’s comments are a colorful 
description and certainly match the observations made by Zhang Yunsehng during the 
ordeal over Yang Chengwu’s daughter and Yu Lijin’s secretary.  
 Just as the blame for Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin’s removal cannot be placed 
squarely on the shoulders of Lin Biao, the removal of Fu Chongbi is another purge that 
Lin is not actively involved or a decisive factor. Rather, Fu’s removal emanates from 
personal animosity and anger generated from Jiang Qing and the Cultural Revolutionary 
Group.  
 Fu Chongbi, as deputy commander of the Beijing military region and commander 
of the Beijing garrison, was responsible for the security and safety of key Party members 
and stated leaders in the country’s capital. This, as noted by Barnouin and Yu, placed Fu 
in an awkward position with respect to the CCRG since high-ranking cadres, who had 
been assaulted and attacked by the Party and put in Fu’s custody, were in his charge.
242
 
The first source of considerable tension then between the CCRG and Fu Chongbi is 
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rooted in Fu’s protection of Party cadres, which affected the CCRG’s capability of 
continuing to carry out radical and violent action upon the Party.
243
  
 The CCRG shortly thereafter, fueled by Jiang Qing rage, performed a two day 
long interrogation of Fu at Diaoyutai. There, Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Yao Wenyuan, and 
Zhang Chunqiao all catechized and cross-examined Fu on the current absconding of Party 
members accused of committing crimes. As Jiang Qing stated, “Fu Chongbi, there is no 
need to be confused, those people, they were part of the capitalist faction, where did they 
go?” Fu only stated that he did not know. Yao Wenyuan added, “You are the Beijing 
garrison commander, how can you not know.” Inquiries into trivial matters such as Fu’s 
sentimental treatment toward disgraced Party members were also performed. Jiang Qing 
for instance, accused Fu for delivering healthy food such as fruit to Huang Kechang who 
had not received an appropriate diet and consequently had become constipated. Jiang also 
objected to Fu permitting Liu Zhijian’s wife to visit and deliver medicine to him.
244
  
 The second, and more significant, source of tension generated from a collection of 
missing manuscripts, approximately one-thousand pages, from the Lu Xun museum in 
Shanghai. Shortly after the death of Lu Xun’s widow, Xu Guangping, Zhou Enlai ordered 
that the manuscripts be recovered for the museum. Jiang Qing asked Fu Chongbi to 
investigate the matter. In order to find the missing documents Fu followed a wild paper 
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trail, moving from contact to contact. Fu’s investigation led him to the Xiyuan hotel in 
the western districts of Beijing. Fu spoke with He Xianlun at the hotel who informed Fu 
that the documents’ location was known by Bo Xinrong—a PLAAF cadre—who was 
currently at Diaoyutai. On March 8, Fu took two jeeps filled with armed soldiers to 
Diaoyutai. Upon entering the compound to report to Jiang Qing, Jiang appeared and 
shouted at Fu yelling, “Fu Chongbi, who invited you to come?” Fu informed Jiang of his 
findings, stating that the missing files from the Lu Xun museum had been in Diaoyutai 
the entire time. Jiang denied the validity in this allegation. However, shortly after looking 
through several boxes of files, the misplaced documents appeared. Jiang fumed and was 
filled with embarrassment.
245
 After this loss of face, Jiang harbored an intense hatred 
toward Fu, one that ignited her fire within and made Fu into a direct target of the CCRG.  
 One major, final consideration that should be made regarding the Yang-Yu-Fu 
Incident is the political atmosphere that surrounds it. The Chairman had no actual reason 
to purge Yang, Yu, or Fu. However, as Barnouin and Yu have astutely noted, Mao 
needed scapegoats to counter what he believed to be a surging rightist deviationist wind 
occurring throughout the country at the time. Labeling the three generals as 
representatives of the right deviationists allowed him to reinforce the campaign against 
this trend.
246
 Taking the Chairman’s political barometer into account, Lin Biao and 
Maojiawan can be viewed as simply following the current trends of the period in order to 
avoid being labeled as rightist revisionists as well. But the crux of the efforts against 
Yang, Yu, and Fu were Jiang Qing, the CCRG, and Ye Qun. Lin Biao, unlike this sordid 
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group, seemed, in private, to be puzzled over the purges of Yang, Yu, and Fu and also 
exhibited no actual distaste for the men, as Lin was still close to them just directly prior 
to their removal from office. Key considerations in this case again are the primary roles 
played by Mao, Ye Qun, Jiang Qing and the CCRG, and the petty personal matters 
formulated by these figures that fueled the need to remove Yang, Yu, and Fu from their 
positions.      
Lin Biao’s Defense Policies and Order Number One 
 There is no doubt that Lin Biao is considered as a tremendously successful 
military strategist. During the three major campaigns to liberate the country during the 
Chinese Civil War (June 1946-October 1949): the Liaoxi-Shenyang (Liao-Shen) 
Campaign, the Beiping-Tianjin (Ping-Jin) Campaign, and the Huai-Hai Campaign, Lin 
emerged as a victorious commander who led over a million troops in the years that China 
witnessed its most bloody years.
247
  
 Lin’s success and craftiness as a military leader in the annals of PRC history was 
not forgotten as it offered buttressing energy to the accusations against Lin that stated he 
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attempted to assassinate Mao. In the official documents from the Central Committee that 
address the full extent of Lin’s counterrevolutionary crimes, it is cited that the:  
Lin Biao anti-Party clique immediately made preparations for their 
armed counterrevolutionary coup d’etat. They drew up the plan for an 
armed counterrevolutionary coup…and stepped up their treacherous 
activities in the fields of politics, military affairs, organization, and 
intelligence….Under the direct command of Lin Biao, the sworn 





Whatever rumored plots Lin allegedly planned, it is clear that the Party perceives Lin as a 
conspiring murderer who sought the removal of Mao and took measures in order to 
succeed, craftily plotting as the military genius he was during the Chinese Civil War. As 
most Party members believed, if Lin could command over a million men he could easily 
use his strategic savvy in order to plan to assassinate the Chairman.  
 This portion of the chapter will discuss and expose a rather different Lin Biao in 
relation to his capabilities as a Defense Minister. In this analysis I will present numerous 
instances which will offer us a vastly different illustration of the crafty, military tactician. 
My aim is not to challenge Lin’s military accomplishments during the Chinese Civil War, 
as there is little doubt to the brilliance of his ability to command during this historical 
period. Instead, our discussion will focus on Lin’s views regarding defense policy for the 
PRC during the 1966-1969 years. Even more specifically, this section will review several 
military experiments and tests Lin was devoted to during the Cultural Revolution. What 
this analysis will illustrate, is that Lin’s overall position toward military experimentation 
and defense policy for the PRC ranges from the sublime to the bizarre. The aggregate 
impression that these episodes offer is suspicion as to the validity that Lin could have 
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carefully plotted an elaborate scheme to assassinate Chairman Mao, the plan typically 
thought of as Lin Biao directing Lin Liguo to lead his misfits to attack Chairman Mao’s 
train with bazookas and flame throwers upon Mao’s return from his Southern Tour.  
 One of the most tactically questionable military experiments that Lin conducted 
was referred to as “building up mountains” (dui shan). This tactic was a way to confront 
modern, conventional, superior militaries by building man-made mountains on both sides 
of a plain in order to force an advancing enemy through narrow corridors and thereby 
save time to prepare a counterattack. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Lin, upon hearing it 
was almost completed, sent him to the countryside east and southeast of Beijing. The 
commander in charge of the project informed Zhang that building up the mountains had 
consumed large amounts of reinforced concrete and enough man-hours to have built an 
entire factory. Inside the mountain a complex, intricate maze of hallways was constructed 
completely of concrete. Lin’s man-made mountains seemed to be wonderful construction 
feats, but Zhang wrestled with the idea and critically questioned the commander in charge 
about possible wartime scenarios. Zhang asked the commander, “If the enemy has 
already advanced to this point that means that Tianjin [to the East] has already been 
captured. Thus the basis of this design rests on the assumption that the defenses around 
Tianjin have been breached. However, what if the enemy did not attack from the Tianjin 
direction, but from the west or north of Beijing?” The commander reportedly laughed and 
commented, “We are merely construction soldiers.” Zhang then inquired, “What if the 
enemy attacked the mountains from the air? Are these man-made mountains sufficiently 
well constructed to protect you from enemy air attack?” The commander then stated, 
“The bunkers can withstand conventional bombs, at least for a short time.” Secretary Li, 
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another Maojiawan staff member who accompanied Zhang on this field trip, interjected, 
“Where will you emplace the antiaircraft guns? It seems to me that the hallways are 
pretty narrow.” The commander replied, “This is a defect.” Upon returning to 
Maojiawan, both Secretary Zhang and Li reported on the progress of the project. In 
typical Lin Biao fashion he did not utter a word or express any emotion.
249
  
In another example, Zhang recalls of a project that Lin Liguo was given by Lin 
Biao. In what is perhaps one of the most humorous instances in Zhang’s memoirs, Lin 
Liguo is noted as disassembling two bicycles one afternoon in the Maojiawan courtyard. 
Zhang Yunsheng came upon Lin Liguo’s project and curiously stared, trying to decipher 
what Lin was doing. Zhang could not contain his inquisitiveness any longer and finally 
asked Lin what he was doing with two bicycles. Lin informed Zhang that Lin Baio had 
requested him to construct a two person bicycle since there might be a possible lack of oil 
in the event of a war. Lin Liguo informed Zhang that, with the exception of the two front 
tires which would not stay parallel, he was nearly successful in completing the project. 
Zhang thought the idea was a joke and tried to contain his laughter.
250
    
Considering the two aforementioned examples, which clearly question Lin’s 
ability to craftily plan and execute affective military experiments designed to enhance 
PRC defenses, we must now move our attention to the infamous “Order Number One” of 
October 1969, that is typically portrayed as the first steps taken by Lin Biao in order to 
successfully execute a “counterrevolutionary coup” against the Party. In multiple 
perspectives, it is viewed as Lin’s trial run for his alleged failed coup attempt that 
occurred in 1971, and as a persecution of the old marshals who were dispatched from 
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Beijing to various locations in China as part of war preparations. It is also seen as an 
effort to consolidate Lin’s power, or at least as an effort to test how much authority Mao 
was actually willing to grant him.
251
  
“Order Number One” emerged from the growing concerns of potential war in 
early 1969 with China’s former ally—the Soviet Union. The seeds of Sino-Soviet tension 
were planted in the late 1950s in the wake of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign 
and withdraw of Soviet nuclear advisors in 1961. The other major reason for the rise in 
concern came from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, out of 
which emerged the Brezhnev doctrine. The invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred 
concomitantly with increased Soviet criticism of China’s Cultural Revolution. As a result 
of mounting Chinese suspicious that Moscow’s intentions were potential security threats, 
as early as May 1967 Beijing ordered Pravda, the official newspaper of the Soviet 
Central Committee, correspondents to leave China immediately. In June 1967, Soviet 
permission to fly into Chinese airspace in order to reach North Vietnam was cancelled. 
These corrosive events debilitated the overall relationship which reached its most agitated 
point in 1969 as a massive military buildup of several hundred thousand troops took place 
along the shared Sino-Soviet border.
252
 The tense security situation erupted in March 
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1969, when two bloody conflicts burst between Sino-Soviet garrison forces on Zhenbao 
Island located near the Chinese bank on the Ussuri River. 
253
  
Lin Biao’s behavior during the Sino-Soviet crisis from March-October 1969 is 
difficult to pinpoint as he did indeed exhibit brief moments of overreacting during the 
crisis, but also appeared aloof in several instances. We cannot determine precisely what 
Lin’s attitude and position toward the crisis is, however, through the following discussion 
validity of the accusation that Lin Biao’s so called “Order Number One” was a trial run 
for Lin’s later alleged coup attempt in September 1971 will be brought into question.  
Lin’s concern for the security of the nation can be seen in several instances. First, 
Lin gave a September 30 order for water conservancy units to open dams in order to 
prevent flooding in case of a potential bombing on the city.
254
 Marshals Chen Yi, Ye 
Jianying, Li Xiannian, and Xu Xiangqian strongly disagreed with the order and 
convinced Zhou Enlai to rescind it. Zhou then went to see Lin and persuaded him to 
cancel the command. Lin was also highly suspicious of Soviet negotiators who he 
believed were acting covertly in order to initiate an attack. Lin suspected that the 
resumption of border negotiations planned for October 20 was cover for a full scale 
attack against China. Lin Biao did not hesitate and acted quickly on his beliefs. On the 
eve of the National Day celebrations, taking place on October 1, Lin ordered an 
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immediate redeployment of all military planes from Beijing, that all runways must be in 
good working order, and that all military personnel must be prepared for potential 
combat. Lin also made a brief tour of areas on the outskirts of Beijing in order to meet 
with military personnel and stress preparedness for war. Lin, accompanied by Wu Faxian, 
Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and several Maojiawan staff members, flew from Beijing and visited 
Wutaishan, Yanmenguan, Badaling, then finally returned to Beijing.
255
  
Lin cannot be blamed for his so called “overreaction” as it appears that it took 
shape within the context of the Chairman Mao’s dim view toward the strategic situation. 
Following the Ninth Party Congress in August, Mao, at the suggestion of Zhou Enlai, 
issued an order on August 28 stressing the need to heighten security on China’s borders 
in order to prepare for a war of aggression. Chinese intelligence sources by September 
began to report that the Soviets had an intention to launch a surgical strike against 
Chinese nuclear facilities. On September 27, the Chairman, at the Great Hall of the 
People, ordered, “Don’t keep anybody in Beijing over the National Holiday. Everybody 
will leave early and prepare for combat readiness and strategy.” Zhou Enlai and Kang 
Sheng also made speeches mirroring the Chairman’s request for war preparation. By mid-
October the Chairman, following another meeting at the Great Hall of the People, 
stressed the need to scatter all major Party members throughout the country. Mao told 
Wu Faxian before leaving for Wuchang, “I am taking the first step. You need to pass 
along to Lin Biao that he needs to leave too.” Lin Biao shortly thereafter departed for 
Suzhou, where he temporarily resided at the former home of Soong Meiling (Madame 
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Chiang Kai-shek), and meanwhile Zhou Enlai headed for Fragrant Mountain.
256
 It is 
within this context that Lin Biao’s “Order Number One” was conceived, that of an 
intense and heightened security atmosphere which was recognized as an immediate 
concern to the country’s safety by top Party officials as well as the Chairman. Lin can be 
viewed as simply following the Chairman’s lead and not plotting to execute a pre-trial 
run of a coup attempt.  
The actual “order” that Lin issued was made on October 17. According to Zhang 
Yunsheng, Lin called him into his office and immediately ordered him to take notes. 
Altogether, Lin mentioned six points which included the dispersal of military units and 
that all vital military equipment be camouflaged in order to avoid its sabotage and 
destruction. Communications were to be maintained at all costs and national defense 
industries were to increase their armament production. The Second Artillery Division 
(dier paobing), China’s nuclear forces, were to put their weapons on high alert.   
The casualness of Lin Biao during the period should be noted. During Zhang’s 
reports which stated that the Soviet Union was contemplating usage of nuclear weapons 
which could easily destroy the major cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, Lin is noted 
as not responding or showing any reaction to the news. Zhang also writes that Lin did not 
receive reports directly following the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Zhenbao 
Island in March. Instead of pondering the international situation and assessing the 
possible perils of conventional or nuclear warfare with the Soviet giant, Lin departed for 
Beidaihe where he did not receive any secretaries for daily updates on the situation. In 
another instance, Lin was seen viewing a large seven meter long map of the border area 
                                                 
256
 Chi Zehou “’Yi hao hao ling’ fachu qianhou” (‘Order Number One’ From Beginning to End), in ed. 
Ding Kaiwen, Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident), (Carle Place: Mingjing 
chubanshe, 2004) pp. 98, 100 
                 162 
detailing the Zhenbao Island and Usurri River area. Ye Qun saw Lin studying the map 
and felt that the event was so unusual that she quickly ordered one of the Maojiawan staff 
members to take a photo of Lin as he appeared pensive, analyzing the map finally 
showing a spark of interest with the international situation.
257
 Implicit in these examples 
is that Lin is exhibiting behaviors that can be characterized as aloof and solitary, again 
illustrating tendencies often seen in a schizoid personality. Also, as seen earlier, Lin 
showed little or no emotion to the entire international war situation. Lin’s introverted and 
overall disinterest further questions the validity of the official charges that Lin attempted 
to use Order Number One and the intense security situation as a trial run for his alleged 
coup attempt made in 1971. What may appear puzzling is that in these instances Lin 
contradicts the examples we discussed earlier—Lin suggesting to Zhou Enlai that the 
dams be opened so that Beijing could not be flooded and Lin’s issue of public statements 
supporting full scale military preparations directly after the Ninth Party Congress—but 
what is a key element in the earlier discussed examples is that Lin’s actions were in 
public and, perhaps more importantly, Lin’s actions were closely following the lead of 
the Chairman who clearly felt an extreme urgency from the pressures of the Soviet 
military buildup and outbreak of fighting along the Sino-Soviet border. It could be 
asserted then that whatever motivations Lin may have appeared to have were stimulated 
by the Chairman. In private however, the views of Lin, as so often seen throughout this 
study, contradicted those seen in public.    
One final key point that must be discussed in our analysis of Lin’s role and 
culpability related to “Order Number One” is the tremendous amount of undue suffering 
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through an entire winter that the older marshals were forced to endure as a result of the 
order. Zhang Yunsheng, Lin’s secretary, even mentions that one of his brothers was in 
the army at the time of Order Number One. However, as Teiwes and Sun have astutely 
noted, the dispersal of Party members and old marshals was linked to war preparations, 
not a consequence of “Order Number One”. Measures to remove Party leaders from their 
offices in Beijing had been underway for a considerable amount of time. These measures 
began within the context of the aforementioned concern by Mao directly during the time 
of the Ninth Party Congress. The measures involved seminars on war preparations and 
warfare conferences of the “three Norths” regional area (Northwest, North, and 
Northeast). It should also be noted that Lin had no role in the actual physical movement 
of Party cadres. The placement of Party members and old marshals was carried out by 
Zhou Enali with the helpful assistance of Wang Dongxing.
258
 What is also obvious is that 
Mao, as the key figurehead of the country, paid close attention to the CMC’s activities as 
he believed in and stressed the need for the “Party to command the gun.” Very little, if at 
all possible, could ever slide past the Chairman concerning military matters. Troop 
movements and rotation of positions were often reported and approved by Mao. 
Furthermore, as we discussed above, according to Zhang’s account Ye Qun personally 
saw the importance of Mao looking over the order since the order was being made during 
a time that was not considered “war.” There is no evidence which specifically cites that 
Ye delivered the order to Mao, but given her close attention to politics, there is little 
doubt that she did not miss the opportunity to forward the order to Mao for his approval. 
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There is thus little reason to believe that Mao, as official sources state, knew nothing of 
Lin’s so-called military order.  
Conclusions 
 While the following chapter will formally conclude this study, the discussion 
throughout this chapter has been exceedingly lengthy; consequently a few key points 
should be mentioned to allow for an easier digestion and gestation process before we 
move forward to the conclusion. This chapter has attempted to scrutinize a series of cases 
which occurred directly prior and during the active phase of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1969) when Lin Biao is traditionally viewed as 1) acting vibrantly as a direct actor 
and executing a series of measures meant to eliminate his opponents in the Party 2) as an 
actor who may not be viewed as a direct actor but is widely assumed as being having a 
level of culpability due to assumption and public rhetoric 3) as a sly and scheming plotter 
who cleverly was planning to devise an elaborate scheme against Mao as early as 1969. 
These views have been largely based on evidence compiled by official Party organs and 
propaganda departments. The evidence compiled by Party organs has been utilized in 
major scholastic Chinese studies such as Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao’s Turbulent Decade, as 
cited extensively throughout this chapter. 
 But these long-time accepted views are largely one dimensional, as they only 
analyze Lin Biao and draw conclusions about him from perceptions formed through a 
public lens. What is even more troubling is that these positions are formed on assumption 
and wild accusations. This chapter however, has aimed to reinterpret Lin and his role in 
those cases where he is seen as a primary actor and culprit in the dismissal or key Party 
members in the consolidation of his power. Unlike those studies which have only 
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employed sources that analyze Lin in the “public” sphere, the Lin Biao viewed in this 
chapter is seen within the “private” sphere which consequently raises questions about the 
actual level of involvement that Lin Biao played during the Cultural Revolution period.  
 Several major points unraveled throughout this chapter need to be mentioned 
here. First, Lin Biao displayed behavioral tendencies that meet several criteria needed 
which are needed in order to be diagnosed with schizoid personality disorder. This 
disorder is a malfunction in personality that is typically characterized by displaying a 
preference to withdraw from society and having limited interaction with others. Another 
key element is that schizoids rarely project any type of emotion, as their emotions are 
usually restricted in an interpersonal setting. Most schizoid personalities have little or no 
reaction to social contact. Lin Biao presented these characteristics in a number of cases. 
As observed for instance when Lin heard of China’s impending war with the Soviets and 
the decision not to attend and manage Chen Zaidao’s criticism session, it is evident that 
Lin displayed no or little emotion and shied away from public situations. Absence from 
major dismissal meetings or criticism sessions and displaying no emotion and showing 
little interest in political matters are all behaviors that were the consequences of Lin’s 
thought process, one that had to pass through the mindset of a man who preferred privacy 
and who was rarely moved or stimulated by any particular instance.  
 The second primary conclusion that is the affect that Lin’s disorder had on the 
ability of Maojiawan to make policy. As second in command of the Party, Lin held a 
formal position that demanded intelligent and assertive decision-making skills, especially 
since it was during the paranoid Cultural Revolution period. Since Lin lacked the 
necessary social tools and overall political acumen to function within his role, the reigns 
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needed to be controlled by someone else. Lin’s wife Ye Qun played a dominant and 
commanding role as she would ba guan (guard the pass). With her increased stature that 
resulted from Lin’s rise and concomitant inability to appropriately administer major 
political matters, Ye did her best to continually enhance the power for herself and for 
Maojiawan. While one can certainly argue that Ye was fighting for her family’s survival 
during a period that when any misstep could lead to one’s downfall, Ye clearly made use 
of the power that came with her position as she personally aided in the removal of several 
potentially jeopardizing Party members and enemies of Jiang Qing and the CCRG. Lu 
Dingyi, Yan Weibing, Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin were all figures that Ye sought to 
eliminate with maximum prejudice. Ye also sought to maintain favorable relations with 
Jiang Qing and the powerful CCRG by craftily sneaking away at various times from 
Maojiawan and the uncommunicative Lin Biao. Lin’s aloofness caused by his schizoid 
personality and social anxiety disorder thus enabled Ye to operate on the level that she 
wanted, a level that led to a tremendous consolidation of power for Maojiawan, but also 
contributed to the eventual downfall of the family. 
 The third conclusion that can be made is the consistent role that Jiang Qing and 
the CCRG played in Cultural Revolution politics. In the case against He Long, Luo 
Ruiqing, and Fu Chongbi, the CCRG is seen as the primary actor in the political melee. 
Lin Biao’s role, for what its worth, is seen as peripheral. Lin did not initiate nor show any 
overt emotion to the removal of any of the aforementioned Party figures. Lin merely 
echoed existing rhetoric in public that backed the strategic political attacks made by the 
CCRG. When combining the public support from Lin Biao to the CCRG as well as the 
construction of a firm and supportive relationship between Maojiawan and Diaoyutai 
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covertly created by Ye Qun, it is evident how easily and quickly false perceptions can be 
formed. The assumption that is formed is that Lin Biao, since he both lauded the CCRG 
in public and formed a strong relationship with CCRG members in public, is naturally 
associated with all political maneuvers made by Diaoyutai. This historical picture though 
is obviously flawed as it completely disregards Lin’s own personal views of Diaoyutai as 
well as the close relationship that Ye, not Lin, forged with Jiang Qing.  
 Whatever support Lin showed for the Cultural Revolution was conduced by the 
political context in which he existed. The leading figure that always needed to be 
considered before making any decision was the prodigious and sagacious Chairman Mao. 
When considering Mao’s decisions and political barometer that always needed to be 
interpreted, Lin’s public image should drastically be reconsidered. As we witnessed 
numerous times, Lin’s tacit approval for certain Party policies and for CCRG radicalism, 
appears as always closely following the Chairman’s own position on the matter. As Lin 
Biao once remarked, “If the Chairman agrees, I agree.” In addition, Lin’s political 
activity, when he did act politically, was primarily reactive rather than proactive.  
 This chapter has also illustrated how easily the images of individuals can be 
grossly misconstrued if based only on the behavior displayed in public. As witnessed 
with Lin Biao, a deeper story is present, one that involves the inner complexities of a 
troubled mind as well as the enabling affect that Lin’s personality deficiencies had on the 
role of his wife. What can be clearly concluded from this chapter is that Lin Biao’s 
position in the reviewed cases is peripheral at best. Although we cannot completely 
exonerate Lin from these cases, as it is clear he did have some knowledge of the events 
occurring, the level of blame that has been traditionally placed on Lin’s shoulders should 
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be reconsidered as Ye Qun and the CCRG seem to be the primary culprits in the political 
































Conclusion: Bringing the Inside Out 
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This study has explored and analyzed the most intimate details of Lin Biao, one of 
modern China’s most enigmatic figures. By probing the discreet personal lifestyle of Lin 
Biao, this study has examined Lin Biao through a private lens, a lens that has not been 
mucked and clouded by the orthodox interpretations and biases of public analyses. In the 
broadest of terms, this review and close scrutiny of the evidence has revealed several 
major points. First, Lin Biao’s role in policy-planning and policymaking on the domestic, 
economic, and foreign policy fronts during the Cultural Revolution is virtually 
nonexistent due to his schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder. As 
witnessed in several instances in the recollections of Zhang Yunsheng, Lin Biao 
exhibited an attitude colored with listlessness and a distinct detachment from the daily 
reports and briefings on policy, both foreign and domestic, which were given to him. The 
harsh and rough dismissal of Party figures and PLA comrades that Lin knew well, and 
who were perceived as potential challenges to his own consolidation of power, was 
managed by Ye Qun, Jiang Qing, the CCRG, or Mao. The degree of Lin’s knowledge 
regarding these removals cannot be precisely measured; however, it can be argued that a 
certain degree of the deluge of petty personal squabbles, scuttlebutts, and plotting by Ye 
Qun and the CCRG were kept from Lin Biao. Moreover, Lin’s disconnection from social 
contact caused by his schizoid personality and social anxieties disintegrated chances that 
Lin had at keeping running tabs of the political eruptions occurring around China and 
what his wife was up to. When Lin did learn of radical surges, he almost always lacked 
any specific opinion regarding what policy direction should be taken. When some degree 
of action did take place on Lin’s part, he contradicts the image that is normally conjured, 
as Lin was not always the bastion of revolutionary ideals, but actually exhibited 
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tendencies to curb excessive violence such as publishing the Eight Points and writing a 
personal letter to Mao requesting that the “arming of the left” be reconsidered. In 
addition, Lin’s actions during the Cultural Revolution that could be interpreted as 
“radical” were usually reactive rather than proactive. Lin rarely held the initiative in any 
petty, political squabble, instead usually choosing to follow in the political footsteps of 
another or by simply agreeing with whatever suggestion came to him. The position of Lin 
following policy suggestions and being easily swayed is a further illustration of Lin’s 
schizoid personality, as schizoid personalities typically do not have a particular opinion 
or stance toward external events and stimuli. 
 The brief points listed above support the argument that Lin Biao was diffident 
toward politics, that he chose to remain aloof from the political storm and whirlpool that 
one could drown in during the Cultural Revolution. In this argument Lin can be perceived 
as cleverly sitting on the side and “letting the tigers fight.” As Lin Biao told his close 
friend Tao Zhu, summarizing his political strategy, in December 1966 and again in 
January 1967, “Be passive, passive, and again passive.”
259
 There is certainly validity in 
this argument. There is also no doubt that this is a consistent theme that has been weaved 
throughout this study. But despite the cogency in this claim, the argument may still be 
perceived by many historians as lacking the necessary evidence to draw a decisive 
conclusion. For instance, as most historians would legitimately argue, even though it is 
evident that Lin Biao shied away from attending public denunciations of his supposed 
political enemies this does not legitimately exonerate Lin nor does it confirm that Lin 
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knew nothing of the ongoing political debacles, or even that he did not want their 
downfall.  
The key to understanding Lin’s role or lack thereof during the Cultural 
Revolution, are the personality and behaviors he demonstrated in chapter 2. As observed 
in the evidence that is currently available, Lin Biao displayed distinctive traits that meet 
the criteria for both schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder cited in the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM). The former disorder is characterized by displaying 
little or no emotion whatsoever due to the failure of a successful development of the self. 
The latter disorder is composed by a fear of social situations where the sufferer would 
often display anxious behaviors or in some instances excessive sweating. Lin loathed 
meeting with personnel for any extensive length of time, when meeting with his staff 
members he either fought excessive perspiration or displayed obsessive tendencies which 
can be viewed as being linked to nervousness or anxiety. Lin preferred being alone, 
sitting in solitude in a bare bedroom with curtains drawn, limiting his social contact to 
occasional chats with Ye Qun.  Even Lin’s daughter and son had little contact with their 
father. When public appearances were absolutely necessary, Lin did not withhold his 
reluctance to attend and was even given a narcotic in one known reported instance in 
order to “perk” him up. Aside from the periodic anxious displays of behavior during his 
daily meetings, Lin virtually showed no emotion or interest when hearing the reports of 
the current political situation from his secretaries.  
What is also consistent throughout this study is that Lin Biao always presented an 
element of ambivalence in his behavior. This irresolute and uncertainly is closely linked 
again to Lin’s schizoid personality disorder. Lin would rarely make a decision that was 
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based on his deductions and values. As seen in numerous instances, Ye Qun would nearly 
always insert her own feelings and opinion on any matter that may come Lin’s way, 
whether it is in terms of policy or private matters of the family. Lin Biao, always 
indecisive, would almost always agree to Ye’s suggestions no matter how antagonistic or 
counteractive they may be to the situation; Lin would rarely consider the consequences to 
her suggestions and the incapacitating affect they may have on policy or on Party 
members. A case might be made that Ye’s decisions and input occurred on matters that 
could be considered minor. However, Lin’s promulgation of the Eight Points is a vivid 
example of Lin taking direction at the bequest of another. Lin responded to Xu’s pleas 
about excessive revolutionary violence by writing a personal letter to the Chairman and 
also writing down seven points for Mao to review. That Lin did this after hearing Xu’s 
pleas smacks of Lin’s irresolute and constantly wavering attitude, Lin would almost 
always follow the suggestions of others due to his inability to formulate specific, firm 
decisions. This dysfunction, again, based on existing evidence is rooted in Lin’s schizoid 
personality disorder. Lin’s unsure attitude is seen further when contemplating his 
reactions to the Chairman. In the previous chapter, Lin would never challenge the 
authority of the Chairman and would simply mark tongyi (agree) on nearly every 
document that passed through his hands. While this image unquestionably aims to 
corroborate the argument presented by Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, who argue that 
politics in Maoist China were similar to the politics at an Emperor’s court, it also 
represents the indetermination that Lin had in his personality. In many ways, Lin’s 
actions may be perceived as only reactions. On the rare occasions when Lin is seen 
formulating an opinion, it was kept to himself, as these positions were all anti-Maoist and 
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viewed by Maojiawan staff members in Lin’s diary. The ambivalence that fills the mood 
of the private interactions and meetings with Lin Biao are examples of Lin’s schizoid 
personality disorder, which clearly affected his ability to judge and assess the crucial 
aspects of Chinese elite politics as well as keep abreast of the current situation.    
 The importance of Lin’s personality blots are further enhanced when 
contemplating the enabling affect it had on Ye Qun. In a sense, Lin himself was an 
enabler. Lin enabled Ye Qun so that he could remain disabled. This was not done 
intentionally on Lin’s part but rather was caused by Lin’s schizoid personality and social 
anxiety disorders. For Lin, his wife was a seemingly perfect substitute to act on his 
behalf, as she seemed to have a great interest in politics and was a vibrant, energetic 
woman. As seen in both chapters 2 and 3, Ye’s persona and overall behavior contrasted 
as much as day and night when compared to Lin. Even though Ye held no true formal 
power or influence over top-ranking Party members, she still served in several key 
positions on behalf of Lin Biao. As a pragmatic and smart political tactician, Ye managed 
the affairs of Lin’s family and kept track of the current political trends of the time period. 
Ye was a ball of energy who was filled with curiosity, a gossiper who did her best to be 
informed of political knowledge. Ye was a stickler for details, one who strived to obtain 
the latest news from the political turf wars between Diaoyutai and the so-called Cultural 
Revolution “conservatives.” While it could be viewed that Ye was only doing her best to 
insure the safety and continued foundation of her family who was devoid of a capable 
leader, Ye undoubtedly took advantage of the destabilized and excessively radical 
national situation. Ye exercised the advantages of the growing instability during the 
Cultural Revolution in order to remove those Party members who she held personal 
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animosities toward such as Lu Dingyi and his wife Yan Weibing. Thus, given Ye’s 
outgoing and vibrant personality and Lin’s reclusive solitude, this study has also 
attempted to illustrate who the true manipulator of events were behind the closed doors of 
Maojiawan. Whether Ye kept details from Lin intentionally or if she simply decided not 
to disclose the facts to Lin since she knew he would be indifferent anyway is open to 
interpretation. However, painted in any color, the illustration carries the same message, 
that is Lin Biao, who suffered from two personality disorders which affected his ability to 
function properly in his position as Vice Chairman, gave operational authority to his wife 
Ye Qun, who utilized this founded power to its maximum in order to enhance the 
political stature and position of the Lin Biao family.        
In the introduction to this study the infamous September 13 incident was briefly 
mentioned. Since the incident challenged the very legitimacy of the Chairman’s rule, 
Lin’s death quickly became taboo with very little discussion of the alleged incident 
amongst the Chinese people. The incident itself has become nearly legendary, with a 
variety of interpretations of what “really” happened on the fateful evening/early morning 
of September 12 and September 13. A key problem with reexamining the current existing 
evidence is that so much conspiracy and controversy surrounds the subject that achieving 
an accurate historical account of the incident becomes nearly impossible. This study has 
not dissected the existing evidence on the September 13 incident, but it has opened the 
door to understanding the persona of Lin Biao. This study has stressed the indifferent, 
aloof, introverted, gormless nature of Lin Biao. As observed, Lin was a man who 
preferred privacy, a man who disliked making public appearances, a man who could 
barely withstand a thirty minute meeting with his staff members, and a man who held no 
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interest in politics. The Lin Biao revealed throughout this study is not the portrait of a 
power-hungry politician who hoped to take over the position as Chairman, thereby 
becoming the emperor of contemporary China. The question must certainly be posed 
then, is the Lin Biao portrayed in this study the cunning and crafty tactician who sought 
to assassinate Mao and, after that failed attempt, tried to flee China? Within the realm of 
the September 13 incident, this study has challenged these norms of thinking. 
The Tragedy of Lin Biao 
 In 1996 Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun published The Tragedy of Lin Biao, the 
first “revisionist” study of Lin Biao to appear in Western scholarship. In similar aspects, 
Teiwes and Sun examined Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution period, directing their 
attention to the political behavior of Lin but ignoring the behavioral characteristics that 
we have examined.  In 1999 Jin Qiu, daughter of PLAAF commander Wu Faxian, 
followed in the footsteps of Teiwes and Sun by publishing The Culture of Power, which 
offered a new, detailed, minute-by-minute description of the evening of Lin Biao’s fateful 
flight. In both works Lin Biao is portrayed as a tragic figure. Teiwes and Sun assert very 
intelligently that Lin Biao’s tragedy was circumstantial, that Lin was forced into a high 
ranking political position against his own wishes, that he was thrust into Mao’s harsh 
political games of Chinese elite politics during the country’s most volatile and paranoid 
period. Volition, according to Teiwes and Sun, existed only in the hands of the Chairman, 
leaving Lin little choice but to loyally follow. Jin Qiu argued that the tragedy of Lin was 
his inability to control his family as both Ye Qun and Lin Liguo allegedly plotted to 
assassinate the Chairman covertly without Lin’s knowledge. But the tragedy of Lin Biao 
began at a much earlier point in time.   
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 Like the revisionist pieces published by Teiwes, Sun, and Jin, this study also has 
broadcasted a tragic message throughout its analysis. Similar to Teiwes and Sun, this 
study has buttressed the position that Lin Biao was a victim of circumstance during the 
Cultural Revolution. However, what exacerbates the tragedy of Lin’s circumstance is the 
material presented in this piece. Lin was placed into a position that he by no means was 
prepared to perform at the appropriate level, either mentally or physically. As Vice 
Chairman, Lin needed to follow and remain well aware of the constant shifts in the 
political storm that was ensuing during his tenure. But being the deeply disturbed man 
that he was, Lin Biao could not function effectively in his role as Vice Chairman and 
carefully follow the storms of both the subtle and overt shifts of the Chairman. Based on 
existing evidence the two disorders that Lin had, schizoid personality disorder and social 
anxiety disorder, crippled his ability to affectively play the elite political game of Maoist 
politics during the Cultural Revolution. Lin was withdrawn, aloof, and resisted social 
contact. Lin showed little emotional feeling toward anything and thus was muzzled from 
making distinct and valuable decisions when the need arose. The consequences were 
staggering as Lin rarely would receive the information he should have received. Lin was 
also a politically malleable figure as his opinion could be finessed and refined to suit 
whoever wanted his blessing or to have Lin perform a particular political task. The 
immeasurable psychological impact of being forced into such a role, which demanded 
such careful tip-toeing around the wishes of the Chairman, did not help matters, 
especially when considering the constant anxieties that Lin was forced to deal with on a 
personal level. Amidst the tumultuous and violent times that the people of China lived 
through during the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao was battling his own personal war 
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within himself. The personal deficiencies that Lin dealt with, seen in this study, thus only 
heighten the tragic level of his tale.  
 What must also be considered is the fact that Lin Biao and his family had very 
little communication. The family unit was indeed dysfunctional. Lin’s troubled and 
disturbed personality severed any possibility for intimacy with his wife and family. 
Moreover, Ye’s demonstrative behavior did little to attract the attention of her daughter, 
Lin Doudou. At a time period when close intimacy to reinforce a strong level of political 
acumen was necessary, the Lin Biao family lacked this much needed survival tool.   
 Apart from the elements of Lin Biao’s personality which only enhance his tragic 
tale, another tragedy is our own ignorance toward the case. Until this study, Western and 
Chinese scholarship has only viewed Lin Biao through a public lens, largely ignoring the 
private Lin Biao that is exposed by Zhang Yunsheng. This study has revealed that the 
public heavily contrasts with the private, that beneath Lin’s public image as a military 
hero who appeared responsible in his position, a lauding champion for Chairman Mao 
and Mao Zedong Thought, laid a man who held vastly different views but was deeply 
disturbed psychologically that he would rarely express or have a policy position or pay 
attention to politics. Beneath the public was a sub-text that was filled with complexities 
and a problematic persona. Also, Mao used Lin Biao as his political sniper to remove 
Peng Dehuai from his position as Defense Minister. Assuming that the Chairman knew of 
Lin’s plights, Lin’s tale becomes even more tragic.
260
 Not only does Lin merely represent 
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a pawn, a toy soldier of sorts, to help carry out Mao’s revolutionary chimera, but it also 
overtly states that the inner complexities and problems of one man were completely 
ignored by another in order to fulfill his own wishes. It is entirely possible that the 
Chairman knew that Lin’s health would be advantageous to him. Mao, after feeling the 
thunderous criticism from Peng over the Great Leap, wanted somebody next to him in the 
Party that would not dare challenge his authority and wishes. Mao chose Lin since he 
knew of Lin’s socially dislocated and easily swayable personality—a personality that 
contrasted the rough, tough, bulldog like personality of Peng Dehuai. Lin Biao’s schizoid 
personality disorder and social anxiety disorder was a double-edged sword for Lin, as 
they contributed to his eventual downfall but also aided him in his ascendancy to power. 
Chairman Mao, China’s last emperor, not conceding to the potential feelings or 
reservations that Lin might have did not matter as the Chairman was the omnipotent force 
whose wishes and deepest desires for political power and unquestioned authority were the 
only things to be concerned about. The Chairman was the epicenter of modern China, 
whatever the Chairman desired, the Chairman received. Like planets revolving around 
the sun, Party members were required to loyally abide by the Chairman’s wishes. In this 




Arguably, what seems most tragic about the tale of Lin Biao is the lack of clear 
understanding of the depths of this man. This is further heightened for the Chinese 
people, who are bound by the public images of those who are in power. The deification of 
men in power is a cultural throwback which has historically been part of the long-held 
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tradition that those in power are omnipotent rulers who will guide the kingdom. This 
view applies to Lin Biao, who is believed to be the evil genius behind the purge and 
removal of many men, a diabolic craftsman of terror. But as this study has revealed, a 
profound secret life existed beneath the man who stood atop the rostrum at Tiananmen 
side-by-side with the Chairman, a private life which divulges a distressed and 
overwrought persona who could hardly cope with the daily tolls that his position 
demanded. It is here where the tragedy truly lies, that certain perceptions for so long of 
Lin have been shaped by the public pictures and appearances that form peoples’ beliefs. 
We have consequently ignored, to a very large degree, the convolution that existed 
beneath Lin. This curious subtext rests within all of us. Until the public begins to direct 
its attention to the elaborate elements that compose human beings, people may never 
truly understand the depths of themselves. For the case of Lin Biao, further studies should 
be directed to understanding the inner-battle that he faced and was forced to cope with 
while serving in a position that he never wished for. Scholars should continue to strive to 
seek an understanding of the disorders that he lived with and what caused them. As 
scholars enhance their understanding of the depths of this man, the public’s knowledge 
will also grow regarding the degree of Lin’s supposed involvement in Mao’s Cultural 
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 Any attempt at unveiling the curtain that cloaks the personal lifestyle of an 
individual is a daunting task. When the personality for examination is the already 
historically enigmatic Lin Biao, the task seems infeasible and consistently disrupted by 
the politically sensitive nature that surrounds his tale. Indeed, the question arose shortly 
following Lin’s demise on that fateful morning of September 13, 1971 of how Lin Biao, 
the closest comrade in arms to Mao and the greatest extoller of Mao Zedong thought, 
could betray the Chairman? The event indeed was groundbreaking. The consequences of 
such an event could have shaken the foundations of the Party and the faith that had been 
placed in China’s modern emperor: Mao Zedong. Since such political weight is placed on 
the incident, the tendency that consequently arose in scholarship shortly following the 
incident is the pervasive and omnipresent view that Lin was evil, and efforts to protect 
the personalities of Mao and Zhou Enlai during the Cultural Revolution period became 
the general bias.  
As with many cases in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history, historians are 
limited to what the CCP chooses to release. Open sources (kaibu) that would generally be 
considered key evidence is often infected with political slants or questionable validity. 
For instance, the infamous trial that investigated the alleged Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
cliques from November 1980 to January 1981, which would normally be considered as 
filled with pertinent information, should actually be viewed as questionable testimonies. 
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) commander Wu Faxian, while on trial 
from November 1980 to January 1981, accused of assisting Lin Biao in his strive for 
power, simply agreed to the charges against him. Taking into account the nine years Wu 
had already been in custody following the alleged September 13 incident and the 
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fabricating laden nature of the Chinese judicial system, Wu could expect to spend the 
next nine years in jail unless remission was granted. Wu took the passive path; his 
statements were feeble and non-confrontational stating, “The Prosecutor’s account of my 
crimes is all based on fact, as is the evidence. I have confessed to them already. I have no 
submission to make. My crimes have been described with absolute accuracy!”
262
 In 
contrast to this official statement however, one historian noted to me that Wu would 
never had opposed Chairman Mao, and if Lin Biao had ever hatched a plan to assassinate 
the Chairman he would have opposed Lin and informed either Zhou Enlai or Mao of 
Lin’s intentions.
263
 Other materials, such as the infamous document detailing Lin’s plan 
for a coup entitled “An Outline of Project 571” are of questionable validity and appear to 
be fabricated, especially when considering its discovery in November 1971, two months 
following the September incident.
264
 In addition, the document, even if it were authentic 
though likely not, was a piece of torn notebook paper with a few quick notes written upon 
it, hardly sufficient planning for a group attempting to assassinate China’s most closely 
guarded individual: Chairman Mao.      
Further occlusions occur with the availability of new source material. Since there 
is a heightened political sensitivity surrounding the Lin Biao case, historical materials are 
virtually nonexistent and CCP archives, unlike archives in the West, cannot be accessed 
for research of any kind. Moreover, the events that surround Lin Biao are tainted in some 
ways by the Cultural Revolution period. General biases of the period seep into most 
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analyses that are available. The events of the period itself are inherently confusing, with 
sources contradicting each other making the historical picture murky.  
In addition, Lin Biao does not possess the same charm, intellectual stimuli, and 
enhanced status of Mao that drove reporters such as Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, and 
Robert Payne to the remote Communist base camp of Yan’an. Eyewitness accounts of the 
period do not focus heavily on Lin Biao but seem to target Mao. Moreover, unlike Mao, 
there exists no record by any personal friends that Lin had known during his youth.
265
 No 
guilt by any means should be placed on these reports or lack thereof, but how the content 
continuously revolves around Mao is an illustration that studies on the Chairman may be 
less challenging in certain circumstances than other Party figures. Indeed, there is no 
dearth of sources on Mao, but for military heroes such as Lin Biao, the reality is painfully 
obvious with an extremely incomplete picture.  
Despite these setbacks, the Lin Biao incident and the figure of Lin Biao has 
received increasing attention in both Western and Chinese scholastic arenas. Part of this 
renewed interest is due to the increasingly open and less hush-hush academic atmosphere 
of the Deng era. Historical objectivity has become a key focus as the CCP follows the 
dictum “seeking truth from facts,” renewing their previously held beliefs on Party history 
and posthumously recognizing those Party members that had been thoroughly criticized, 
denounced, and purged from their positions during the Cultural Revolution. The 
“Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the 
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People’s Republic of China,” adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee and published in 1981, recognized, for instance, that “the so-called 
bourgeois headquarters inside the Party headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping simply 
did not exist,”
266
 therefore refuting officially held positions during the Cultural 
Revolution. Such reexaminations are attributed to the Dengist era; nevertheless official 
Party positions surrounding Lin Biao remain mostly unchanged.  
Newly published materials in China though begin to challenge and negate 
traditional Party positions of Lin Biao’s history. The fact that studies dating from 1989 to 
2005 that expose and contradict Lin Biao’s official history, which continue to be 
published in China without any apparent censorship, does smack of non-official 
recognition by the Party of a new historical interpretation of Lin Biao’s case. Scholars are 
beginning to find new primary sources that expose the private lives of CCP leaders. Oral 
accounts are becoming increasingly available as well, as individuals who participated in 
events are more willing to talk about their experiences now more than ever. With the 
absence of access to Chinese archives, these sources are invaluable for any contemporary 
Chinese historian as they offer a contrasting historical image of China’s leaders than 
those commonly remembered and known through public exposure.     
The primary sources for exposing the private life of Lin Biao are seen in the 
personal memoirs by his secretaries and servants. These sources are valuable because of 
the close interpersonal relationships and ties that are commonly forged between 
secretaries and their shouzhangs. As Mao noted about one of his own secretaries, Quan 
Yanzhi, “there are no secrets about me or my family that I can hide from you even if I 
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can hide them from heaven or earth.”
267
 The personal life of Lin Biao is exposed by the 
memoirs of Zhang Yunsheng in Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu (True Account 
of Maojiawan; The Reminiscences of Lin Biao’s Secretary). Zhang, a military officer 
from the Shenyang Military Region and Lin Biao’s old Fourth Field Army, served as one 
of Lin Biao’s personal secretaries from 1966 to late 1970. As a secretary, Zhang and his 
fellow factotums were officially responsible for a variety of duties that are traditionally 
given to a secretary including: speech drafting; looking after the work environment and 
personal life of leaders including housing, transport, food, health care, recreation, to co-
ordinate working and interpersonal relationships among leaders; to organize conferences 
and arrange leaders’ activities, and to read and summarize daily domestic and foreign 
newsworthy events.
268
 Zhang’s position within the Lin household provides us with a 
perfect aperture to view the personal life of Lin Biao and his family. The details Zhang 
provides are tantalizing and parallel Western tabloids possessing a voyeuristic tone 
throughout the bulk of the text. Very little historical or political analysis is present in 
Zhang’s record. Zhang’s memoir is not mere propaganda nor does it seem to have an 
overt political slant; although Zhang is sympathetic toward his former shouzhang. 
Zhang’s memoir divulges striking personality blots possessed by Lin and the 
domineering personality of Ye Qun, Lin’s wife and manager of his personal office. The 
source is invaluable as it is the best window into the inner life of the Lin residence and 
provides us with a legitimate account of the personal lifestyle of Lin Biao. Zhang’s 
account thus contrats with the vitriolic denunciations that accompany more traditional 
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CCP examinations of Lin. Although the piece is peppered with Zhang occasionally 
carrying a task out for Ye Qun or meeting with Lin Biao, Zhang does not portray himself 
as the outstanding secretary that performed endless duties and yeomen services for his 
shouzhang. It is this aspect that tends to lend increased credibility to Zhang’s tale, as a 
careful reading suggests he does not perform the usual self-aggrandizement that normally 
accompanies mishu memoirs.    
Guan Weixun’s Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun (Ye Qun According to Me) is similar, 
though not as lengthy and enriched as Zhang’s documentation. Guan held the position as 
deputy director of the army’s cultural arts bureau and resided in the Lin residence from 
1968 to 1971. He was responsible to read and educate Ye Qun on both Western and 
Chinese classical literature. Guan’s information is credible and enriches our 
understanding of the personal lifestyles of elites within the CCP. His memoir also 
includes several valuable interviews he conducted with Lin Biao’s daughter Lin Liheng 
(Lin Doudou) in the 1980s. 
Jiao Ye’s fantastic study Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhong de Ye Qun yu Lin 
Biao (The Riddle of Ye Qun: A secretaries reflections of Lin Biao and Ye Qun) is a 
detailed oral history. Jiao interviewed a number of personal staff members to Ye Qun and 
Lin Biao. The majority of recollections and invaluable information came from the mouth 
of Ye Qun who would gossip wildly about certain issues. These secretaries also 
constantly lived with Ye’s vents of spleen that would engulf her completely and 
consequently lead to intimate conversations with her secretaries to aid in calming Ye 
down. It is during these therapeutic-like sessions that Ye would spill information and 
offer some juicy tidbits about herself, Lin Biao, or other Party members. These 
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eyewitness accounts complement Zhang’s memoir and offer insight and details into an 
otherwise impenetrable world.  
In addition to the memoirs mentioned above, Chinese scholars have made major 
strides in publishing scholastic studies of Lin Biao that offer analysis that is objective and 
not peppered with political undertones. Li Tianmin’s Lin Biao pingzhuan (A Critical 
Biography of Lin Biao) was published in 1979 in Hong Kong. Even though its insight is 
limited to the extremely sensitive political nature surrounding Lin Biao and Party history 
in general during the time of its publication, it still holds water today and is a valuable 
resource for Lin’s earlier life. However, like most CCP elite studies of the 1960s and 
1970s, the study is simply filled with information and aggregate data, primarily 
concerned with understanding the personalities that are at the apex of the CCP. Basing 
most of its evidence on provincial origin and revolutionary experience, these studies 
stressed the Chinese cultural importance of guanxi or connections in CCP politics but 
offered little or no analysis of the data they provided.   
One of the latest editions in Lin Biao literature is Shao Hua’s Lin Biao de zhe 
yisheng (Such as Lin Biao’s Life). Shao’s study is filled with personal interviews of Lin’s 
closest childhood friends and is also the latest account of Lin Biao’s life that is published 
in the PRC. However, Shao’s study still carries the heavy political undertones so 
common in PRC publications, as Lin Biao is seen as a revolutionary hero but quickly 
took to political assassinations against presumed enemies in the Party during the Cultural 
Revolution. Not only does Shao largely follow the traditional interpretation but he also 
offers no analysis of how Lin made the so-called dramatic transformation from military 
God to political sniper. Also new to Lin Biao studies is Shu Yun’s comprehensive study 
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Lin Biao shijian wanzheng diaocha (A Complete Investigation of the Lin Biao Incident) 
published in 2006, and Wu Runsheng’s Lin Biao yu wenhua da geming (Lin Biao and the 
Cultural Revolution). Both are published by Mirror Books and sway heavily away from 
the traditional interpretations held by the Party and most Western scholarship.   
Western sources have performed surprisingly little research about Lin Biao. This 
stems largely from the typical stereotype that is exuded by so many toward the Lin Biao 
topic: there are no sources. As indicated above, since Deng’s reforms and the lessened 
pressure and control within the Chinese academic arena, publications have become 
available that tackle Lin Biao. All one must do is to be able to read Chinese. Citizens in 
China who knew Lin are also more open to speaking out. The hardships that Chinese 
scholars faced during the 1960’s, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, is painfully 
obvious by earlier Western studies of Lin Biao. The general bias seen in Western 
accounts can be illuminated by Martin Ebon’s Lin Piao: The Life and Writings of China’s 
New Ruler. The only redeeming value of Ebon’s work is the collection of Lin’s speeches 
compiled and inserted in the second half of the book which at the time of its publication 
were no doubt valuable. But his analysis is based solely on the public Lin Biao, the figure 
seen standing next to the Chairman, extolling the Four Greats, and always grasping the 
Little Red Book. The publisher even claims that Ebon’s book is “without doubt of major 
importance to the security of the Western world.” Even Lin’s writings are labeled as Lin 
Biao’s “Mein Kampf and can be ignored only at our extreme peril.” These statements are 
obvious reflections of a Cold War mindset. But their importance pertaining to this study 
is that, as we will see, the public and private greatly differ, particularly with regard to Lin 
Biao.  
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Fortunately, Western scholarship has progressed and the two newest studies of 
Lin Biao are stimulating and inspirational for the author of this study. Frederick Teiwes 
and Warren Sun’s The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural 
Revolution gives an extremely detailed analysis of Lin Biao’s life during the Cultural 
Revolution and challenging traditional assumptions of key Cultural Revolution events 
and Lin Biao’s level of guilt based on Party history. The second work is Jin Qiu’s The 
Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution. Published in 1998, 
Jin’s piece is the latest Western account that examines the Lin Biao incident. Unlike 
Teiwes and Sun, Jin’s study does not deeply analyze particular Cultural Revolution 
events, instead Jin opts to primarily give her attention to the actual “Lin Biao Incident” 
that occurred on the tragic evening of September 12, 1971. Jin argues in her persuasive 
hour-by-hour account of the evening of September 12, 1971 that Ye Qun and Lin Biao’s 
son Lin Liguo both planned to take Lin Biao from Beidaihe to Guangzhou or to Dalian, 
the latter is where Lin Biao was more prepared to go. Lin Liheng (Lin Doudou) informed 
Zhou Enlai and members of Unit 8341, Mao’s central bodyguard unit, of Ye and Lin’s 
intended plans. After Zhou relayed the message to Mao and inquired if Lin’s plane 
should be intercepted, Mao refused, saying “Rain will fall, widows will remarry. What 
can we do? Let him go.” Jin’s account is based on both Chinese and Western sources as 
well as first hand interviews with Lin Doudou. Jin also utilizes unpublished source 
material such as Wu Faxian’s own recollections of the event to which she, being Wu’s 
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